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ABSTRACT  
 
 Beginning in the 1980s, the term hate crime became part of the research canon of 
criminologists across the United States.  Researchers have examined the characteristics of 
hate crime victims, offenders, and offenses.  However, little is known about the context 
of hate crime, and more specifically about the ways that the changing demographics of 
the United States have contributed to hate crime.  The dissertation examines the 
relationship between these demographic shifts and the trend in hate crime from 2000 to 
2007 through the use of population averaged panel models.  These models assess changes 
over time and across place in the number of hate crimes in a state as a function of 
changing demographic, economic, and political conditions.   
 The findings show that there is considerable variation in anti-Black, anti-
Hispanic, and anti-Gay/Lesbian hate crime across states and over time.  These differing 
trends can be explained by changing demographic patterns as well as the political 
mobilization and visibility of minority groups.  However, the results also suggest that 
much of the trend in hate crime is explained by the reporting practices of the differing 
states.  As such the results indicate a need for policies to strengthen the reporting 
practices of law enforcement organizations and encourage reporting by the victims of 
these types of crimes.  Additionally, the results suggest that there is a growing need for 
better data for the further examination of these questions.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Hate crimes
1
 are committed by an individual or group because of a characteristic 
of the victim or their group position.  In other words hate crimes are not only an attack on 
or a threat against the single victim, but often times are threatening to the entire group or 
community in which the victim belongs.  For this reason, these crimes may have more 
severe consequences than similar crimes that are not motivated by some bias.  As such, it 
is important to understand the causes and correlates of hate crime at the individual and 
macro level in order to inform policy and practice with the purpose of preventing hate 
crime.      
 Prior research on hate crime has focused primarily on the individual or the 
incident.  This research has looked at the effects of the crime on the victim (Garnets, 
Herek, & Levy, 1992), the types of offenders (McDevitt, Levin, & Bennett 2002), and 
even the characteristics of the criminal incidents (Messner, McHugh, & Felson, 2004).  
At the macro level, studies have looked at within jurisdiction counts of racially 
motivated, primarily anti-black, hate crime (Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998b; Lyons, 
2007; Lyons, 2008).  This dissertation expands on prior research at the macro level by 
assessing the relationship between a variety of state characteristics and counts of hate 
crime from multiple states.   
                                                 
1
 The terms hate crime and bias crime are used interchangeably in this dissertation.  While these terms are 
often used to indicate the same set of actions, there are semantic differences.  ―Bias crimes‖ are typically 
crimes that occur because of a specific victim characteristic, such as religious affiliation, race, age, or 
sexual orientation.  The use of the term ―because of‖ allows for few assumptions about the motivation of 
the offender (Jenness and Grattet, 2001:87).  On the other hand, the term ―hate crime‖ assumes a 
motivation of hatred or animus on the part of the offender towards some characteristic, such as race, of the 
victim and assumes that it was this prejudice that was the impetus for the actions of the criminal.  (See 
Lawrence, 1999 for a more detailed discussion of the implications of this difference).  
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Three closely related theories have been applied in literature assessing the 
relationship between race and crime.  These are Blalock‘s minority threat; Suttles‘s 
defended neighborhoods, and Blau‘s macrostructural opportunity theory.   These theories 
propose relationships between the composition or distribution of race in an area and 
crime.  As such, these theories can be extended to examine the relationship between 
prejudice and crime.  
 This dissertation expands the application of minority threat beyond the black-
white relationship that has been the focus of the majority of prior research.  Specifically, 
the propositions of minority threat are applied to racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities.  
While minority threat has been assessed to a large extent in relation to racial minorities, 
and to some extent with ethnic minorities (specifically Hispanics), the propositions have 
rarely been applied to other minority, or subordinate, groups.   
  The primary research question for this project is: What explains the level of and 
change in hate crime in a state?  The propositions of Blalock‘s minority threat hypothesis 
are used as a guiding framework. 
 
DEFINING HATE CRIME 
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines a hate crime as ―crimes 
motivated by racial, religious, disability, sexual-orientation, and ethnicity/national origin 
biases‖ (FBI, 2000).  However, hate crimes can also be defined as a form of informal 
social control or as a manifestation of prejudice.  Both of these definitions have 
implications for the application of theory to the study of hate crime, and each is discussed 
below. 
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Hate Crime as Social Control 
 
 The term hate crime was not part of the legal landscape until the mid-1980s 
(Jacobs & Potter, 1998); however, the United States is no stranger to racially motivated 
violence.  In fact, one of the most prominent times in our country‘s history was during 
and after the Civil War, when many African-Americans were subjected to lynching.  
Research suggests that there is a link between the history of lynching in this country and 
the continued formal social control of blacks and other minority groups.  For instance, 
Zimring (2003) describes a relationship between past lynching and current capital 
punishment through the values of what he terms a ―vigilante influence‖.  Zimring 
suggests that the same values of vigilante justice that contributed to lynching a century 
ago today lead to the use of capital punishment.  Research also suggests a relationship 
between the past history of lynching and current hate crime.  For instance, King, 
Messner, and Baller (2009) find a positive relationship between past lynching and the 
frequency of reported hate crimes.  Researchers contend that hate crimes target entire 
groups as opposed to individuals and as such are ―a means of controlling the behavior of 
an entire group through intimidation and often violence‖ (King et al., 2009: 292).  Thus, 
it is possible to define hate crime as a form of social control; much like research has 
defined lynching as a form of social control (Tolnay & Beck, 1992).   
 There are two types of social control, formal and informal.  Formal social control 
is that which is exerted by the state, while informal social control is exerted by an 
―informal‖ entity, typically the family.  These are what Bursik and Grasmick (1993) refer 
to as private and public control.  Black (1998) refers to informal social control as ―self-
help‖.  Black suggests that crime may be used as a form of informal social control, or 
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self-help, when there is an absence of or a break down in formal social control.  Thus, it 
would follow that there would be more informal social control where there is less formal 
social control. 
While there is much debate about the definition of social control, one such 
definition comes from normative theory, which suggests that social control, whether 
formal or informal, is a tool used to bring behavior back within the normative guidelines 
defined by the group exerting the control, in other words the powerful group (Black, 
1976; Sutherland, Cressey, & Luckenbill, 1992).  To illustrate, take the example of 
homosexuality.  Formal and informal social control have been used in an effort to 
criminalize or demoralize homosexual behavior.  For example, formal laws criminalizing 
sodomy
2
 in several states (e.g., Fla. Stat. 800.02; Miss. Rev. Stat. 566-090) in essence 
criminalized the private sexual behavior of consenting adults, in most cases gay men.  
Similarly, after President Abraham Lincoln abolished slavery, laws were instituted in the 
South to prevent blacks from having the ability to vote.  These original grandfather 
clauses, requiring an individual to provide proof that their grandfather had the right to 
vote, were put into place by the white majority in an effort to keep blacks in the 
subordinate, and thus powerless, position that they had experienced during slavery.   
Hate crime is a form of informal social control, in that it is a tool used by 
members of the dominant group, whether white, wealthy, or heterosexual, in an attempt 
to bring the subordinate groups back into the normative guidelines as defined by the 
dominant group.  As with the previous examples, informal social control can be used to 
control behavior, for instance, as mentioned earlier the lynching of blacks was used for 
                                                 
2
 These laws were deemed unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 2003 (Lawrence v. 
Texas).  
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much of the late 1800s and the early part of the 20
th
 century to control the behavior, and 
diminish the competition, of blacks.   
 An alternative definition of social control characterizes control as a means to 
protect scarce resources.  This conception of social control suggests that those with power 
(i.e., the wealthy, the politically influential) will utilize social control, in most cases some 
form of punishment or law (i.e., formal social control) in order to maintain control over 
scarce resources.  These scarce resources include ―property, power, and status‖ (Tolnay 
& Beck, 1992) among others.  For instance, as Tolnay and Beck point out in their study 
of lynchings in the South, once blacks had access to scarce resources, that is, once blacks 
were no longer simply property, the dominant class (i.e. white, wealthy men) felt 
threatened and began using lynching (a form of informal social control) to prevent blacks 
from gaining access to these scarce resources.  Similarly, for the past decade the 
homosexual community in the United States, and many countries around the world, has 
been fighting for the right to marry.  The dominant group, in this case religious 
fundamentalists and political conservatives, has used social control in the form of 
proposed amendments to the US constitution and individual state constitutions to prevent 
the gay and lesbian community from obtaining this scarce resource.   
Hate Crime as a Manifestation of Prejudice 
   
 While hate crime has been defined as a form of social control it has also been 
deemed by some scholars as a form of prejudicial behavior.  In 1954, Gordon Allport 
suggested five manifestations of prejudice that vary in degree from ―the least energetic to 
the most‖ (1979:14).  At the lower end of this scale is what Allport termed ―antilocution‖, 
defined as a person simply talking about their antagonism freely with friends who share 
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similar beliefs.  The second type of prejudice is avoidance, specifically active avoidance 
of members of the disliked groups, ―even at the cost of considerable inconvenience‖ 
(1979:14).  Third is discrimination or the active exclusion of members of the disliked 
group from various groups or organizations, including employment, residential housing, 
political rights, and churches.  Fourth is physical attack.  ―Under conditions of heightened 
emotion prejudice may lead to acts of violence or semiviolence‖ (Allport, 1979: 15).  
Finally, at the extreme, is extermination, which as the term suggests involves the mass 
murder, or genocide, of an entire group.   
 Within this scale of acts of prejudice, hate crime would fall into the definition of 
physical attack with the more prejudiced individuals or groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan 
(KKK) and Hitler, advocating for the complete genocide of a group of people.  Although 
many hate crimes are not explicitly violent, that is they do not involve the assault of one 
individual by another, the attack of a religious institution such as a synagogue is still a 
physical attack on a group or more specifically a symbol of that group.    
 
CONTROLLING PREJUDICE 
  
 Over the course of the last century many attempts have been made by the 
legislatures of the United States and its component states to control prejudice and 
prejudicial behavior.  These laws have taken on many forms and the development has 
largely been guided by social movements, such as the civil rights movement, the 
women‘s rights movement, the victim‘s rights movement, and the gay and lesbian 
movement.   
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 These attempts to control prejudice began in the 1930s when Illinois passed a 
―group libel‖ statute in response to violent race rioting, which ―punished those who make 
bigoted ‗defamatory‘ statements against racial, religious, or ethnic groups‖ (Levin, 
2001:725).  However, these group libel statues were short lived.  This law was repealed 
in 1961. 
 Group libel statutes were followed by legislation that was aimed at the extremist 
groups, such as the KKK, which were then and are still associated with hate activities.  
These statutes included anti-masking laws and bans on these groups‘ ability to congregate 
or parade (Walker, 1994).  These anti-Klan statutes continued into the 1960s when the 
United States Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of laws criminalizing 
―terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform‖ (Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 1969). The justices deemed the laws unconstitutional. 
 During the 1960s, the focus of law makers turned to civil rights violations.  For 
instance, the Federally Protected Rights statute (18 U.S.C. § 245) was signed into law in 
1968.  This statute ―prohibits interference with voting, obtaining government or federally 
funded benefits or services, accessing federal employment, or participation in a federal 
jury…the law also punishes the interference with six other federally protected activities, 
but only when they are committed on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin‖ 
(Levin, 2001:740).   
 These civil rights violation statutes, along with the victim‘s rights movement and 
a growing emphasis on punitive action in the 1970s, culminated in the passage of hate 
crime laws in the early 1980s (Jenness & Grattet, 2001).  The first such law was passed in 
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1981 in Oregon and hate crime legislation quickly diffused across the United States 
(Grattet, Jenness, & Curry, 1998).    
 As with the earlier attempts to control prejudicial behavior, hate crime laws 
received constitutional setbacks during their early tenure.  First, the hate speech 
ordinance in St. Paul, Minnesota was ruled unconstitutional by the United States Supreme 
Court in 1992 (R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 1992).  In the same year, ―the Supreme Court 
overturned a death sentence that was imposed in part on the basis of a convict‘s 
membership in a White supremacist group‖ (Dawson v. Delaware, 1992).  However, in 
1993 just one year after the St. Paul statute was deemed unconstitutional, Wisconsin‘s 
penalty enhancement statute was upheld by the Supreme Court in a unanimous decision 
(Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 1993).   
In reversing the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme 
Court in an opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist cited three 
basic reasons for affirming the statute.  First, whereas the 
government may not punish abstract beliefs, it can punish a vast 
array of depraved motives.  The Court further found that penalty 
enhancement laws, unlike the statute at issue in R.A.V., did not 
prevent people from expressing their views or punish them for 
doing so.  Lastly, the Court pointed to the severity of hate crimes, 
stating that they are ―thought to be more likely to provoke 
retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harm on their victims 
and incite community unrest‖ (quoted in Levin, 2001:745).   
 
Following the decision in Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993), several states adopted or revised 
their hate crime statutes.  By 2003, forty-six states and the federal government had some 
form of hate or bias crime legislation on the books (Jacobs & Potter, 1998).   
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TYPES OF HATE CRIME LAW 
 
 While the term hate crime is often used in public discourse as a singular indicator 
for crimes motivated by hate, bias, or prejudice, the definition of this term in truth applies 
to a wide range of crimes.  These crimes are defined at two levels.  The United States 
federal government has two types of hate crime law: data collection statutes and criminal 
statutes.  Each state also has its own hate crime statute, taking one of five prominent 
forms: civil rights statutes, ―freestanding‖ statutes, ―coattailing‖ statutes, modifying 
statutes, and penalty enhancement statutes (Jenness & Grattet, 2001). 
Federal Hate Crime Law 
This bill… represents more than merely collecting data about 
incidents of racial, religious, and ethnically motivated violence.  It 
also will constitute a statement to the general public of our country 
that this Congress and this administration and, indeed, the State 
and local governments, will not tolerate further acts of violence. 
(quoted in Jenness & Grattet, 2001: 53)  
 
 The above quote comes from Arthur Green, the director of the Connecticut 
Commission on Human Rights, who testified at the first federal hearings on the proposed 
Hate Crime Statistics Act in 1985.  The act was not confirmed until 1990 after the FBI 
raised concerns about the enforceability of the bill.  The Hate Crime Statistics Act 
(HCSA) of 1990, signed into law by then President George H.W. Bush, requires the U.S. 
attorney general to collect data on hate crime.  This bill defines hate crime as ―crimes that 
manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, 
including where appropriate the crimes of murder; non-negligent manslaughter; forcible 
rape; aggravated assault; simple assault; intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage, or 
vandalism of property‖ (Public Law 101-275).  The law required this data collection 
effort to continue for four years.  In 1994, the Violent Crime Control and Law 
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Enforcement Act amended the HCSA.  This amendment added the protected category of 
disability (Public Law 103-322) and called for the collection of hate crime statistics ―for 
each calendar year‖ (Public Law 104-155).  This data collection mandate fell to the FBI‘s 
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program. 
 The second type of federal hate crime law, unlike the reporting statutes, attaches a 
criminal penalty to hate crimes.  In 1994, The Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act 
(HCSEA) defined eight predicate crimes for which judges could impose enhanced 
penalties.  These crimes included murder; non-negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; 
aggravated assault; simple assault; intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage, or 
vandalism of property.  The enhanced penalties the statute called for were limited to ―not 
less than three offense levels for offenses that a finder of fact at trial determines beyond a 
reasonable doubt are hate crimes‖ (Public Law 103-322).  Hate crime, for the purposes of 
the HCSEA, was defined as criminal conduct wherein ―the defendant intentionally 
selected any victim or property as the object of the offense because of the actual or 
perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual 
orientation of any person‖ (Public Law 103-322). While seemingly broad, this penalty 
enhancement statute only addresses ―those crimes that take place on federal lands and 
properties‖ (Jenness & Grattet, 2001:45).    
 For hate crimes that do not fall within the federal jurisdiction, the 50 States in the 
union have developed some form of hate crime law, many of which are similar to the 
federal penalty enhancement statute. 
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State Hate Crime Law 
 
 The state hate crime laws differ with respect to the status provisions (protected 
groups), the severity of criminal penalties, and the legal language in the statute (Grattet, 
Jenness, and Curry, 1998).  Despite these differences, Jenness and Grattet (2001) identify 
five prominent forms of state hate crime statutes.  The first are ―statutes that criminalize 
interference with civil rights‖ (Jenness & Grattet, 2001; 80; emphasis added).  These 
statutes ―criminalize actions that, by force or threat of force, interfere with or intimidate 
others in the exercise of their civil rights, and they specify a list of protected statuses‖ 
(Jenness & Grattet, 2001; 80).  In 2007, approximately 20% of the state statutes were 
civil rights statutes. The second group of state laws, “freestanding” statutes, ―create a 
new and freestanding category of crime, commonly referred to as ‗ethnic intimidation‘ or 
‗malicious harassment‘‖ (Jenness & Grattet, 2001; 80).  In 2007, approximately 27% of 
state hate crime statutes created this freestanding category of crime.  The third category, 
“coattailing” statutes, ―create crimes of ethnic intimidation or malicious harassment by 
embedding them within previous established criminal codes‖ (Jenness & Grattet, 2001; 
81).  For coattailing statutes approximately 6% of hate crime statutes created this new 
type of crime by adding them to existing criminal codes in 2007.  Fourth, modifying 
statutes, ―modify a preexisting statute by adding a clause that reclassifies the crime if it 
was committed because of the victim‘s race, religion, or other group status characteristic‖ 
(Jenness & Grattet, 2001; 82).  Approximately 10% of state statutes in 2007 were 
modifying statutes.  Finally, the last category is penalty enhancement statutes, 
approximately 45% of state statutes in 2007, which ―increase the penalty for committing 
an enumerated crime when the crime was motivated by hate or bias‖ (Jenness & Grattet, 
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2001; 82).  There are two ways in which a penalty enhancement may occur.  First, the 
law may assign a higher sentence range for the offense.  Second, the law may upgrade the 
offense (i.e., from a misdemeanor to a felony). For detailed examples of each of these 
state statutes refer to Appendix B. 
Summary 
Hate crime is a socially constructed concept which is defined in different ways at 
different times in history and across different places.  Defining hate crime as a form of 
informal social control calls for the use of theories explaining patterns of social control to 
be applied to the explanation of hate crime.  Defining hate crime as a manifestation of 
prejudice, specifically physical attack, requires the use of theories explaining prejudicial 
action to explain hate crime.  The minority threat framework can be used to explain both 
patterns of social control and manifestations of prejudice and as such minority threat 
lends itself well to the explanation of hate crime.   
Due to the differing social definitions of hate crime, the legal definition has 
changed over time.  At one time crimes against minority groups were violations of civil 
rights, at another prejudicial actions were controlled through the use of statutes 
criminalizing hate groups.  Today, these statutes vary by state and are different in the 
federal government, with the federal laws criminalizing those actions that impede civil 
liberties or crimes committed at the federal level because of the victim‘s membership in a 
particular group.  The state laws on the other hand consist of five primary categories, 
ranging from those which criminalize the impediment of civil liberties to those which 
create a separate offense and those which add penalties for a bias motivation.   
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Each of these definitions, both social and legal, provide a framework for 
understanding hate crime.  These potential explanations are discussed in the following 
pages. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Minority Threat 
 
 Consensus vs. Conflict Theory: Foundations of Modern Day Threat 
 
 The minority threat propositions are based largely in the conflict theory tradition, 
which is most often traced to the teachings of Karl Marx.  Marx provided little in the way 
of a discussion about punishment; however, he spoke to a great degree about the source 
of power and the use of that power.  Marx, writing during the time of the shift from 
feudalism to a capitalist society, proposed that it was this shift that produced the power 
dynamics and the changes to the systems of punishment that are still in place today.  
Marx suggested that as the population of owners of economic resources gained more 
capital they gained more power.  In other words, Marx attributed the source of power to 
the ownership of the means of production.  Those who owned the means of production he 
termed the bourgeoisie (Garland, 1990). 
Additionally, Marx suggested that the shift from feudalism to capitalism produced 
a working class, or the proletariat.  This class, in effect, lost control over the means of 
production turning them into nothing more than laborers.  These laborers thus had little to 
no power (Cain & Hunt, 1979; Melossi, 1980; Vold, 2002).   
Due to the redefinition of the power structure, Marx proposed, the punishment 
system and the development of the criminal law would fall to those in power, i.e., the 
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bourgeoisie.  This upper class would use its power then to establish laws that would aid 
them in their quest for gaining even more capital and thus even more power.  In doing so 
the bourgeoisie would further pauperize the proletariat and those privileges that the 
proletariat had previously enjoyed, such as the free collection of wood from the forest, 
were suddenly illegal.  The changing of these laws thus criminalized many of the ways in 
which the proletariat had previously made money, and further marginalized them to the 
role of hard laborer (Cain & Hunt, 1979; Melossi, 1980; Vold, 2002).      
Capitalism is still the predominant social structure in the United States, and the 
power struggles that Marx referred to between the rich and the poor are still very much 
alive.  In today‘s terms these power struggles are often not relegated simply to the rich 
and the poor, or the upper class and the lower class, but also divide society across racial, 
ethnic, and religious lines, among others.  As such, these divisions result in the similar 
use of criminal law and punishment by those who maintain power (i.e., the rich, the 
white, and the religious majority) on those with less power (i.e. the poor and the 
black/Hispanic) to further those divisions (Cain & Hunt, 1979; Melossi, 1980; Garland, 
1990; Vold, 2002). 
 An alternative view of the production of law and the use of social control comes 
from consensus theories which are often traced to Emile Durkheim.  Durkheim divided 
law into public law and private law. Public law he said, ―is held to regulate the 
relationships of the individual with the state‖, while private law regulates the 
relationships ―of individuals with one another‖ (Durkheim, 1984:28).  Likewise, 
Durkheim defined a crime in terms of its offense against what he termed the collective 
consciousness.  A collective consciousness, according to Durkheim, is ―the totality of 
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beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of society [that] form a 
determinate system with a life of its own‖ (Durkheim, 1984:38-39). Thus crimes threaten 
the beliefs and sentiments of society, and as such must be punished accordingly.  
Punishment, Durkheim suggests, then is a measure of power in that power is measured 
―either by the degree of authority that [the collectivity] exercises over its citizens or by 
the degree of seriousness attributed to the crimes directed against it‖ (Durkheim, 
1984:43).  Thus, opposition to the collectivity stands to strengthen it.  Drawing on these 
ideas from Durkheim, ―consensus theory postulates that equality is a fundamental value 
and that sanctions are imposed more or less objectively on individuals who commit 
behavior that runs contrary to society‘s collective conscience‖ (Cureton, 2000:703).   
Conflict theory suggests then that groups are defined according to the power that 
they possess.  Consensus theory suggests that the existence of an out group, a group that 
is in opposition to the collective, will strengthen the cohesion of the collective.  Minority 
threat draws largely from conflict theory, although it is related to consensus theory 
through this oppositional approach.  That is, minority threat, like conflict theory, defines 
group divisions based on power, and likewise suggests that the presence of a threat will 
result in a coming together of the more powerful group in order to suppress that threat.  
Thus, the development of these two traditions in sociology and later in criminology led to 
the birth of minority threat. 
The Birth of Minority Threat 
 In its original formulation, minority threat was not applied to social control, but 
instead was used to examine discrimination and prejudice.  It was developed at a time 
when the civil rights movement was in full swing and discrimination and prejudice were 
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at the forefront of the popular consciousness.  Thus, researchers set out to explain these 
behaviors. 
 While minority threat is traditionally traced to Hubert Blalock‘s seminal book, 
Toward a Theory of Minority Group Threat (1967), Herbert Blumer (1958) was the first 
to associate prejudice with group position instead of individual emotion or belief.  He 
suggested that prejudice can be manifested in the group regardless of the individuals in 
that group.  Prejudice, according to Blumer, is a ―collective process‖ (1958: 3) in which 
one group defines itself by defining another group.   
 Like Blumer (1958), Blalock (1967) suggests that racial prejudice or animosity is 
tied to group position.  The main tenet of minority threat, from Blalock‘s original theory, 
suggests a relationship between the size of the minority population and discrimination.  
Specifically, Blalock suggested that the size of the minority population should be 
positively associated with discrimination.  He also proposed that this relationship would 
be nonlinear. In other words, Blalock suggests that there is a point at which the 
relationship between the relative size of the minority population and discrimination 
would change direction or change shape.  That is at some point the positive relationship 
may become negative when the minority reaches a large enough portion of the population 
to be able to exert power.  Blalock posited two specific reasons for the association 
between minority group size and discrimination.  First, competition between groups 
(Figure 1.1A), specifically through labor surpluses, economic instability, or lack of 
education or resources of dominant group members, can result in discrimination (Blalock, 
1967: 168).  Second, political instability (Figure 1.1B) or the formation of an alliance 
between the minority group and another group that is perceived by the majority group to 
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provide power to the minority can result in discrimination (Blalock, 1967: 169).  This 
second factor was referred to by Blalock as power threat, while the first was simply 
referred to as competition.  Both of these factors have been explored in more detail in 
research that has been conducted since Blalock‘s original work.  These concepts today 
are referred to as economic and political (or power) threat and are discussed in further 
detail below.   
 The Progression of Minority Threat 
 Blalock‘s (1967) original work, focusing on minority groups in general, resulted 
in a number of studies looking at the size of the minority population and various forms of 
discrimination. In addition, and most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, the 
theory was applied to additional forms of social control that were directed at minority 
groups.  Primarily applied to formal social control, this theory has undergone a number of 
changes, including the continuation and introduction of different forms of threat (e.g. 
economic and political threat as well as the fear of black crime hypothesis) and a theory 
that suggests the opposite effect of what Blalock originally posited, that is a negative 
relationship between the size of the minority population and social control (i.e., benign 
neglect).   
Research has found some support (discussed further in Chapter 2) for the positive 
relationship between the size of the minority population and formal social control.  As 
such one might wonder how the size of the minority group may relate to hate crime and 
other forms of informal social control, in light of the proposition discussed earlier that 
formal social control is inversely related to informal social control.  Blalock and his 
successors, however, do not refer to absolute levels of formal social control, but rather to  
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Figure 1.1: Theoretical relationships between minority group size and discrimination (A) 
competition (B) power threat (Blalock, 1967) 
 
the over-representation of minorities in the use of formal social control.  Thus, the theory 
is still being used to predict forms of discrimination and prejudice.  It would follow then 
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that the size of the minority population would be positively associated with hate crime, a 
form of prejudiced behavior, as it would be related to the overuse of formal social control 
on minority group members. 
Original Formulation 
 As mentioned previously, Blalock‘s (1967) original formulation included a 
competition (or economic) and a power (or political) threat explanation.  Specifically, 
Blalock suggested that under certain conditions (i.e., where economic competition is the 
primary source of prejudice) it would be possible to find a nonlinear positive relationship 
between the size of the minority population and economic discrimination.  He suggested 
that as minority groups become more equal to the majority, competition will increase, 
resulting in a greater need for discrimination on the part of the majority.  Where the gap 
was greater between the dominant and subordinate group, competition would be weaker 
and thus there would be less need for discrimination.  In other words, discrimination will 
increase as competition increases, however at some point that discrimination will have 
the intended effect and will increase the gap between the minority and the majority, in 
affect reducing the level of competition.  As competition decreases discrimination will 
likewise begin to decrease.  Thus, while the relationship between minority group size and 
discrimination should be positive to a point it should also be nonlinear.  In other words, at 
some point it may turn negative.  
 Blalock (1967) also suggested a relationship between power threat and 
discrimination.  While he proposed a positive relationship with a decreasing slope for 
competition, he proposed a positive relationship with an increasing slope for power 
threat.  In this proposition, Blalock suggests that the relationship between minority 
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population size and discrimination is a function of both resources and mobilization on the 
part of the dominant and subordinate groups.  Specifically, Blalock proposes that power 
is ―proportional to resources times mobilization‖ (p. 128).  In other words, if the 
dominant group wishes to maintain power over the subordinate group it must effectively 
limit either or both the subordinate‘s resources or its ability to mobilize effectively.  As 
the size of the minority group increases the resources afforded to the group will increase, 
therefore, in order to maintain dominance the majority must act to prevent the minority 
from mobilizing against them and taking away their power.  Effectively accomplishing 
this, Blalock suggests, requires the majority group use discrimination.  Blalock also notes 
that in order to maintain dominance the majority must amplify their mobilization, or 
discrimination, at a faster rate producing a positive relationship with an increasing slope. 
 These ideas of economic (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Eitle, D‘Alessio, & 
Stolzenberg, 2002; Stults & Baumer, 2007) and political threat (Behrens, Uggen, & 
Manza, 2003) have continued to prevail in research looking at the discrimination, or 
marginalization, of minority groups.  These hypotheses have largely maintained their 
original formulation.   
Adding to the Minority Threat Canon 
In conjunction with the further development of Blalock‘s original propositions, 
two other explanations have been added to the proposed relationship between the size of 
the minority population and the social control of that group.  The first of these was 
developed largely from the fear of crime literature and proposes the intervening 
mechanism of fear of black crime instead of economic or political threat (Jackson, 1989; 
Chiricos, McEntire, & Gertz, 2001; Stults & Baumer, 2007).  The fear of crime literature 
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asserts a relationship between fear and the steps that people take to minimize that fear 
(Stults & Baumer, 2007).  When the fear is directed specifically at a minority group, 
individuals may take actions against that group in order to protect themselves.  Within the 
context of formal social control these actions may result in pressuring the police to arrest 
individuals belonging to this minority group.  On the other hand, informal social control 
may also result from fear.  Specifically, McDevitt, Levin, and Bennett (2002) suggest that 
hate crime offenders will sometimes act to defend their neighborhood from an influx of 
minority group members that they see as threatening.  The fear of black crime hypothesis 
would posit that this threat came from the stereotype that blacks, specifically, are more 
apt to participate in criminal behavior than members of the white majority (Stults & 
Baumer, 2007).  If this proposition is correct, that is if this stereotype holds, fear should 
be most prevalent in areas with a larger minority population and smaller in areas with 
more racial residential segregation or few minority members (Jackson, 1989).   
Liska, Lawrence, and Benson (1981) and Liska and Yu (1992) added a fifth 
moderating factor to the minority threat canon.  Liska and colleagues proposed that the 
degree to which a place is segregated will moderate
3
 the relationship between the size of 
the minority population and social control.  Specifically, those cities with a large minority 
population that are more segregated, thus having less interaction between minority group 
members and the majority, will have less social control which is contradictory to the 
threat framework.  On the other hand, areas with a large minority population that is less 
segregated, and thus having more interaction between the minority group members and 
majority group members, will have more social control in line with the threat framework.  
                                                 
3
 A moderating variable is one that ―partitions a focal independent variable into subgroups‖ (Baron & 
Kenny 1986) that define the effect on the dependent variable. 
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Liska, Lawrence, and Benson assessed the relationship between threat and police force 
size in cities.  The authors introduced segregation as an alternative indicator of threat, that 
of culturally and racially dissimilar subordinate populations.  The findings support this 
alternative measure of threatening people; however, the racial composition of the city 
remained the strongest predictor of police force size.  The authors concluded that ―the 
segregation effect depends on geographical region and year‖ (Liska et al., 1981:420). 
Likewise, Liska and Yu suggested that segregation acts as a form of informal social 
control which ―may decrease the perceived threat to higher authorities, leading to 
decreases in formal controls, like police size and even arrests‖ (Liska & Yu, 1992:61).  
However, neither of these studies explicitly tested the moderating process between the 
degree of segregation and the relationship between minority group composition and 
social control.   
Many studies have tested the minority threat propositions, including the direct 
relationship between the size of the minority population and social control, as well as the 
economic and political threat hypotheses.  These studies have assessed minority threat, 
and more specifically racial threat, which defines the subordinate population as the 
minority racial group and in most cases the black/African-American population, in terms 
of its relationship to prejudice, formal control, and informal control.  For instance, Taylor 
(1998) examined the relationship between racial composition and measures of prejudice
4
 
toward blacks, finding that the size of the minority population was significantly and 
positively related to prejudice.  Likewise, King and Weiner (2007) assessed the 
                                                 
4
 Prejudice was measured based on three subscales from the General Social Survey including stereotyping 
of blacks, aversion to contact with blacks, and anti-egalitarianism. 
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relationship between minority threat and anti-Semitism
5
, finding that the size of the 
Jewish population in a county was significantly and positively related to anti-Semitism.    
Regarding formal social control, the propositions have been tested looking at 
sentencing and imprisonment (Britt, 2000; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001), the size of the 
police department (D‘Alessio, Eitle, & Stolzenberg, 2004; Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Liska et 
al., 1981; Holmes, Smith, Freng, & Muñoz, 2008), police brutality (Holmes, 2000; Smith 
& Holmes, 2003), and levels of  (Jacobs, Carmichael, & Kent, 2005) or opinions about 
capital punishment (Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld, 2003).  For instance, Britt (2000) 
found that the proportion black in a county was significantly and positively related to the 
individual level decision to incarcerate and the difference in whites‘ and blacks‘ per 
capita income is significantly and negatively associated with the incarceration decision.  
Britt concludes that this is support for the economic threat hypothesis indicating that ―as 
the difference between whites‘ and blacks‘ incomes increase—suggesting greater racial 
income inequality—the mean risk of incarceration declines […] as a group becomes less 
of a real threat because the economic differences are so pronounced, punishments may 
become less severe‖ (p. 723).    
Finally, in terms of informal social control, King and Brustein (2006) assessed the 
relationship between political threat and incidents of violent acts against Jews or Jewish 
property in pre-World War II Germany.  While the authors did not find a significant 
relationship between the size of the Jewish population in Germany and anti-Jewish 
incidents, they did find a significant and positive relationship between their measure of 
political threat (electoral support for leftist parties) and anti-Jewish incidents.   
                                                 
5
 Anti-Semitism was measured using the 2003 American Mosaic Survey, based on three separate questions.  
Each question was assessed separately.  A positive and significant relationship was found between Jewish 
population size and perceptions of Jewish power.  
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Seemingly Contradictory Theories 
 With every theory there come findings that contradict the theory.  Minority threat 
is no exception.  The theory proposes a positive relationship between minority population 
and social control.  Liska and Chamlin (1984) noted, however, that this relationship is not 
always positive.  They proposed that the opposite may be true.  In certain situations, 
especially when the minority population is large, formal social control may actually 
decrease.  This negative relationship may be the result of two processes, one that is 
victim generated and one that is police generated.  On the one hand, minority group 
members have been found to be less trustful of the police (Hagan & Albonetti, 1982; 
Brunson, 2007) and so they may be less apt to report victimization, especially when the 
offender is white.  On the other hand, when a minority group victim does report a crime 
they may be unable to convince the police that a crime did indeed occur or they may be 
unable to mobilize the police to act in their favor.  This is known as the benign-neglect 
hypothesis, which suggests the relationship between minority population and social 
control is negative.  This new hypothesis comes directly from the racial threat tradition, 
only once again proposes a separate mediating process.  Here the mediating process is the 
ability of the group to mobilize the police.  If thought about in terms of Blalock‘s (1967) 
power threat model, in which he suggests that power is a function of both the resources 
afforded the minority and the majority and the ability to mobilize on the part of the 
minority and the majority, benign-neglect can be seen as directly linked to racial threat, in 
the sense that it is a function of resources without mobilization on the part of the 
minority.  Additionally, benign-neglect could be seen in this same vein as a function of 
less mobilization on the part of the majority in response to the lack of mobilization on the 
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part of the minority. This hypothesis is applied quite often to formal social control; 
however, the application to forms of informal social control is not intuitive.  It would be 
quite difficult to suggest that the same mechanism producing the negative relationship in 
formal social control (e.g. inability to mobilize police) would be at work in informal 
social control. 
As with the more traditional forms of the racial threat proposition, benign-neglect 
has found tentative support in prior research.  For instance, Eitle, Stolzenberg, and 
D‘Alessio (2005) concluded that white offenders are more likely to be arrested than black 
offenders for simple and aggravated assault.  The authors suggested that this relationship 
could potentially be explained by benign-neglect in that police may put less value on 
assault cases involving black victims, since the majority of assault incidents were 
intraracial.  Eitle and colleagues also proposed that when an assault occurred in a 
predominantly black neighborhood that was isolated from white neighborhoods, these 
crimes were not perceived as a threat to social order and thus were not policed heavily.  
Likewise, another study (Parker & Maggard, 2005) assessed the relationship between the 
size of the black population and black drug arrests and found the effect to be negative.  
The researchers concluded that ―there is less pressure on the police to control crime 
because victims who are non-White are less likely to report crime or even when they do 
report crime, police may allocate fewer resources to resolve the offense‖ (Parker & 
Maggard, 2005; 539) because these crimes most often involve a black offender and a 
black victim.   
These divergent findings may threaten the validity of the minority threat 
hypothesis; however, as Holmes (2000) suggests ―threat has multiple dimensions, 
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involving the interests of both dominant group members‖ and the agents of social control 
(p. 349).    
 While Blalock (1967), and the majority of researchers who have examined threat, 
have looked almost solely at the relationship between blacks and whites, over the course 
of the last twenty years the minority threat framework has been expanded to other groups.  
This expanded proposition has primarily focused on assessing the Hispanic-White 
relationship.  The theoretical assumption here is the same:  as the size of the Hispanic 
population in a neighborhood increases, social control of Hispanics will also increase.  
Research on minority threat, using the percent Hispanic population in addition to percent 
black population, has found little to no support for a relationship between Hispanic 
population and overall social control (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 
2004; Jacobs, Carmichael, & Kent, 2005; D‘Alessio, Eitle, & Stolzenberg, 2004).  This 
minority threat perspective has found preliminary support in literature assessing the 
relationship between men (the majority) and women (the minority) in business practices 
(South, Bonjean, Markham, & Corder, 1982) and has been extended to the voting 
behaviors of evangelical religious groups (Campbell, 2006).   
Defended Neighborhoods 
 In addition to these hypotheses that propose straightforward relationships between 
minority group size and social control, there has been another theory developed that can 
be linked to Blalock‘s (1967) original minority threat propositions.  The defended 
neighborhoods thesis is very similar to the fear of black crime hypothesis in that 
individuals will become defensive, but there is no fear of crime connection.  This thesis 
was originally proposed by Suttles (1972) and suggests that when minority group 
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members begin to move into an area that has been predominantly and historically white, 
the members of that community will defend their community identity through the use of 
social control.  Defended neighborhoods draws on the idea of a relationship between the 
size of the minority population and the use of social control, but it applies more readily to 
areas with a very small minority population and implies an interaction between the 
increasing of the minority population and the historical size of the majority population.  
So, while this theory may have started in the same tradition as the minority threat 
hypothesis, it has diverged from the basic relationship seen in the majority of the 
minority threat studies, and has produced an explanation for a relationship that minority 
threat as it was originally proposed could not capture, that of a small but increasing 
minority population and social control.  
The defended neighborhoods hypothesis has primarily been applied to forms of 
informal social control.  For instance, Green, Strolovitch, and Wong (1998b) found 
support for their hypothesis that racially motivated crime should be highest in areas 
where minorities are beginning to move that have been historically white.  Likewise, 
Lyons (2007) discovered that ―the effect of informal social control on antiblack hate 
crime increases in racially homogeneous white communities that are experiencing recent 
in-migration of black newcomers‖ (p. 841).  This hypothesis has also found support when 
college campuses are used as the measure of community (Van Dyke & Tester, 2005).   
Opportunity or Contact 
 Two additional theories provide insight into the nature of intergroup relationships 
and the ways in which context shapes these dynamics.  The first is Blau‘s macrostructural 
opportunity theory (1977) which suggests that minority group members are more likely to 
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come into contact with majority group members and are thus more likely to have conflict 
with majority group members, while majority group members are less likely to have 
contact with minority group members and thus are less likely to have conflict with them.  
In other words, Blau suggests that opportunity plays a large role in the likelihood of inter-
vs. intra-group conflict.  For the purpose of criminal conflict, there should be more 
opportunity for a minority group offender to commit an offense on a majority group 
member, than for the opposite to occur.  That is, it should be relatively rare for a majority 
group member to have the opportunity to commit an offense against a minority group 
member.   
 An opposite hypothesis, known as the contact hypothesis (Williams, 1947; 
Allport, 1979), suggests that animosity between groups should be decreased with contact, 
especially under positive conditions.  In other words, the more face-to-face contact a 
majority group member has with a member of the minority group the less animosity the 
majority group member should feel towards the minority group and thus the less conflict 
between the two groups.   
 Both of these hypotheses propose relationships between the likelihood of 
interactions between majority and minority group members and the resulting criminal 
patterns in an area.  Blau (1977) suggests that the more interactions between minority and 
majority groups the more opportunity for criminal conflict and thus the more crime.  
Allport (1979) on the other hand suggests an increase in interaction between minority and 
majority groups should decrease animosity between the groups and thus should decrease 
crime.   
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 Contact theory has found support across multiple research methods including field 
studies (Deutsch & Collins, 1951), archival research (Fine, 1979), survey research (Herek 
& Capitanio, 1996), and laboratory studies (Cook, 1978; Desforges et al., 1991) in 
relation to the effect of positive contact on levels of prejudice.  In fact, in a meta-analysis 
of studies assessing this relationship, Pettigrew and Tropp (2000) found that overall there 
is support for the contact hypothesis.  However, few, if any, studies have assessed the 
relationship between the contact hypothesis and intergroup conflict and more specifically 
crime.   
 On the other hand, Blau‘s macrostructural opportunity theory has found much 
support in relation to the effect of the opportunity for intergroup contact on intergroup 
conflict.  For instance, Stolzenberg, Eitle, and D‘Alessio (2006) found that the size of the 
black population was related to white on black crime but not to black on white crime, 
suggesting that as the black population increases in size the opportunity for a white 
person to come into contact with a black person increases resulting in an increase in 
white on black conflict. 
 These theories and more have been used to explain prejudice and discrimination 
as well as both formal and informal social control.  Given that hate crime is a form of 
both prejudiced behavior and informal social control these theories may be used to 
explain this phenomenon.  However, given the multitude of different hypotheses that may 
be drawn from these theories, many of which are opposing, it is important to focus on a 
single theory.  For the purpose of this dissertation the guiding framework is the basic 
minority threat hypothesis described by Blalock.  This theory is meant to apply to all 
forms of discrimination and prejudicial behavior across all minority-majority group 
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comparisons.  As such it provides a starting point for examinations of the trends in hate 
crime. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 The minority threat framework provides five specific research questions that will 
be examined in the analysis.   
1. Is there a relationship between the relative size of the minority population and 
the number of hate crimes in a state? 
2. Is the political strength of the minority group related to the number of hate 
crimes in a state? 
3. Does the level of economic competition in a state relate to the number of hate 
crimes? 
4. Does the level of economic competition in a state or the political strength of the 
minority group explain the relationship between the relative size of the minority 
population and hate crime if one exists? 
5. Are these relationships linear or curvilinear? 
The specific expectations are illustrated by Table 1.1 below. 
Table 1.1: Summary of Predictions based on Minority Threat Framework and Prior 
Research 
 
Dependent Variable 
Concept 
African-
American Hispanic Gay/Lesbian 
Minority Group Size +* +* +* 
Minority/Majority Economic 
Competition +* +* NS 
Minority Group Political Power +* +* +* 
* Indicates the theory proposes the relationship should be curvilinear 
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SUMMARY 
 In summary, hate crimes are those actions that are committed against a member of 
a protected category based on their membership in that protected group.  These crimes 
result in more severe consequences for the victim and for the group in which they belong 
and as such have resulted in several types of legal remedies.  Because the motivation of 
the offender is the primary factor in distinguishing hate crime from other crimes it is this 
motivation that researchers and theorists attempt to explain.  As such the theories that 
have been used to explain levels of hate crime are those that were originally developed to 
explain prejudice and discrimination.  These theories include minority threat, defended 
neighborhoods, and macrostructural opportunity theory.  Each of these relates the size or 
distribution of the minority group population to the prevalence of intergroup conflict.  
This study examines the relationship between these theories and the level of hate crime in 
a state while controlling for other potential covariates.   
 The following chapter reviews the relevant empirical literature on contextual 
influences on hate crime.   
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF RESEARCH  
Given the nature of discourse in the social sciences on race and other minority 
characteristics, it is not surprising that there has been much empirical research on the 
subject.  The theories discussed in chapter one have received considerable attention.  Less 
attention has been paid to the macro level covariates of hate crime.  These empirical 
studies and the ways in which this study builds on them are discussed in the following 
pages. 
 
HATE CRIME CONTEXT 
Within Jurisdictional Variation in Hate Crime 
 While few studies have assessed the prevalence of hate crime on a national scale 
(for an example of this in Germany see King & Brustein, 2006), several studies have 
examined the incidence of hate crime within single jurisdictions or states.  Two cities, 
Chicago and New York, have been studied in great depth.  Lyons (2007) applied a social 
disorganization and defended neighborhoods framework to the prevalence of racially 
motivated crime using data from the Chicago Police Department.  He finds limited 
support for the social disorganization framework in relation to racially motivated crime, 
as well as support for the defended neighborhoods hypothesis.  Specifically, he finds no 
significant relationship between residential mobility, measured as the percent of the 
population who moved in the past five years, and either anti-white or anti-black incidents; 
however, economic disadvantage measured using the index of concentration at extremes 
(ICE) and racial composition measured as percent black, percent white, and percent 
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Hispanic, are significantly related to racially motivated crime. Lyons also finds that ―the 
effect of informal social control on antiblack hate crime increases in racially homogenous 
white communities that are experiencing recent in-migration of black newcomers‖ 
(Lyons, 2007:841).   
 Likewise, Lyons (2008), applying a racial threat, defended neighborhoods, and 
ethnic heterogeneity framework to anti-black and anti-white incidents in Chicago, finds 
that increases in the black population result in increases in anti-black hate crimes when 
the community is predominantly white consistent with the defended neighborhoods 
proposition.  On the other hand, a similarly white neighborhood not experiencing this 
increase in the black population did not experience the same increase in anti-black hate 
crimes (Lyons, 2008).   Lyons also finds support for the racial threat arguments.  Finally, 
in regards to the ethnic heterogeneity predictions, Lyons finds that communities with 
high heterogeneity, that is where there is a higher likelihood of interaction between 
blacks and whites, experience more anti-white hate crimes.  
 Green and colleagues (1998b) assessed the defended neighborhoods hypothesis in 
relation to racially motivated crime in New York City.  The authors conclude that anti-
Asian, anti-Latino, and anti-Black hate crime are influenced by a combination of a 
historically and predominantly white neighborhood and a growth in the minority 
population (Green et al., 1998b).   
 Likewise, Green and colleagues (2001) examined the relationship between 
population density and hate crime, specifically focusing on the density of the gay and 
lesbian population and anti-gay/lesbian hate crime.  The authors conclude that there is a 
relationship between population density and hate crime, with neighborhoods with a 
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higher concentration of gay men or lesbians experiencing more anti-gay or lesbian hate 
crime respectively.   
 In another study, using data from the New York City Police Department‘s Bias 
Incident Investigative Unit (BIIU), Green, Glaser, and Rich (1998a) assessed the 
relationship between changes in economic conditions, specifically the unemployment 
rate, and monthly counts of hate crime incidents.  The authors found little support for the 
argument that patterns of hate crime prevalence are related to or explained by fluctuations 
in the economic conditions in the city.   
 Finally, using a larger aggregate, specifically North Carolina, Green and Rich 
(1998) explored the relationship between white supremacist activity on the part of the Ku 
Klux Klan (KKK) and cross burnings.  The authors find that a county‘s first white 
supremacist rally increased the incidence of cross burning (Green & Rich, 1998).   
 Prior research on the macro level context of hate crime suggests overall that there 
is a relationship between demographic changes and hate crime.  However, this research 
has focused on single jurisdictions and as such while we know a great deal about those 
jurisdictions we cannot generalize to other jurisdictions based on these studies and so it is 
difficult to inform large scale policy based on these small scale studies.  Additionally, the 
exclusive focus on single cities or states limits the generalizability of the findings.  Thus 
it is the purpose of this dissertation to expand on this prior research by examining 
multiple jurisdictions and prevalence by using a national database of hate crime incident 
counts.        
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Hate Crime Reporting: An Alternative to Prevalence         
 One question that has plagued hate crime researchers interested in the prevalence 
of the event is whether it is possible to distinguish prevalence from reporting behavior 
using official crime statistics.  Bowling (1993) acknowledges one study which suggests 
the true prevalence of racial violence in Great Britain is ten times that estimated by the 
Home Office using police records.  Likewise, an analysis of data from the National Crime 
Victimization Survey (NCVS) found that only 43.8% of hate crimes are reported to the 
police and only 44.1% of violent hate crimes are reported to the police (Harlow, 2005).  
In comparing the statistics of the NCVS and the FBI‘s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) indicated that 9,222 individual victims of hate crime 
were reported in the UCR in 2002 while the NCVS estimated approximately 190,840 
annual hate crime incidents.   
 In addition to these attempts to measure what is commonly referred to as the 
―dark figure‖ of hate crime, many studies have examined the differential reporting 
practices of jurisdictions.  For instance, in 1994, with ―7,298  participating agencies, only 
1,150 (or 16%) reported hate crimes as having actually occurred in their jurisdictions‖ 
(Nolan & Akiyama, 1999:113).  Likewise, Nolan and Akiyama conclude that between 
84% and 85% of jurisdictions reporting to the UCR each year report zero hate crimes.   
 This preponderance of zeros in the hate crime data has prompted some researchers 
to examine the correlates of reporting by police jurisdictions, police officers, and victims.  
McDevitt and colleagues (2003) categorized these correlates into two groups.  The first 
are individual inhibitors and the second are police disincentives.  Each of these factors 
that affect hate crime reporting are tied to one of seven key decision points in the 
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reporting of hate crime incidents.  First, the victim must understand that a crime has been 
committed.  Second, the victim must recognize that hate may be a motivating factor.  
Third, the victim or some other party must contact the police to intervene.  Fourth, the 
victim or another party must communicate the possible motivation of the crime to the 
police.  Fifth, the police officer must recognize the hate motivation.  Sixth, the law 
enforcement officer must document the hate motivation and charge the suspect with a 
hate/bias offense.  Finally, the law enforcement officer records the incident and submits 
the information to the UCR‘s Hate Crime Reporting Unit (McDevitt et al., 2003:79).  The 
results of the study by McDevitt and colleagues suggest that a breakdown in the process 
of compiling hate crime reports causes many discrepancies between the perception of the 
prevalence of hate crime and the official records.  This breakdown the authors suggest 
may occur at two points in the process: between the submission of reports by the local 
law enforcement agency to a state agency which then compiles the hate crime reports or 
between the notation of the bias motivation in a report and the report‘s arrival with the 
officer in charge of reporting. 
 Among the individual level predictors of non-reporting, police officers have 
identified policies that sensationalize hate crime to be burdensome and thus less likely to 
be followed by the police.  Officers have also suggested personal beliefs as a reason for 
non-reporting.  That is ―they believe that all crimes of similar magnitude should be 
treated the same‖ (Nolan & Akiyama, 1999: 114).  Levin (1992) suggests ―police officers 
are conditioned to identify crimes based on the severity of injury or the magnitude of 
property damage… not on the basis of motive‖ (quoted in Nolan & Akiyama, 1999:114).  
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―The police believe that the most salient factors in discouraging victims from reporting is 
the police/victim interaction‖ (McDevitt et al., 2003:84).   
 Among the organizational predictors of non-reporting, Nolan and Akiyama (1999) 
cite insufficient resources and a belief on the part of administrators that the 
―identification of traditional crimes as hate crimes could divide their jurisdictions along 
racial lines‖ (p. 115).   
 In addition to the processes that may hinder the reporting of hate crime to the 
UCR, McDevitt and colleagues (2003) also suggest four elements that may encourage 
reporting.  First, the presence of a formal hate crime policy may encourage reporting.  
Prior research (Walker & Katz, 1995; Nolan & Akiyama, 1999) has suggested that police 
officers will often follow policies they view as legitimate, and that they view most 
written formal policies as legitimate, suggesting that a formal hate crime policy would 
lead to more reporting.  Additionally, the level of supervision or review of hate crime 
incidents can influence reporting; specifically, a more intense review process can increase 
reporting.  Third, the presence of a single specialized officer or a unit designated to deal 
with hate crime may increase reporting.  Finally, specialized training of police officers on 
matters of hate crime recognition and investigation can increase reporting.  McDevitt and 
colleagues point out that each of these characteristics is more likely to be present in larger 
police departments. 
 Given the disparities in reporting, the majority of research examining the 
contextual covariates of hate crime, as illustrated in the previous section, has focused on 
within jurisdiction variation.  Indeed, when a count of hate crimes has been used as a 
dependent variable at the national level, it has been assessed as an indicator of 
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compliance with hate crime law instead of an indicator of prevalence (King, Messner, & 
Baller, 2009). It is my belief, however, that it is possible to control for reporting practices 
and to begin to examine the variation in prevalence of hate crime across jurisdictions.  
Indeed, an examination of agencies that were consistent contributors
6
 to the UCR hate 
crimes data collection revealed that ―trends in the reported hate crimes by the consistent 
contributors are very similar to the trends reported … by all participating agencies‖ 
(Nolan et al., 2002:143).  Thus, an additional question examined here is whether the 
minority threat relationships hold up when controlling for the reporting practices and 
differential definitions of hate crime in states? 
 
TESTING THEORIES 
Minority Threat 
The majority of the early studies on minority threat treated threat as being 
manifested by the simple presence of a minority population.  However, in Blumer‘s 
(1958) original description of the way in which racial prejudice manifested itself, and 
continuing into the more recent racial threat formulations, threat is treated as something 
that is not directly manifested by the presence of the minority group, but rather 
manifested through the perception of that group as threatening the political or economic 
status of the majority or their safety.  This change in the conceptualization of threat 
resulted in a movement away from the use of the size of the minority population as the 
sole indicator of threat, and towards the use of direct measures of the intervening factors 
that are thought to result in perceptions of threat. 
                                                 
6
 Consistent contributors were defined as police agencies that ―(a) participated in the national hate crime 
program each year from 1995 through 1998 and (b) during this time they reported at least one hate crime to 
the FBI‖ (Nolan et al., 2002:142). 
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Blalock (1967) suggested that at the time that he wrote his book it was not 
possible to directly measure discrimination, nor the intervening factors in his theory.  The 
majority of studies that came out after this original statement of the theory simply took 
the size of the black population, usually measured using the decennial census and percent 
black, and suggested a relationship between this measure and various forms of social 
control or discrimination.  This measurement was heavily criticized during the last two 
decades (Chamlin & Cochran, 2000) due primarily to the suggestion that percent black 
was merely measuring the size of the crime prone population and was not an indicator of 
threat.   
Two major patterns present themselves in examining the minority threat literature. 
First, attempts to measure the curvilinear relationship through the use of quadratic 
measures and threshold effects have shown limited support.  The binary measures 
intended to capture a proposed threshold effect (Wilson & Ruback, 2003; Jacobs & 
Carmichael, 2004; Jacobs et al., 2005) are based on the theoretical assumption that there 
is a point at which the relationship between the size of the minority population and social 
control changes direction (e.g., from positive to negative) or changes shape (e.g., begins 
to change at an increasing or decreasing rate).  For instance, Jacobs and Carmichael 
(2004) proposed that capital punishment would be more likely in jurisdictions with a 
larger African-American population, so they specifically included a dichotomous 
measure indicating jurisdictions that were over 6.4% African-American (the state 
median) in their models.  While this threshold effect was not significant in predicting the 
number of death sentences in states, it was significant and negative in relation to the 
absence of death sentences, indicating that where the size of the black population was 
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small there was a greater likelihood that the state would not sentence an offender to death 
consistent with what would be predicted based on the racial threat propositions.   
 In addition to the threshold effect, several continuous measures have also been 
examined.   In an attempt to get at the curvilinear relationship, researchers have often 
included a quadratic transformation of the percent minority measures.  The theoretical 
assumption behind the use of this measure is that at the extreme, that is where the 
minority population represents a very small proportion of the overall population or a very 
large proportion of the overall population, the social control of that group should be low. 
This is due to the idea that blacks are considered less threatening either because there are 
too few of them to produce tension or because they are the majority group in the 
population.  An opposite proposal, that at the extremes social control should be at its 
highest, because it is when there is greater disconnect between the minority and majority 
groups that the majority will feel most threatened, has also been suggested.  These 
quadratic relationships have rarely found support in practice (Tolnay et al., 1989; 
Holmes, 2000; Holmes, Smith, Freng, & Muñoz, 2008).   
Second, some researchers have moved away from the use of the percent minority 
measure seen in the majority of the early studies of minority threat (Liska & Chamlin, 
1984; Tolnay, Beck, & Massey, 1989; Crawford, Chiricos, and Kleck, 1998).  This has 
resulted in several new operational definitions of Blalock‘s (1967) key explanatory 
factor, the relative size of the minority population.   
As a result of the criticisms against the use of the percent minority measure in 
studies of minority threat, especially that percent minority is truly measuring the crime 
prone population instead of threat, researchers began to directly measure the intervening 
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factors that Blalock (1967) and others suggested, even though Blalock originally 
proposed that the intervening factors could not be directly measured.  Specifically, 
Blalock suggested that discrimination could not be directly measured, and so what he 
referred to as ―inequalities‖ (p. 144) such as segregation which could be directly 
measured, were considered.  The assumption was that discrimination would be the 
intervening mechanism by which the size of the minority population affected those 
inequalities.  While discrimination has not been directly measured, more recent research 
has assessed the relationship between the size of the black population and measures of 
racial prejudice (Stults & Baumer, 2007).  As Allport (1954) suggests, discrimination is 
one action in which a person can display prejudice.  With this in mind, it is possible that 
racial prejudice, though not a direct measure of discrimination, is a close proxy. 
The other mediating factors in which Blalock (1967) was interested but unable to 
directly capture, for economic threat, consisted of: a labor surplus, economic instability, 
and a lack of education or resources of dominant group members.  For power threat, the 
mediating factors were political instability and the minority group allying itself with a 
powerful outside enemy of the majority.  In recent research, more direct measures 
indicating economic threat and political threat have been proposed (Stults & Baumer, 
2007).   
 Studies have attempted to directly measure economic and political threat in 
several ways.  Economic threat, for instance, has commonly been measured using some 
variation on unemployment.  Many studies have used the simple measure of the percent 
of the population that is unemployed to measure labor surplus (Jacobs & Carmichael, 
2004).  Other studies have used what is commonly referred to as economic inequality 
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which has been defined as the ratio of black to white unemployment (Eitle et al., 2002) or 
the difference between white and black per capita income (Crawford et al., 1998; Jacobs 
& Helms, 1999; Britt, 2000).  Additional studies have relied on the Gini coefficient, 
which is calculated as the average difference in income between all pairs of individuals in 
an area relative to the mean income of the area (Liska, Chamlin, & Reed, 1985; Jacobs & 
Carmichael, 2001; Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld, 2003; Parker & Maggard, 2005).  
These measures have found mixed support in the literature.  For instance, one study 
found an increase in the ratio of black to white per capita income to be significantly 
related to a decrease in the risk of incarceration (Britt, 2000).  In contrast, Eitle and 
colleagues (2002) did not find a significant relationship between economic threat, 
measured as the ratio of black to white unemployment, and blacks‘ likelihood of arrest.  
 Similar to these attempts to measure economic threat, researchers have begun to 
directly measure political threat.  Jacobs and Helms (1999) suggested race riots as a 
measure of political threat, using the natural log of the cumulative sum of riots to predict 
correctional expenditures.  The findings indicate that an increase in the number of race 
riots was significantly and positively related to spending on corrections.  Chamlin and 
Cochran (2000) also proposed that ―race-related riots pose a direct physical and symbolic 
threat to the white majority and elites‖ (p. 87).  Specifically, they suggested that the 
incidence of robbery arrests would increase following the 1967 race-related riot in 
Cincinnati, Ohio.  The authors did not find a significant relationship between the race riot 
and robbery arrests.  While, Chamlin and Cochran chose robbery as their outcome 
because it was thought to be ―characterized as being more threatening to superordinate 
than subordinate groups‖ (p. 88), it is possible the use of a civil disorder measure, such as 
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race riots, would be more effective at predicting disorder related crimes than at predicting 
economic crimes. 
 Two other measures have been used to measure political threat.  First, the ratio of 
black-to-white voting in South Carolina was proposed to be positively related to black 
arrests in the state, although this prediction was not supported (Eitle et al., 2002).  
Second, Stults and Baumer (2007) suggested the use of the ratio of elected black political 
officials to the proportion of the voting-age population that is black as an indicator of 
political threat.  Similar to a number of other studies in which political threat was directly 
captured, Stults and Baumer‘s indicator was not significantly related to private police 
force size.   
 Additional direct measures of the proposed intervening mechanisms in the racial 
threat literature have been developed through the introduction and more widespread use 
of social surveys such as the General Social Survey (GSS) and the American Mosaic 
Survey (AMS).  
Stults and Baumer (2007), for instance, used measures from the GSS to assess the 
mediating processes between the size of the minority population and private police force 
size.  The authors found a nonlinear relationship between the size of the black population 
and private police force size.  Stults and Baumer then applied linear and quadratic 
measures of the economic threat, fear of crime, and racial prejudice measures to directly 
assess intervening mechanisms and their effect on the relationship between the black 
population and private police force size.  Both the economic threat and fear of crime 
extensions of the racial threat propositions were supported.  Specifically, the researchers 
concluded that relative to the economic threat perspective, ―explicit efforts by the 
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majority to maintain economic dominance are likely to occur as the black population 
grows in relative size, but become less necessary as blacks begin to make up a substantial 
portion of the population‖ consistent with the significant nonlinear functional forms 
(Stults & Baumer, 2007: 536).   
Likewise, King and Wheelock (2007), using the AMS to look at the association 
between the relative size of the minority population and punitive attitudes, proposed that 
―for white respondents, perceptions of racial threat explain the association between 
punitive attitudes and aggregate demographics and economic conditions‖ (p. 1261).  The 
authors found a relationship between the change in the size of the black population and 
punitive attitudes suggesting that whites are more likely to be punitive in counties that 
experienced a recent in-migration of black residents.  In addition, King and Wheelock 
found a significant and positive relationship between their measures of perceived threat 
and punitive attitudes that attenuated the relationship between change in black population 
size and punitive attitudes, but did not explain the relationship fully.   
Summary 
Research on minority threat has received mixed support.  First, the proposed 
direct effect of the relative size of the black population on various measures of social 
control has been supported overall both in the positive formulation (Britt, 2000; Holmes, 
2000; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Smith & Holmes, 2003; Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Jacobs 
et al., 2005) and the negative (or benign-neglect) formulation (Liska & Chamlin, 1984; 
Eitle et al., 2005; Parker & Maggard, 2005).  In addition, the curvilinear relationship has 
found some support in the quadratic (Jacobs et al., 2005) and the threshold effect (Jacobs 
& Carmichael, 2004), but has also failed to find support in some studies (Holmes, 2000; 
Stacey, Michele, 2010, UMSL, p. 45 
 
Cureton, 2000; Holmes et al., 2008).  The economic threat hypothesis has been supported 
in relation to sentencing (Britt, 2000), incarceration (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001), and 
police force size (D‘Alessio et al., 2004).  Political threat has also found support in 
relation to informal social control (King & Brustein, 2006), but has generally not been 
supported in relation to formal social control (Chamlin & Cochran, 2000; Stults & 
Baumer, 2007).  The fear of crime mediation, or threat of black crime hypothesis, has 
found some support in relation to capital punishment (Jacobs et al., 2005).  Finally, the 
perceived threat measures have found support generally for the economic threat and 
threat of black crime hypotheses (Stults & Baumer, 2007; King & Wheelock, 2007).  
 
INTERRACIAL CRIME 
 By its very nature, bias crime is often interracial crime.  While there has been 
little research on the prevalence of bias crime, non-bias interracial crime has been 
examined in some detail.  This literature may be important for informing the analysis of 
bias motivated intergroup crime to the extent that all intergroup crime is similar.  The 
majority of this research assesses the correlates of interracial homicide rates although a 
few recent studies have begun looking at interracial assault and robbery (Hipp, Tita, & 
Boggess, 2009).   
 The majority of studies of interracial crime have assessed three theoretical 
frameworks.  First, Blau‘s macrostructural opportunity theory, discussed earlier, has been 
a primary focus of research on interracial homicide particularly (Messner & Golden, 
1992; Jacobs & Wood, 1999; Parker & McCall, 1999; Wadsworth & Kubrin, 2004; 
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McCall & Parker, 2005). This is due in large part to Blau‘s focus on the relationship 
between opportunity structure and the prevalence of crime.   
Second, many researchers have focused on a frustration-aggression framework 
(Blau & Blau, 1982) to explain the motivation behind interracial crime (Messner & 
Golden, 1992; Jacobs & Wood, 1999; Parker & McCall, 1999; Wasdsworth & Kubrin, 
2004; McCall & Parker, 2005; Hipp et al., 2009).  Specifically, frustration-aggression 
explanations hold that blacks (or other minorities) may feel compelled to succeed in the 
same spheres that whites have enjoyed success in for centuries, specifically work related 
avenues, but due to their subordinate status their means of achieving that success is 
limited.  This inability to achieve success will result in frustration which will lead 
minorities to attempt to find relief for that frustration.  This relief will come through 
aggressive action, in this case through violent action, directed at the perceived source of 
the frustration, in this case the dominant white population.  In other words, the 
frustration-aggression hypothesis would suggest that as black economic opportunities 
decrease, blacks offending toward whites should increase.   
Third, studies have assessed the relationship between social disorganization and 
interracial crime (Messner & Golden, 1992; Parker & McCall, 1999; Hipp et al., 2009).  
Based on the work of Shaw and McKay (1942) and further developed by Bursik (1988) 
social disorganization theory suggests that as the structural conditions in a neighborhood 
deteriorate and communities become more socially disorganized, they will lose their 
ability to maintain effective social control.  In today‘s cities racial heterogeneity and 
residential mobility contribute to racial segregation in the inner city.  This segregation 
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causes further deterioration and poverty in the inner city which in turn further weakens 
controls.  These weakened controls result in increasing crime rates. 
 Studies assessing the relationship between these three theoretical perspectives and 
interracial homicide or violent crime have found mixed results.  Messner and Golden 
(1992) find support for the frustration-aggression framework in relation to overall 
homicide, white offending, and black offending, but not for overall interracial homicide.  
Later work by Jacobs and Wood (1999) criticizes the use of the overall interracial 
homicide rate due to the assertion that Blau‘s structural theory in particular would predict 
differing relationships for black offender-white victim crimes and white offender-black 
victim crimes.  Specifically, Blau would suggest that cities with few blacks will have a 
higher rate of black on white offending due to the increased likelihood of a black person 
coming into contact with a white person.  However, the opposite effect would be true for 
white on black offending, because whites will have a lower likelihood of coming into 
contact with a black person in this situation. Jacobs and Wood thus disaggregate 
interracial homicide to account for these differing patterns and find support for Blau‘s 
theory in both analyses.  Specifically, they find that ―in cities with relatively few 
blacks… the association between the percentage of blacks and black killings of whites 
[is] negative‖ (Jacobs & Wood, 1999:179).   
 In a recent study by Hipp and colleagues (2009), the relationship between social 
disorganization, conflict theories as discussed earlier and interracial robbery and assault 
within Los Angeles was assessed.  This analysis uses more recent data, from 2000 to 
2006, and assesses the relationship between racial inequality, racial composition, and 
inter and intra-racial crime both within and between census tracts; however, the results do 
Stacey, Michele, 2010, UMSL, p. 48 
 
not support Blau‘s theory.  On the other hand, the authors find general support for a 
social disorganization model.  Specifically, the authors find that for intragroup violence 
absolute racial inequality was associated with more violence for Latinos and African-
Americans.   The authors also find that relative inequality was positively associated with 
Latino on Black robbery. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The United States has a long history of violent behavior on the basis of prejudice 
(e.g., lynching).  The most recent incarnation of this violence has been hate crime.  Since 
the 1980s hate crime has been part of the policy debate in this country.  Additionally, hate 
crime has become a part of research in many social sciences including psychology, 
sociology, and criminology.  This research has suggested that hate crimes are distinct 
from other crimes in their effect on the victims and in the extent of the effect the crime 
has on the community at large.  Given the findings of prior research, and the increased 
attention paid to hate crime in the political arena, gaining a better understanding of the 
phenomenon will lend itself to more effective policy discussions.   
Research on crime in general has shown that human behavior, specifically 
criminal behavior, does not occur absent the environment.  In fact, research in 
psychology suggests that all human behavior is shaped by the world around us.  Macro 
level studies of crime suggest that crime is often a function of opportunity or 
criminogenic environments.  This emphasis on the macro level context of crime has not 
been a major area of research on hate crime, however. 
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Prior research on the macro level context of hate crime suggests that demographic 
changes, intergroup contact, and a lack of economic disadvantage are related to an 
increased prevalence of hate crime.  However, what is known about the macro level 
context of hate crime is based on a handful of studies conducted in two primary locations.  
The extent to which the findings of these studies may be generalized to other jurisdictions 
and other time periods is not known.  In an effort to fill this gap in the empirical literature 
on hate crime this dissertation assesses the macro level context of hate crime using a 
database of hate crime incidents over a large number of jurisdictions and from recent 
years.   
Additionally, the prior research on the macro level context of hate crime has 
tended to focus on racially motivated incidents.  The same is true of studies using the 
minority threat framework to assess crime in general.  In an effort to extend this minority 
threat framework into other groups this dissertation examines minority threat as a 
mechanism to explain other group dynamics beyond black-white.   
The following chapter describes the methods that will be used to answer the 
questions listed in chapter 1.  
Stacey, Michele, 2010, UMSL, p. 50 
 
CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND VARIABLES 
Sources 
 Data is drawn from eleven sources for the purposes of answering the research 
questions posed in chapter 1.  First, the 2000-2007 Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) is used 
for the hate crime measures.  Collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the 
UCR provides information on all crimes known to the police.  The Hate Crimes Statistics 
publication produced by the FBI provides counts of all known hate crimes since 1995 for 
all reporting law enforcement jurisdictions, cities, counties, and states.  This publication 
also breaks down this information by the type of hate crime, including race, religion, 
ethnicity/national origin, sexual orientation, and disability.    
The second, widely used in research on various topics, is the United States 
decennial census.  The census is collected every ten years by the United States Census 
Bureau and provides aggregate population counts as well as economic indicators at 
various levels of aggregation.  State level data is drawn from the 2000 census.  
Additionally, because the decennial census is only conducted every 10 years, and thus the 
2010 census is only now being conducted, it is necessary to draw inter-censal estimates 
from another source.  This source is the American Community Survey (ACS).  This 
survey was fully implemented in 2002, and involves the collection of population data for 
each year.  Because the ACS did not begin until 2002 and the census is only available for 
2000, linear interpolation is used to compute the 2001 estimates for the variables of 
interest. 
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 Fourth, several sources provide additional measures of minority threat.  The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provides information on immigration patterns 
into the United States.  The Immigration Yearbook published each year by DHS provides 
counts of several types of immigrants as well as information on their origin and 
destination. Additionally, for the gay and lesbian analysis, two groups that may feel 
particularly ―threatened‖ by a growing homosexual population are political conservatives 
and religious fundamentalists.  For the purpose of measuring conservatism, data is drawn 
from Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections.  Religious fundamentalism data is 
drawn from the 2000 Religious Congregations and Membership Survey.    
 In addition, in order to control for organizational factors that may influence the 
reporting of hate crime to the UCR (Nolan & Akiyama, 1999), data is drawn from the 
Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) from 2000 and 
2003.  Linear interpolation was used for the inter-survey years.  
 Political threat indicators were drawn from the Current Population Survey‘s 
(CPS) Voting and Registration Supplement.  These represent the voting behavior of the 
minority groups.  Additionally, a second political threat indicator was drawn from the 
Joint Center for Political and Social Research‘s (JCPSR) Roster of Black Elected 
Officials.   Finally, in order to account for the political power of gays and lesbians data 
was drawn from the Human Rights Campaign and confirmed by state statutes and reports 
of court cases on the provision of civil rights protections for same-sex couples and 
homosexual individuals. 
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Table 3.1: Explanation of Predictors and Modeling Structure 
 
Dependent Variable 
 Independent 
Variables 
African-
American Hispanic Gay/Lesbian Description 
%Blk/%Wh X 
  
Ratio of Black to White in State 
Hispanic 
Immigration 
 
X 
 
Hispanic immigration rate per 
100,000  
W/B 
Unemployment X 
  
Ratio of White to Black 
Unemployed 
H/W 
Unemployment 
 
X 
 
Ratio of Hispanic to White 
Unemployed 
H/B 
Unemployment 
 
X 
 
Ratio of Hispanic to Black 
Unemployed 
% Black Voters X 
  
% of Blacks age 18+ who Voted 
% African-
American 
Legislators X 
  
% of State Legislators who are 
African-American 
% Hispanic Voters 
 
X 
 
% of Hispanics age 18+ who 
voted 
Total Poverty X X 
 
% of Population living below 
the Federal Poverty Line 
% Young White 
Males X X 
 
% of White Male population 
age 18 to 29 
West X X 
 
State in Western US 
South X X 
 
State in Southern US 
% Urban X X 
 
% of State Population residing 
in cities over 100,000 
% Population 
Covered X X X 
% of State Population Covered 
by Reporting Agencies 
% Agencies 
Reporting Non-
Zeros X X X 
% of Reporting Agencies 
indicating a Non-Zero Count 
Aggravated 
Assault Rate X X 
 
Aggravated Assault rate per 
100,000 
Reporting Statute X X 
 
State has reporting statute only 
Criminal Statute X X 
 
State has criminal statute only 
Reporting and 
Criminal Statute X X 
 
State has both a reporting and 
a criminal statute 
Police per Capita X X 
 
Number of Police officers per 
100,000 
% Community 
Policing X X 
 
% of Agencies indicating a 
Community Policing Policy 
% Bias Unit X X 
 
% of Agencies indicating the 
presence of a bias Unit or 
Other Specialized Personnel 
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Table 3.1: Explanation of Predictors and Modeling Structure 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
African-
American Hispanic Gay/Lesbian Description 
Sexual 
Orientation 
Statute X X 
 
Sexual Orientation included as 
Protected Category 
Disability Statute X X 
 
Disability included as Protected 
Category 
Bias Statute X X 
 
Motivation is "because of" bias 
as opposed to hatred 
Perception 
Statute X X 
 
Statute includes perception 
clause 
Civil Rights 
Statute X X 
 
Statute is a civil rights statute 
Freestanding 
Statute X X 
 
Statute is a freestanding 
statute 
Modifying 
Statute X X 
 
statute is a modifying statute 
Coattailing 
Statute X X 
 
statute is a coattailing statute 
Hispanic 
Population 
 
X 
 
Total Hispanic Population 
Black Population X 
  
Total Black Population 
% Same Sex HH 
  
X 
% of Unmarried Partner 
Households with Same-Sex 
Partners 
% Republican 
  
X % Voting Republican 
Evangelical 
Adherence 
  
X 
Rate per 1,000 of Evangelical 
Adherents 
G/L Political 
Power 
  
X 
Gay and Lesbian Political Power 
Scale 
 
Finally, due to the differing structures of hate crime law discussed previously (i.e. 
the absence of sexual orientation and/or disability from many statutes) and the possible 
discrepancies in reporting behavior across states, it is possible that some areas may treat 
hate crime differently than others.  In order to control for this possible recording bias, 
data is collected from the state statutes themselves.  Each statute is available online.  The 
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coding of these statutes is discussed shortly.  For a summary of which indicators are used 
in which analysis, see Table 3.1.
7
 
Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis for the examination of trends in hate crime in this study is the 
state.  The state was selected for two primary reasons.  First, the state is the vehicle 
through which policy is made.  Law makers produce policy at the state level.  These 
policies filter down to the lower aggregations such that all jurisdictions in a state are 
subject to them.  Thus, in order to inform policy the state is the ideal unit to examine.  
Second, hate crime is an extremely rare event, at least in terms of those crimes that come 
to the attention of the police.  As a result there is limited variability at smaller levels of 
aggregation.  The state as a result provides considerably more variability than these 
smaller units.  Despite these benefits, the state is a heterogeneous unit.  This 
heterogeneity may influence the results of the analysis.  Specifically, it is possible that the 
heterogeneity of states may suppress some of the relationships that may be found at lower 
levels of aggregation.  In other words, the increased heterogeneity of states may make it 
more difficult to detect a relationship between the predictors and hate crime.  This is 
possible due to the fact that race, ethnicity, and other group characteristics are not evenly 
distributed in a state.  For instance states that are more rural may have the greatest 
concentration of minorities in a small land area, such as a single large city, and thus the 
state as a whole may have fewer hate crimes.  This is addressed here using a control 
indicator for  percent urban described shortly.  
 
                                                 
7
 Due to data limitations discussed further in chapter 6, the gay/lesbian analysis was limited to only a few 
covariates. 
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Dependent Variables 
 The analysis involves the examination of three dependent variables.  Each of 
these represents the number of bias crimes that occurred in the state each year from 2000 
to 2007.  There are a total of 51 states
8
 (the 50 United States plus the District of 
Columbia) in the analysis.  These count measures include the total number of anti-black 
bias crimes, the total number of anti-Hispanic bias crimes, and the total number of anti-
homosexual
9
 bias crimes.  These represent three of the five major categories of bias 
crimes available in the UCR data.  The two not included here are anti-religious incidents 
and anti-disability incidents.  Anti-disability incidents represent such a small percentage 
of reported hate crime incidents each year that there are not enough incidents to be able to 
estimate a reliable regression model.  Anti-religious incidents occur at about the same 
rate as sexual orientation crimes; however, the examination of this category is outside the 
scope of the present study. 
Predictors 
The relationship between several contextual indicators and bias crime is assessed.  
The indicators drawn from the 2000 Decennial Census and the 2002-2007 ACS include 
indicators of the relative size of the minority population as defined by Blalock.  Blalock 
suggests that it is not the overall size of the minority population, but the size of the 
minority group relative to the majority.  As such indicators include the ratio of blacks to 
whites in the population, the percent of the population that is of Hispanic origin, and 
finally a proxy for the gay and lesbian population.  Additionally, the rate of Hispanic 
immigration is included.  This indicator is used to assess growth in the Hispanic 
                                                 
8
 Due to some data limitations this sample was limited in the anti-homosexual analysis. 
9
 Anti-Homosexual bias crimes are defined by the UCR as anti-lesbian (female homosexual), anti-gay 
(male homosexual), and anti-homosexual.  Anti-bisexual crimes will also be included in this measure.   
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population that can be attributed to a subgroup of the minority that may be considered 
particularly threatening to the majority group.  Specifically, immigrants may be seen as a 
threat to the job security of the majority group since it is believed that many immigrants 
are willing to work for less pay and do not pay the same taxes (Citrin, Green, Muste, & 
Wong, 1997).  This is drawn from the Department of Homeland Security‘s Immigration 
Yearbook for the years 2000 to 2007.  
Also from the Census and ACS, in line with the economic threat perspectives, 
several measures of the economy are included where appropriate.  Blalock refers to 
competition between groups.  In an effort to capture this competition, indicators of the 
unemployment ratio, the income ratio, and the poverty ratio are included.   
Also in line with the minority threat framework, the concept of political threat is 
measured using data from three sources.  First, the Current Population Survey from 2000, 
2002, 2004, and 2006 provides measures of participation in voting.  Specifically, the 
percent of blacks over the age of 18 who voted in a given election year and the percent of 
Hispanics over the age of 18 who voted in a given election year are used.  For non-
election years the prior year‘s figures are used.  In other words, the 2000 figures are used 
for 2001, etc.  Second, the Joint Center for Political and Social Research publishes the 
Roster of Black Elected Officials each year.  This provides an indicator of the percent of 
state legislators who are African-American.  The political threat hypothesis would 
suggest that more participation in the political arena by the minority group will lead to a 
greater level of perceived threat and thus will lead to more hate crime. Finally, gay and 
lesbian political power is assessed using a proxy measure created by examining the civil 
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rights protections afforded gay and lesbian couples and individuals and developing a 
summative scale.  This scale is discussed in more detail in chapter 6. 
In addition to these minority, economic, and political threat indicators, control 
measures are drawn from the Census and ACS data.  First, prior research (Comstock, 
1991; Berrill, 1992; Messner et al., 2004) suggests that the majority of hate crime 
offenders are young white males.  In order to control for differences in the size of the 
offending population the percent of the state population who are white males age 18 to 29 
is included.  Additionally, in order to control for some of the heterogeneity of states an 
indicator of the percent of the state population living in cities over 100,000 population 
(percent urban) is included.  Finally, controls for the region the state is in are included.  
Additionally, a control for the overall economic conditions of the state is included in the 
form of the total percent poor.  This is done in order to ensure that the indicators of 
competition are picking up competition and not the overall economy of the state.    
A number of organizational measures, consistent with research looking at the 
reporting of crime statistics and in particular hate crime reporting, are drawn from both 
the LEMAS and the UCR data in an effort to control for reporting effects.  First, the 
average size of the police departments is included.  Prior research (McDevitt et al, 2003) 
has suggested that larger police agencies are more likely to have a hate crime policy, 
greater supervision over hate crime incidents, specialized training, and specialized 
officers or units to deal with hate crime each of which has been shown to encourage 
reporting.  This indicator is drawn from the FBI‘s Crime in the United States publication 
for each year.  Second, an indicator for the percent of police agencies in the state that 
maintain a specialized officer or unit for the investigation of hate crime is included from 
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the LEMAS dataset. It is likely that states that have more of these specialized units will 
be more sensitive to hate crime and will thus report more hate crime.  The LEMAS 
dataset also provides an indicator of the percent of police agencies in the state that have a 
community policing policy or program.  Prior research (Martin, 1996) suggests that 
community policing agencies may be more sensitive to the concerns of the community, 
and thus may be more concerned with the issues of hate crime.  As a result these agencies 
may lead to a greater level of reporting of hate crime. 
 Additionally, the UCR data provides two indicators of reporting practices. The 
first is the percent of the population covered by reporting agencies and the second is the 
percent of agencies reporting non-zero counts.  States that report more should have 
higher hate crime counts. 
An indicator of the aggravated assault rate is drawn from the UCR.  Messner and 
colleagues (2004) suggest that hate crimes are similar to all aggravated assaults.  Thus, it 
is expected that there should be more hate crimes where there are more aggravated 
assaults.   
Finally, measures are coded by the researcher directly from the state hate crime 
statutes of each state in the analysis.  These indicators include, first, whether the statute 
calls for the reporting of hate crime (1= reporting statute, 0=other; reference category), 
the criminalization of hate crime (1=criminalizing statute, 0=other), or both (1=both 
reporting and criminal statute, 0=other).  States that have a reporting statute which 
requires the collection of hate crime statistics should report more to the hate crime data 
collection program.  Additionally, the statutes are coded as to which type of statute the 
state has (see chapter 1 for a description of the different statute types; penalty 
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enhancement statutes are the reference category).  It is possible that the varying 
definitions of hate crime from one state to another may influence the state‘s reporting of 
hate crime.  Third, each statute is coded as to the handling of the motivational criteria.  
Specifically, if the statute defines a hate crime as a crime in which the victim was chosen 
―because of‖ their membership in a protected group the statute is coded as a ―bias crime‖ 
statute (1=bias statute, 0=hate statute).  If the statute uses another strategy for defining 
the motivational component of hate crime the statute is coded as a ―hate crime‖ statute 
(see Jenness & Grattet, 2001: 87-90 for a more detailed discussion of the difference 
between these wording choices).  Bias statutes are more broadly defined and thus should 
have more crimes categorized as hate crime. Along the same lines, the statutes are each 
coded according to whether they include a ―perception clause‖ (i.e., a person commits a 
felony because he or she perceives the victim to have some quality: 1=perception clause, 
0=no perception clause).  Finally, each statute is coded according to the level of inclusion 
of different groups (i.e. does the state include sexual orientation and disability in their 
statute: 1=included, 0=not included). 
 The state of Missouri, for instance, includes provisions for enhanced penalties 
for crimes ―which the state believes to be knowingly motivated because of race, color, 
religion, national origin, sex, sexual orientation or disability of the victim or victims, the 
state may charge the crime or crimes under this section‖ (557.035 RSMo).  The statute 
provides for an increase in the case of assault in the third degree from a class A 
misdemeanor (565.070. 2 RSMo) to a class D felony (557.035. 2 RSMo).  Missouri does 
not have a reporting statute.  Illinois on the other hand does have a data collection statute 
calling for ―an electronic data processing and computer center for the storage and 
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retrieval of data pertaining to criminal activity‖ (ILCS 2605/2605-45. 4).  As another 
example, Utah up until 2004 linked crime committed due to bias or prejudice to civil 
rights violations; however, in 2004 this bill was repealed and replaced by a penalty 
enhancement statute.  For more detailed examples of the coding scheme see Appendix B. 
 
ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
 The analysis involves the regression of the count dependent variables on the 
predictors and controls.  These incident count indicators are used to assess the 
relationship between the contextual indicators and the number of hate crimes in the state.  
Negative Binomial Regression for panel data is used to assess the effects of the relevant 
contextual indicators on each of the bias crime types.  These models allow for the 
assessment of changes over time in the number of bias crimes within a state while 
controlling for variation across states.  Negative Binomial Regression corrects for the 
overdispersion that is often apparent in event count models.     
 In order to estimate negative binomial regression models in the face of serial 
autocorrelation (or time dependence of errors)
10
, generalized estimating equations (GEE) 
are used.  These models allow for the estimation of a population averaged model in which 
the within-group correlation structure can be specified.   
Drawing a Picture of Minority Threat 
 
 The three dependent variables are examined separately and as such the minority 
threat framework is applied differently to each.  As mentioned previously anti-black hate 
crime has been examined to some extent in prior research using minority threat.  The 
                                                 
10
 A test for serial autocorrelation (xtserial in Stata) was significant, suggesting that there is time 
dependence of errors in this data.   
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proposed hypotheses are: first, that as the relative size of the black population in a state 
increases the number of hate crimes against blacks should increase.  This hypothesis 
comes straight from the traditional minority threat framework.  Likewise, as the political 
power of the black population within the state increases and as the white population 
becomes more economically disadvantaged the number of hate crimes against blacks 
should increase consistent with the political and economic threat arguments.  Finally, 
straight from the minority threat framework it is expected that black to white competition 
and black political power will mediate
11
 the relationship between the size of the black 
population and hate crime.  Additionally, Blalock proposes that these relationships may 
be curvilinear.  That is the relationship should be positive but at some point it may turn 
negative. 
 
  
 
       
 
 
 
 
     
 
        
  
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
  
        
         
         
         
         
         
          
Figure 3.1: Proposed relationship between minority threat and Anti-Black and Anti-
Hispanic Hate Crime 
 
 For the anti-Hispanic analysis the predicted relationships are very much the same.  
For instance, as the size of the Hispanic population increases so should hate crimes 
                                                 
11
 A mediating relationship suggests that a third variable acts to generate the ―mechanism through which 
the focal independent variable is able to influence the dependent variable of interest‖ (Baron & Kenny, 
1986).  This mediating variable should thus explain the relationship between the independent variable and 
the dependent variable. 
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against them.  Additionally, as Hispanic political power increases and majority economic 
power decreases anti-Hispanic hate crime should increase.  Finally, Hispanic political 
power and majority economic power should mediate the relationship between Hispanic 
group size and hate crime. The relationships for both anti-Black and anti-Hispanic hate 
crime are illustrated by Figure 3.1. 
 
 
  
        
         
                 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
Figure 3.2: Proposed relationship between minority threat and Anti-Homosexual Hate Crime 
 
 
 The anti-gay and lesbian analysis is limited to the predictions of minority threat 
and political threat.  While it is likely that economics will play a role in the explanation of 
anti-gay and lesbian crime, it is not likely that heterosexuals will feel threatened 
economically by their homosexual counterparts.  On the other hand, consistent with the 
minority threat hypothesis, it is expected that as the relative size of the gay and lesbian 
population increases hate crimes against them will increase.  Likewise, as gays and 
lesbians gain in political power the political conservatives are likely to feel threatened 
and as such crimes against gays and lesbians should increase.  Finally, extending the 
concept of threat, a leading argument for the marginalization of gays and lesbians has 
been the definition of their private sexual behavior as sinful.  As such religious 
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fundamentalists, or those who believe strongly in the teachings of the Bible, are likely to 
feel threatened by an encroaching and politically powerful gay and lesbian population.  
Given this extension an increase in the prevalence of religious fundamentalism in a state 
should result in an increase in anti-homosexual hate crimes.  Likewise, similar to the 
other relationships that the minority threat framework suggests, this relationship should 
be curvilinear, such that at some point the positive relationship may turn negative. 
 
OUTLINE OF WHAT IS TO COME 
 
 The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 4 examines the relationship 
between minority threat and anti-racial hate crimes.  Specifically, this chapter presents 
the results of the regression of the number of anti-black hate crimes on the relative size of 
the black population, the black political strength and black to white economic 
competition.  Chapter 5 applies minority threat to anti-ethnic hate crimes, specifically 
anti-Hispanic.  Like the anti-black analysis, this analysis examines the relationship 
between Hispanic population size, Hispanic to white and black economic competition, 
Hispanic political power, and the number of anti-Hispanic hate crimes in a state.  Chapter 
6 extends the analysis of minority threat to anti-homosexual hate crimes, specifically 
assessing the relationship between the size of the gay and lesbian population, political 
conservatism, religious fundamentalism and the number of crimes against gays and 
lesbians in the state. Finally, the last chapter discusses the ways in which the findings 
may contribute to the policy debate on hate crime as well as future research. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
MINORITY THREAT, REPORTING, AND ANTI-RACIAL HATE 
 
Introduction 
 
 Since the time of slavery racial animosity has been the motivating factor in 
violence of all kinds.  Lynching in the 1800s and the early part of the 1900s led to the 
violence that today is called hate crime.  The civil rights movement was one of the 
primary driving forces behind the development of civil rights violation statutes which, as 
mentioned in chapter 1, led directly to the development of hate crime laws in the 1980s 
and 90s.  As such anti-racial hate crimes have been the primary focus of the majority of 
hate crime research.  This chapter extends the prior research on anti-racial crimes by 
examining the predictors of anti-racial hate crimes from 2000 to 2007 applying in 
particular a minority threat framework.   
Trends in Anti-Racial Hate Crime 
 Anti-racial hate crime incidents comprise upwards of 50% of all hate crime 
incidents each year.  The hate crime reporting program began reporting data in 1995 and 
since that time the number of reported incidents has increased; however, as Figure 4.1 
below suggests the overall hate crime rate has decreased.  This could be an artifact of 
reporting.  Perhaps the increase in the number of hate crimes reported is the result of an 
increase in participation in the hate crime reporting program by police jurisdictions.  An 
increase in coverage may lead to artificial increases in the reported number of hate crimes 
that are not translated into changes in the rate of hate crime once the adjustment for 
population size has been made.  Alternatively, it may be that hate crimes have been 
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decreasing.  However, this is not supported by some of the other trends in the hate crime 
data. 
Figure 4.1: Total Hate Crime Rate, 1995-2008
 
 To examine the possibility that the hate crime rate is decreasing due to changes in 
the reporting practices of agencies, Figure 4.2 below shows the trend in the percent of the 
population that is covered by the Hate Crime Reporting Program during the same time 
period.  Looking at each of these figures suggests that while the overall hate crime rate 
has been steadily decreasing since 1995, the coverage of the hate crime reporting 
program has actually increased, from a low of about 74% in 1995 to a high of about 87% 
in 2008.  Thus it would seem that it is not a decrease in reporting that explains the 
decrease in the overall hate crime rate, suggesting that there are other mechanisms at 
work that drive the trend in hate crime.  Does this trend appear the same across bias 
motivations?  And if so, what could explain these trends? 
To answer the first question, figure 4.3 below shows the rate of anti-black bias 
crimes over the course of the hate crime reporting program.  The decline in the anti-black 
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hate crime rate appears similar to the overall trend in hate crime, with a relatively steady 
decline; although in the last few years the rate seems to have leveled off.    
 
Figure 4.2: % Population Covered by Reporting Agencies, 1995-2008 
 
  
Figure 4.3: Anti-Black Hate Crime Rate, 1995-2008 
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 The above figures suggest that there is variation in hate crime over time, but what 
about across place.  In order to answer that question I have graphed the hate crime rate at 
lower levels of aggregation beginning with the region (Figure 4.4) and then the state 
(Figure 4.5).  The regional graph suggests that not only is there variation across the four 
regions of the United States, but that variation changes over time.  For example, looking 
at the West, in 2000 and 2001 the West had the highest racial bias crime rate in the 
country; however, beginning in 2002 the Midwest surpassed the West to become the 
highest.  Additionally, the South, a region typically associated with racial bigotry has the 
lowest racial hate crime rate in the country across all eight years.  Perhaps Southern states 
simply report fewer hate crimes because they are less likely to take hate crime seriously.  
While this is an interesting question it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine 
this possibility. 
Figure 4.4: Racial Bias Motivation by Region, 2000-2007 
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intriguing picture.  Figure 4.5 below shows the racial hate crime rate from 2000 to 2007 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
R
at
e
 p
e
r 
1
0
0
,0
0
0
 T
o
ta
l P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
South
West
Midwest
Northeast
Stacey, Michele, 2010, UMSL, p. 68 
 
for five states.  These five states were chosen to represent all four regions of the United 
States.  California regularly reports the largest number of hate crimes of any state to the 
FBI.  However, California is also the largest state in the union and as such the hate crime 
rate is not much higher than the other states.  The racial hate crime rate decreased in 
California from 2000 to the present.  On the other hand, the other states in the graph 
appear overall to have relatively stable racial hate crime rates over time, with slight 
increases or decreases in some years.  Tennessee is interesting in that in 2001 there was a 
large increase in the racial hate crime rate unlike the other states in the graph.  Otherwise, 
Tennessee seems to have decreased in its overall racial hate crime rate, while remaining 
stable since 2002.  While this graph is not conclusive in regards to its examination of the 
variation across states, it does suggest that there are differences across states and within 
states on the rate of racially motivated bias crime.  The following analysis attempts to 
explain this variation by applying the minority threat perspective to within and between 
state level variation in the number of anti-black hate crimes.   
Figure 4.5: Race Bias Crime Rate per 100,000 for Five States, 2000-2007
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Minority Threat and Anti-Black Hate Crime 
In order to explain the variation seen in the graphs above, the minority threat 
framework will be used.   As with Blalock‘s original framework, the minority threat 
hypothesis suggests that the relative size of the black population should be positively and 
significantly related to the number of hate crimes.  Additionally, the minority threat 
framework proposes two mediating relationships.  First, where there is more economic 
competition between blacks and whites (the minority and the majority) there should be 
more hate crime, and this relationship should mediate the effect of the relative size of the 
black population and hate crime.  Second, where the minority population has a stronger 
political presence there should be more hate crime against them.  Also, like the economic 
competition argument the relationship between the relative size of the black population 
and hate crime should be mediated by the political strength of the minority population.   
Data and Variables 
 The dependent variable is drawn from the 2000-2007 Uniform Crime Reports 
Hate Crime Reporting Program and represents the number of anti-Black hate crimes in a 
given state year.  On average there were approximately 53 anti-black hate crime incidents 
in a given state year with a range from 0 to 606.   
 The state characteristics include, most importantly, the indicators for the three 
concepts in the minority threat framework.  First, the indicator for the relative size of the 
minority population is drawn from the 2000 Decennial Census and the 2002-2007 
American Community Survey and represents the ratio of blacks to whites in the 
population (% Black/% White).  Second, the measure for economic threat is the ratio of 
black to white unemployment (% Black Unemployed/% White Unemployed).  Finally, 
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there are two indicators for political threat.  The first is drawn from the Current 
Population Survey‘s Voting and Registration Supplement for the years 2000, 2002, 2004, 
and 2006.  It represents the percent of the black population over the age of 18 who voted 
(% Black Voters).  For the inter-electoral years (i.e. 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007) the 
previous year‘s estimates were used.  The second political threat indicator is drawn from 
The Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies roster of Black Elected Officials for 
the years 2000-2007 and represents the percent of State Legislators who are African-
American.   
In addition to these minority threat indicators and the control measures described 
in chapter 3, the total black population is included in the models as an indicator of 
exposure.  The inclusion of an exposure term allows for the interpretation of the 
regression results in terms of the hate crime rate instead of hate crime counts.  The effect 
of the exposure term on the dependent variable is estimated by the model; however, the 
coefficient is constrained to 1.   
Analysis 
Event count models allow for the examination of the effects of a set of predictors 
on a count dependent variable.  The standard event count models used in criminology are 
negative binomial models which correct for the overdispersion that is often a problem in 
crime counts.  However, negative binomial models for panel data are not efficient when 
there is serial autocorrelation in the errors.  In order to adjust for this time dependence of 
the errors a Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) is suggested.  These models allow 
for the specification of the within-group correlation structure.   
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For a cross-sectional (t=1) model where k is the number of covariates and  β is a k 
X 1 vector of parameters, the standard GEE model is: 
     (4.1) 
Where 
     
   
 Φ is a scale parameter which may or may not be of substantive interest 
 Vi of Yi is specified as a function of g of the mean.  
Di = µi/ β 
 
 For models in which t>1 (panel models), the GEE equation remains unchanged, 
however, Yit is the dependent variable and Xit are the covariates, where i indexes the N 
units of analysis (―cases‖ or ―clusters‖) and t indexes the T time points (or repeated 
measurements), such that Yit is a column vector of observations, Xit is a T x k matrix of 
covariates and E(Yit) = µi. Where the model does change is in the estimation of Vi.  
Specifically, for cases where T > 1, we specify a T X T matrix Ri(α) which becomes the 
working correlation matrix. This correlation matrix then enters the variance term Vi 
        (4.2) 
where Ai are T X T diagonal matrices with g(µit) as the tth diagonal element (Zorn, 2001; 
Hardin & Hilbe, 2003).   
For the purposes of the following analysis, the working correlation matrix is 
estimated through the autoregressive correlation structure in which  
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where .  This estimates the within-group correlation structure which has the 
structure   
 
 
where R denotes the working correlation matrix for modeling the within-group 
correlation.  This structure suggests that the within-group correlation will be one on the 
diagonal and lagged by one otherwise.  These models estimate the marginal effect or the 
average effect across panels (Stata Corp, 2005).  
Results 
 The discussion of the results will start with a look at the descriptive statistics, 
presented in table 4.1 below, of the measures used in the analysis.  Looking at the 
primary predictors, the average ratio of blacks to whites in the population is 0.27 with a 
range from 0 to 2.259.  For this indicator, where the ratio of blacks to whites is between 0 
and 1 whites make up a greater percent of the population than do blacks.  Where the ratio 
of blacks to whites is greater than one, blacks make up a greater proportion of the 
population in the state than do whites.  A value of 1 on this indicator suggests equilibrium 
between the two races.  The ratio of black to white unemployment on average is 2.274 
with a range from 0 to 7.507.  As with the minority threat indicator, a value of 0 to 1 on 
this ratio indicates a case where blacks have less unemployment relative to whites.  A 
value over 1 indicates a case where blacks have more unemployment relative to whites, 
and a value of 1 indicates equilibrium.  The percentage of legislators that are black on 
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average is 7.456 with a range from 0 to 25.862.  The percentage of blacks who vote on 
average is 54.824 with a range from 0 to 100.  As for the control measures, on average 
there is 12.579 percent of the state population living below the poverty line with a range 
from 6.429 to 21.609.  Additionally, the percent of white males between the ages of 18 
and 29 in a state on average is 8.119 with a range from 1.808 to 14.440.  About 25% of 
the states are in the Western region of the United States and about 33% are in the 
Southern United States.  Finally, on average approximately 21.332% of the population in 
states in any given year live in cities over 100,000 population. 
   As for the correlates of reporting, the average aggravated assault rate per 100,000 
population is 274.122 with a range from 42.579 to 973.73.  The average percentage of the 
state population covered by the reporting agencies is 82.186 percent with a range from 0 
to 100.  The average percent of reporting agencies that reported non-zero counts in a 
given state year was 20.599 percent with a range of 0 to 100.  The average number of 
police officers per 100,000 population is 220.874 with a range from 47.571 to 823.306.  
The average percent of agencies in a state with a bias unit or other specialized personnel 
is 11.658 with a range from 0 to 100.  The average percent of agencies in a state with a 
community policing policy is 47.219 with a range from 0 to 100.  Finally, the average 
black population in a given state year is 1,088,384 with a range from 2,932 to 5,583,808.  
In addition to these agency controls for reporting, additional controls in the form 
of state statute characteristics are assessed.  These indicators are described in more detail 
in chapters 1 and 3.  The percentage of cases (state-years) characterized by these 
definitions of hate crime in their state statutes is presented in Table 4.2 below.  
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Approximately 55.9% of cases include sexual orientation, and approximately 59.3% 
include disability as a protected category in their definition of hate crime.   
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of State Characteristics for Anti-Black Hate Crime Analysis 
 
Mean SD Min Max 
Anti-Black Hate Crime Counts 52.669 83.595 0 606 
% Black/% White 0.27 0.36 0 2.259 
Black/White Unemployed 2.274 1.384 0 7.507 
% African-American Legislators 7.456 7.298 0 25.862 
% Black Voters 54.824 18.67 0 100 
Total Poverty 12.579 3.227 6.429 21.609 
% Young White Males 8.119 2.177 1.808 14.44 
West 0.255 0.436 0 1 
South 0.333 0.472 0 1 
% Urban 21.332 18.957 0 100 
Aggravated Assault Rate 274.122 150.953 42.579 973.73 
% Population Covered 82.186 27.355 0 100 
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros 20.599 22.408 0 100 
Police per Capita 220.874 112.104 47.571 823.306 
% Bias Unit 11.658 15.799 0 100 
% Community Policing 47.219 27.236 0 100 
Black Population 1088384 1369358 2932 5583808 
 
Approximately 2% of cases rely on a reporting statute alone, while a third of cases have a 
criminal statute alone, and 49.8% have both a reporting and a criminal statute.  Cases that 
define a bias crime in terms of a crime committed because of the status characteristic of 
the victim instead of requiring some hate or animus to be involved represent 
approximately 59.6% of the cases in the analysis.  Likewise, cases that define a hate 
crime as being caused by the perceived status characteristic of the victim represent 
approximately 31.6% of the cases.  
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for State Statute Control Measures 
 
Percentage 
Sexual Orientation Statute 55.9 
Disability Statute 59.3 
Reporting Statute 2 
Criminal Statute 33.3 
Reporting & Criminal Statute 49.8 
Bias Statute 59.6 
Perception Statute 31.6 
Civil Rights Statute 19.6 
Freestanding Statute 27.2 
Coattailing Statute 5.9 
Modifying Statute 9.1 
Penalty Enhancement Statute 43.9 
Obs 408 
Groups 51 
 
As for the type of hate crime statute in the state, approximately 19.6% of cases 
criminalize violations of civil rights.  Freestanding statutes, those that create a new 
category of crime, represent 27.2% of the cases, while coattailing statutes represent 5.9% 
of cases.  Modifying statutes represent 9.1% of cases.  The largest category, penalty 
enhancement statutes represent 43.9% of cases. 
The regression analysis proceeds in five steps, each of these is presented in table 
4.3 below.  Model 1 tests the first hypothesis, that the relative size of the minority 
population is positively related to the number of anti-black hate crimes in a state.  The 
results suggest that on average in states where there are more blacks in relation to whites 
there are fewer hate crimes against blacks.  Specifically, a one unit increase in the ratio of 
blacks to whites in the population decreases the average number of hate crimes in a state 
by a factor of 0.05.  This is inconsistent with the predictions of the minority threat 
framework which would suggest that as the number of blacks relative to whites increases 
there will be more hate crimes against them.   
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Table 4.3: Regression of Anti-Black Hate Crime Counts on State Structural 
Characteristics, 2000-2007 (Robust Standard Errors) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 (S.E.) 
IRR 
(S.E.) 
IRR 
(S.E.) 
IRR 
(S.E.) 
IRR 
(S.E.) 
IRR 
Intercept 
 
-8.483** -8.148** -7.850** -7.494** -9.247** 
(0.175) 0.539 0.674 0.694 1.101 
% Black/% White -2.999** -1.320** -1.224* -1.181* -1.143 
(0.337) 
0.05 
0.456 
0.27 
0.539 
0.29 
0.548 
0.31 
0.692 
Black/White 
Unemployed 
 -0.012 -0.027 -0.013 -0.070 
 0.043 0.046 0.047 0.062 
% African-American 
Legislators 
 -0.113** -0.096** -0.087** -0.080** 
 0.019 
0.89 
0.023 
0.91 
0.023 
0.92 
0.027 
0.92 
% Black Voters  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Total Poverty   -0.093** -0.081* -0.045 
  0.034 
0.91 
0.034 
0.92 
0.036 
% Young White Males   0.068 0.041 0.049 
  0.054 0.055 0.075 
West   0.284 0.587 0.402 
  0.301 0.322 0.292 
South   -0.307 -0.448 -0.540 
  0.333 0.336 0.316 
% Urban    -0.018* -0.019* 
   0.008 
0.98 
0.009 
0.98 
Aggravated Assault Rate     -0.000 
    0.001 
% Population Covered     0.020** 
    0.003 
1.02 
% Agencies Reporting 
Non-Zeros 
    0.017** 
    0.004 
1.02 
Police per Capita     0.001 
    0.002 
% Bias Unit     0.010 
    0.010 
% Community Policing     -0.013* 
    0.005 
0.97 
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Table 4.3: Regression of Anti-Black Hate Crime Counts on State Structural 
Characteristics, 2000-2007 cont. (Robust Standard Errors) 
2000 0.027 0.069 0.065 0.021 0.142 
(0.107) 0.109 0.116 0.120 0.160 
2002 -0.105 -0.040 -0.026 -0.047 -0.039 
(0.107) 0.092 0.097 0.100 0.134 
2003 0.082 0.078 0.091 0.056 -0.515 
0.139 0.118 0.125 0.128 0.284 
2004 0.201 0.189 0.227 0.164 -0.429 
0.158 0.132 0.141 0.144 0.284 
2005 0.344 0.515** 0.859** 0.715** 0.190 
0.178 0.159 
1.67 
0.243 
2.36 
0.246 
2.04 
0.393 
2006 0.397* 0.467** 0.801** 0.683** 0.113 
0.187 
1.49 
0.173 
1.60 
0.241 
2.23 
0.245 
1.98 
0.385 
2007 0.410* 0.501** 0.784** 0.644** 0.131 
0.193 
1.51 
0.182 
1.65 
0.246 
2.19 
0.249 
1.90 
0.382 
Exposure:      
Black Population --- --- --- --- --- 
Wald χ2 119.93 147.97 179.46 185.29 291.36 
Obs 408 400 400 400 400 
Groups 51 50 50 50 50 
p < .01 ** p < .05 * 
 
Model 2 assesses the economic and political threat hypotheses including the 
mediating effect proposed by Blalock.  The results for the economic threat indicator do 
not support a relationship between the economic conditions in a state and hate crime; 
however, the political threat indicators provide a different picture.  The percent of state 
legislators who are African-American is negatively associated with black hate crime.  
Specifically, a one unit increase in the percent black legislators results in a decrease of 
anti-black hate crime on average by a factor of 0.89.  This negative relationship between 
political power and hate crime is also inconsistent with the predictions of political threat 
which suggests a positive relationship.  However, Blalock also suggests that where 
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minority groups are equal to the majority in power there will be less hate crime.  
Additionally, model 2 does provide support for the mediating relationship between 
minority threat and hate crime.  While it does not appear that minority group political 
power mediates the relationship completely, the magnitude of the effect of the relative 
size of the black population on hate crime is decreased considerably.   
Model 3 adds in the controls.  Of the controls the percent of the population living 
below poverty level is significant and negative, suggesting that states with less poverty 
overall have more black hate crime.  Also of note is that the control measures do not 
seem to reduce the effect of the relative size of the minority population or the minority 
group political power on hate crime.   
Model 4 adds the control for % Urban into the model.  Urban population, while 
significant, does not reduce the effect of minority or political threat on hate crime; 
however, the more of a state‘s population that resides in larger cities the less hate crime 
in that state.   
Model 5 adds in the controls for the correlates of reporting.
12
   First, and most 
importantly, by adding the controls for the correlates of reporting the effect of the relative 
size of the minority population on anti-black hate crime is reduced to non-significance.  
This suggests that the relationship between minority threat and hate crime is explained by 
the reporting practices of the states.  Second, the political power of the minority group 
not only remains significant but is not reduced in magnitude.  Finally, of the reporting 
controls three are significant.   First, the percent of the state population covered by 
reporting agencies is significant and positive, suggesting as would be expected that where 
                                                 
12
 The property crime rate per 100,000 was included in supplementary analyses but was non-significant and 
did not change the results of the analysis.  (Results not shown.) 
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more of the state population is covered there is more reported anti-black hate crime.  
Second, also as would be expected, where the percentage of reporting agencies that report 
non-zero counts is greater the number of anti-black hate crimes on average is greater.  
Finally, there is a negative relationship between the percentage of community policing 
agencies in the state and anti-black hate crime, such that states with more community 
policing agencies have fewer anti-black hate crimes on average.
13
   
 Table 4.4 below assesses the relationships between the way a state defines hate 
crime, in terms of its statute, and the number of hate crimes that occur in the state.  
Additionally, these models assess whether the differing definitions across state explain 
the effect of the minority threat and control measures on hate crime.  Overall, controlling 
for the differing definitions of hate crime across states does not add to the explanation of 
anti-black hate crime.  Indeed, none of the statute controls is significant, and the 
relationships seen in Table 4.3 do not change dramatically by adding in the statute 
controls. 
Alternative Indicators of Economic Threat: Income and Poverty 
 
 While changes in unemployment do not seem to have an effect on the prevalence 
of anti-black hate crime, this is not conclusive evidence that there is no economic threat 
effect.  Indeed, it is possible that unemployment is simply not the best indicator of threat. 
In an effort to further elaborate the economic threat hypothesis two other potential 
indicators of threat were used.  The first is the ratio of black to white per capita income in 
a state each year and the second is the ratio of black to white poverty (% living below the  
 
                                                 
13
 Temporal lags were added in supplementary analyses; however they did not produce significantly 
different results. (Results not shown.) 
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Table 4.4: Supplementary Analysis of Predictors on the Number of Anti-Black 
Hate Crimes, 2000-2007 (Robust Standard Errors) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Coef Coef Coef Coef 
 
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) 
Intercept -8.786** -8.412** -8.035** -9.280** 
 
0.276 0.347 0.878 1.191 
% Black/White -2.900** -1.467** -1.275* -1.135 
 
0.356 0.527 0.634 0.731 
Black/White Unemployed 
 
-0.021 -0.028 -0.094 
  
0.052 0.057 0.068 
% African-American Legislators 
 
-0.114** -0.082** -0.074** 
  
0.022 0.026 0.029 
% Black Voters 
 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.002 
  
0.003 0.003 0.004 
Total Poverty 
  
-0.074* -0.041 
   
0.036 0.038 
% Young White Males 
  
0.061 0.042 
   
0.065 0.081 
West 
  
0.594 0.330 
   
0.350 0.329 
South 
  
-0.450 -0.568 
   
0.342 0.332 
% Urban 
  
-0.014 -0.016 
   
0.008 0.009 
Aggravated Assault Rate 
   
-0.000 
    
0.001 
% Population Covered 
   
0.022** 
    
0.004 
% Agencies: Non-Zero Count 
   
0.017** 
    
0.004 
Police per Capita 
   
0.001 
    
0.002 
% Bias Unit 
   
0.009 
    
0.010 
% Community Policing 
   
-0.013* 
    
0.006 
Sexual Orientation Statute 0.222 0.244 0.206 0.178 
 
0.250 0.254 0.265 0.265 
Disability Statute -0.332 -0.154 -0.127 -0.294 
 
0.263 0.279 0.283 0.283 
Criminal Statute -0.129 -0.281 -0.192 -0.172 
 
0.353 0.385 0.384 0.352 
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Table 4.4: Supplementary Analysis of Predictors on the Number of Anti-Black 
Hate Crimes, 2000-2007 cont. (Robust Standard Errors) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Coef Coef Coef Coef 
 
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) 
Reporting & Criminal Statute 0.214 0.000 0.105 -0.060 
 
0.393 0.421 0.421 0.394 
Bias Statute 0.322 0.333 0.118 0.109 
 
0.270 0.304 0.291 0.259 
Perception Statute -0.085 -0.362 -0.287 -0.056 
 
0.237 0.259 0.297 0.288 
Civil Rights Statute 0.522 0.352 0.405 0.111 
 
0.274 0.302 0.290 0.263 
Freestanding Statute -0.107 0.226 0.138 0.046 
 
0.250 0.271 0.264 0.246 
Coattailing Statute -0.340 0.028 -0.031 -0.069 
 
0.440 0.483 0.471 0.429 
Modifying Statute 0.109 0.150 0.146 0.211 
 
0.344 0.360 0.356 0.348 
2000 0.081 0.136 0.099 0.198 
 
0.116 0.131 0.146 0.175 
2002 -0.135 -0.061 -0.062 -0.062 
 
0.116 0.110 0.121 0.146 
2003 0.018 0.055 0.046 -0.559 
 
0.150 0.141 0.153 0.302 
2004 0.198 0.197 0.185 -0.454 
 
0.168 0.153 0.167 0.300 
2005 0.347 0.500** 0.793** 0.140 
 
0.186 0.182 0.285 0.411 
2006 0.382 0.462* 0.756** 0.048 
 
0.194 0.197 0.279 0.400 
2007 0.377 0.505* 0.717* 0.072 
 
0.200 0.204 0.283 0.397 
Exposure 
    Black Population --- --- --- --- 
Wald χ2 137.86 186.23 224.21 317.48 
Obs 408 400 400 400 
Groups 51 50 50 50 
p < .01 ** p < .05 * 
poverty line) in a state each year. Table 4.5 below presents the results of the regression 
analysis using these alternative indicators of economic threat. 
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Table 4.5: Alternative Indicators of Economic Threat  on Anti-Black Hate Crime Counts, 2000-
2007 (Robust Standard Errors) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) 
Intercept -7.876** -9.772** -8.138** -7.377** -9.451** 
 
0.691 1.097 0.275 0.907 1.290 
% Black/% White -0.956 -0.957 -1.291** -1.127 -1.257 
 
0.500 0.649 0.466 0.579 0.704 
Black/White Income 0.848* 0.922** 
   
 
0.022 0.298 
   Black/White Poverty 
  
0.004 0.004 -0.000 
   
0.027 0.028 0.036 
% African-American Legislators -0.086** -0.085** -0.108** -0.084** -0.071* 
 
0.022 0.026 0.020 0.024 0.028 
% Black Voters -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Total Poverty -0.099** -0.057 
 
-0.096** -0.062 
 
0.033 0.037 
 
0.035 0.038 
% Young White Males 0.030 0.047 
 
0.048 0.071 
 
0.051 0.073 
 
0.080 0.096 
West 0.544 0.407 
 
0.748* 0.633 
 
0.338 0.312 
 
0.358 0.344 
South -0.465 -0.599 
 
-0.413 -0.507 
 
0.350 0.341 
 
0.353 0.348 
% Urban -0.015 -0.019* 
 
-0.019* -0.022* 
 
0.009 0.009 
 
0.009 0.010 
Aggravated Assault Rate 
 
-0.000 
  
-0.000 
  
0.001 
  
0.001 
% Population Covered 
 
0.017** 
  
0.018** 
  
0.003 
  
0.003 
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros 
 
0.015** 
  
0.016** 
  
0.003 
  
0.004 
Police per Capita 
 
0.001 
  
0.000 
  
0.002 
  
0.002 
% Bias Unit 
 
0.013 
  
0.012 
  
0.009 
  
0.009 
% Community Policing 
 
-0.012* 
  
-0.008 
  
0.005 
  
0.005 
2000 -0.021 -0.005 0.015 -0.025 -0.005 
 
0.081 0.107 0.079 0.085 0.108 
2002 -0.036 -0.005 -0.056 -0.051 -0.019 
 
0.089 0.118 0.087 0.091 0.116 
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Table 4.5: Alternative Indicators of Economic Threat  on Anti-Black Hate Crime Counts, 2000-
2007 cont. (Robust Standard Errors) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) 
2003 0.099 -0.365 0.082 0.060 -0.252 
 
0.116 0.260 0.112 0.118 0.274 
2004 0.122 -0.384 0.240 0.205 -0.173 
 
0.129 0.262 0.174 0.184 0.320 
2005 0.712** 0.303 0.596** 0.819* 0.548 
 
0.225 0.366 0.196 0.330 0.457 
2006 0.738** 0.288 0.466* 0.711* 0.349 
 
0.227 0.361 0.212 0.326 0.451 
2007 0.696** 0.300 0.410 0.656* 0.395 
 
0.232 0.360 0.220 0.332 0.452 
Exposure: 
     Black Population --- --- --- --- --- 
Wald χ2 197.97 255.47 136.78 167.15 222.52 
Obs 392 392 363 363 363 
Groups 49 49 49 49 49 
p < .01 ** p < .05 * 
Models 1 and 2 assess the relationship between the income ratio and anti-black 
hate crime.  The income ratio is significant and positive, suggesting that on average in 
areas where blacks make more in comparison to whites there is more anti-black hate 
crime. This is consistent with the economic threat hypothesis that where there is more 
competition between the minority and majority groups there will be more hate crime.  
Also consistent with the economic threat hypothesis is that the inclusion of the income 
ratio in the model reduces the effect of the relative size of the black population to non-
significance. 
Models 3, 4, and 5 in Table 4.5 examine the relationship between the poverty 
ratio and anti-black hate crime.  Unlike the income ratio this indicator is not significantly 
related to anti-black hate crime.  
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 This analysis suggests that perhaps it is competition over income that matters in 
the explanation of anti-black hate crime.  Also importantly, the income ratio remains 
significant when controlling for minority threat, political threat, and the reporting 
controls. 
Testing Blalock’s Proposed Curvilinear Effect 
 
 Another aspect of the minority threat framework is that the relationship between 
minority threat, economic threat, and political threat and hate crime is not linear.  In order 
to test this hypothesis, quadratic terms were added for each of the minority, economic, 
and political threat indicators.  Each of these terms was created by multiplying the linear 
term by itself.  Table 4.6 below presents the results of this analysis.  The minority threat 
model suggests that, consistent with Blalock‘s propositions, the relationship between 
minority threat and hate crime is curvilinear.  The linear effect suggests that as with the 
previous models where there are more blacks relative to whites in the population there is 
less hate crime; however, the slope of this effect is decreasing at a progressively faster 
rate.  The economic threat model suggests that there is no linear or curvilinear 
relationship between economic competition and hate crime.   
The first political threat model suggests that where African-American‘s have 
more political strength there is less hate crime and that this relationship is not curvilinear.  
Finally, the fourth model in table 4.6 tests the curvilinear hypothesis in terms of the 
percent of blacks who voted.  This model also provides support for the curvilinear 
hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between political threat and hate crime 
that is decreasing at a progressively faster rate, although the magnitude of the quadratic 
term is very small, suggesting that there is only a small curvilinear effect. The final  
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Table 4.6: Testing the Curvilinear Hypothesis: Regression of Anti-Black Hate Crime 
Counts, 2000-2007 (Robust Standard Errors) 
 
 
Minority 
Threat  
Economic 
Threat 
Political 
Threat 1 
Political 
Threat 2 Full Model 
 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) 
Intercept -8.901** -9.236** -9.275** -8.774** -8.501** 
 
1.134 1.102 1.102 1.114 1.185 
% Black/% White -6.406** -1.109 -1.395 -1.109 -6.025** 
 
1.827 0.693 0.714 0.663 1.895 
Black/White Squared 3.932** 
   
3.667** 
 
1.247 
   
1.339 
Black/White Unemployed -0.081 -0.006 -0.076 -0.055 -0.007 
 
0.067 0.139 0.066 0.058 0.146 
B/W Unemployed Squared 
 
-0.014 
  
-0.013 
  
0.029 
  
0.030 
% African-American Legislators -0.042 -0.082** -0.151** -0.083** -0.071 
 
0.029 0.027 0.053 0.027 0.063 
A-A Legislators Squared 
  
0.003 
 
0.001 
   
0.002 
 
0.002 
% Black Voters -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.021* -0.018 
 
0.004 0.003 0.004 0.010 0.012 
Black Voters Squared 
   
0.000* 0.000 
    
0.000 0.000 
Total Poverty -0.054 -0.046 -0.044 -0.046 -0.055 
 
0.036 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.036 
% Young White Males 0.021 0.049 0.043 0.038 0.009 
 
0.077 0.075 0.075 0.074 0.078 
West 0.182 0.400 0.244 0.309 0.052 
 
0.280 0.294 0.294 0.309 0.306 
South -0.220 -0.559 -0.515 -0.526 -0.217 
 
0.313 0.320 0.301 0.331 0.330 
% Urban -0.015 -0.020* -0.015 -0.017 -0.013 
 
0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 
Aggravated Assault Rate 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
% Population Covered 0.023** 0.020** 0.023** 0.019** 0.022** 
 
0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros 0.018** 0.017** 0.018** 0.016** 0.018** 
 
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 
Police per Capita 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
Stacey, Michele, 2010, UMSL, p. 86 
 
Table 4.6: Testing the Curvilinear Hypothesis: Regression of Anti-Black Hate Crime 
Counts, 2000-2007 (Robust Standard Errors) 
 
Minority 
Threat  
Economic 
Threat 
Political 
Threat 1 
Political 
Threat 2 
Full Model 
 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) 
% Bias Unit 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.013 
 
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 
% Community Policing -0.016** -0.013* -0.015** -0.012* -0.015** 
 
0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 
2000 0.169 0.161 0.160 0.099 0.151 
 
0.177 0.176 0.172 0.147 0.184 
2002 -0.066 -0.036 -0.052 0.051 0.019 
 
0.149 0.133 0.144 0.128 0.147 
2003 -0.604* -0.531 -0.576* -0.353 -0.480 
 
0.301 0.285 0.294 0.269 0.298 
2004 -0.536 -0.442 -0.507 -0.399 -0.536 
 
0.300 0.285 0.293 0.268 0.293 
2005 -0.277 0.180 0.055 0.193 -0.293 
 
0.443 0.393 0.403 0.374 0.437 
2006 -0.320 0.106 -0.015 0.197 -0.258 
 
0.427 0.384 0.393 0.364 0.420 
2007 -0.285 0.123 0.018 0.234 -0.202 
 
0.424 0.382 0.390 0.363 0.416 
Exposure: 
    
 
Black Population --- --- --- --- --- 
Wald χ2 345.45 287.75 329.10 271.80 322.12 
Obs 400 400 400 400 400 
Groups 50 50 50 50 50 
p < .01 ** p < .05 * 
 
model in Table 4.6 tests all of the curvilinear relationships at once.  In other words, do the 
curvilinear effects seen in the prior models hold up when controlling for the other 
curvilinear relationships.  The only significant minority threat indicator is the relative size 
of the black population and its quadratic.  This is inconsistent with the predictions of the 
minority threat framework which would suggest that the relative size of the black 
population should be mediated by the political power of the minority.  
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Testing the Moderating Hypothesis (Interaction Effects) 
 
 The above analysis does not provide support for a mediating relationship between 
political or economic threat and minority threat.  In other words, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the relationship between the relative size of the black population and the 
prevalence of anti-black hate crime is mediated by economic competition (as measured 
by unemployment, poverty, or income) or the political power of the minority group.  
However, perhaps it is not a mediating relationship, but instead a moderating one.  In 
other words, perhaps instead of political or economic threat explaining the relationship 
between the relative size of the black population and anti-black hate crime away, perhaps 
the effect of the relative size of the black population on hate crime is different across 
varying levels of unemployment or political strength.  In order to test these moderating 
hypotheses a series of interaction terms were added to the models.  These interaction 
effects are presented in Table 4.7 below. 
 First and foremost, it is possible that the negative effect of the relative size of the 
black population on anti-black hate crime will be stronger where blacks have more 
political strength.  In order to test this hypothesis an interaction term was created between 
the ratio of blacks to whites in the population and the percent of legislators who are 
African-American in a state.
14
   The results of this analysis suggest there is not a 
moderating effect. 
 Second, in order to test the possibility that the effect of the relative size of the 
black population on anti-black hate crime may be different across levels of economic 
competition, an interaction effect between the ratio of blacks to whites in the population  
                                                 
14
 Both of these measures were grand mean centered (by subtracting the mean from the original value) prior 
to calculating the interaction term. 
Stacey, Michele, 2010, UMSL, p. 88 
 
Table 4.7: Interaction Effects: Testing the Moderation of Threat for Anti-Black 
Hate Crime Counts 
Minority Threat X African-American Legislators 
Intercept -8.174** 
% Black/White -1.392** 
% African-American Legislators -0.111** 
Interaction: B/W X AA Legislators 0.030 
Minority Threat X B/W Unemployed  
Intercept -8.080** 
% Black/White -1.245** 
% B/W Unemployed -0.043 
Interaction: B/W X B/W Unemployed -0.132 
B/W Unemployed X African-American Legislators 
Intercept -8.164** 
% B/W Unemployed -0.043 
% African-American Legislators -0.113** 
Interaction: W/W Unemployed X AA 
Legislators 
-0.002 
Minority Threat X % Pop Covered  
Intercept -9.351** 
% B/W  -1.091 
% Population Covered 0.022** 
Interaction: % B/W X % Pop Cov 0.014 
Minority Threat X % Non-Zero  
Intercept -9.406** 
% B/W -1.097 
% Agencies with Non-Zero Counts 0.023** 
Interaction: % B/W X % Non-Zero 0.039 
Minority Threat X % Community Policing 
Intercept -9.283** 
% B/W -1.155 
% Community Policing -0.012 
Interaction: % B/W X % Comm Pol 0.003 
p < .01 ** p < .05 * 
 
and the ratio of black to white unemployment was added into the models.  This 
interaction term assesses the possibility that the negative effect of the relative size of the 
black population may be weaker in states where there is more economic competition. 
Again the results suggest this is not the case. 
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 Third, an additional possibility is that economic competition and political power 
work together to explain the prevalence of anti-black hate crime.  In other words, perhaps 
the effect of the minority group‘s political power on the prevalence of hate crime is 
weaker where there is more economic competition between groups.  This hypothesis is 
examined by adding an interaction term between the percent of state legislators who are 
African-American and the ratio of black to white unemployment. Like the other models, 
there does not seem to be a moderating effect. 
 In addition to testing the moderating relationships of the minority, political, and 
economic threat indicators it is also possible that the effect of minority threat on anti-
black hate crime may depend on the reporting practices of the states.  In other words, 
perhaps reporting moderates the relationship between minority threat and hate crime.  
Specifically, it is possible that in states where reporting is high minority threat will have a 
stronger effect than in states where reporting is low.  Two potential reasons for this 
association may exist.  First, it is possible that the models are unable to pick up a 
minority threat effect in states where there is low reporting.  Second, it is possible that 
states that do not report or have low reporting have what has been referred to by scholars 
as benign neglect (Liska & Chamlin, 1984).  This concept refers to a lack of response on 
the part of police and other official agencies toward crimes that they see as lesser.  In 
other words, it is possible that states that have low reporting do not take hate crimes as 
being serious and that this view may be related to the relative size of the minority 
population in the state.  Where minority groups pose a greater threat crimes against them 
are not taken as seriously and thus are underreported.   
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 In order to assess this possibility three interaction terms are examined.  The first 
examines whether the effect of the relative size of the minority population depends on the 
percent of the population covered by reporting agencies.  The second assesses whether 
the effect of the relative size of the minority population varies across levels of non-zero 
reporting agencies.  Finally, the third tests the relationship between minority threat and 
hate crime by assessing the hypothesis that the effect of the relative size of the minority 
population varies across levels of community policing agencies.  The interaction terms 
are non-significant and the direct effects seen in the previous analysis remain unchanged.  
This suggests that the reporting practices of states do not moderate the relationship 
between the relative size of the minority population and the prevalence of anti-black hate 
crime.   
Discussion 
Racial animosity has been a part of American culture sense the first settlers set 
foot on American soil.  This animosity has presented itself in many forms since the 
beginning, from slavery to lynching, and most recently hate crime.  As the descriptive 
analysis that started the chapter suggests there is variation across time and place in the 
level of anti-black hate crime.  However, this descriptive analysis does not provide an 
explanation for this variation.  I suggest that demographic shifts in line with the minority 
threat framework may be used to explain the variation in hate crime.  The analysis tests 
the hypotheses proposed by this framework.  
The results of the regression analysis suggest a number of interesting points.  
Particularly, the reporting practices of states explain much of the trend in anti-black hate 
crime, including the relationship between the relative size of the black population and 
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hate crime. Including several correlates of reporting that have been suggested by prior 
research in the regression equations reduces the relationship between the relative size of 
the black population and hate crime to non-significance where other controls did not.  
This suggests that perhaps the demographic make up of the population of a state does not 
matter when the reporting practices of that state are taken into account. 
 Of special interest is the significant relationship between the political power of 
the minority group, income ratio, and hate crime. Where blacks are more visible in the 
political arena there is less hate crime, and importantly this relationship remains 
significant after controlling for reporting, state structural characteristics, and differences 
in the definition of hate crime.  The negative relationship, however, is inconsistent with 
the predictions of the minority threat framework, where it would be expected that blacks‘ 
political strength would be positively related to hate crime.  There are two possible 
explanations for this negative relationship.  First, it is possible that, consistent with the 
minority threat framework, once blacks become strong enough they will have gained 
influence and will be able to reduce prejudice and discrimination, and hate crime, against 
them.  This hypothesis is not supported, however, by the absence of a significant 
curvilinear relationship between political threat and hate crime.  The second possible 
explanation comes from the contact hypothesis.  Research on the contact hypothesis 
(Rothbart & John, 1985; Schiappa, Gregg, & Hewes, 2006) suggests that knowing a 
celebrity or other public figure who is black may reduce stereotypes and thus prejudice 
possibly resulting in less hate crime.  This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the 
percent of blacks who voted is not significant, but the percent of state legislators who are 
African-American is significant.  State legislators are visible public figures and may 
Stacey, Michele, 2010, UMSL, p. 92 
 
reduce stereotypes and prejudice among their constituents, even those who may not have 
voted for them.   
Additionally, another finding  that is interesting involves the curvilinear 
relationships, which suggest that where minority groups are larger in relation to whites 
there is less hate crime and this relationship is non-linear. Specifically, the non-linear 
effect suggests that at some point the negative relationship between the relative size of 
the Black population and anti-Black hate crime becomes weak and may reverse direction, 
becoming positive.  Finally, it seems that it is not competition over jobs that is a threat to 
the majority group, but instead competition over income that generates the threat, 
suggesting that where minority groups begin to make more on average in relation to the 
white majority, that majority will feel threatened and will act to reduce that threat. 
Thus, in terms of the minority threat framework, there is support for the economic 
threat hypothesis using the income ratio.  However, some of the findings are inconsistent 
with the minority threat hypothesis.  Specifically, where there are more blacks relative to 
whites in the population there is less hate crime whereas minority threat would predict the 
opposite.  This could be explained by reporting, and in fact the regression results and the 
bivariate correlations (Appendix A) suggest that this may be the case.  Specifically, the 
bivariate correlations suggest that there is less reporting in states that have more blacks 
relative to whites.  It also seems that demographic shifts are not as important for 
explaining trends in hate crime as shifts in politics and reporting.   
Overall the findings of the regression of the level of anti-Black hate crime in a 
state on state structural characteristics suggest that the primary driving force behind the 
trend in anti-Black hate crime over time has been a combination of changes in the 
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reporting practices of states and changes in the participation of the minority group in the 
political arena and even more so the visibility of that group in the political arena.  What 
these findings mean for future research and policy will be discussed in chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 5 
 
MINORITY THREAT, POLITICS, AND ANTI-ETHNIC VIOLENCE 
 
Introduction 
 
Despite the characterization of the United States as a melting-pot, animosity 
between ethnic groups has been a predominant problem in this country.  With the 
proximity of such countries as Mexico and Cuba, Hispanics have surpassed African-
Americans as the largest minority group in the country.  Alongside increased coverage of 
immigration patterns and debate within the political arena around immigration policies 
and practices, it is likely that Hispanics are becoming more threatening to the dominant 
groups.  As such this chapter presents the results of the regression analysis assessing the 
predictors of anti-ethnic hate crime using minority threat as a guiding framework. 
Trends in Anti-Ethnic Hate Crime 
 As with the anti-black trends discussed in the previous chapter, the anti-ethnic, 
and anti-Hispanic specifically, trends suggest variation across time and place.  Figure 5.1 
below shows the trend in the anti-Hispanic hate crime rate per 100,000 population from 
1995 to 2008.  This trend is somewhat more volatile than the anti-black trend primarily 
due to the fact that anti-Hispanic crimes are rarer than anti-black crimes.  The overall 
trend is decreasing with a slightly increasing trend beginning in 2003.  As with the trend 
in anti-black hate crime there appears to be a slight spike in 2000.  This does not appear 
in the overall trend in hate crime presented in Chapter 4, and does not coincide with any 
major historical events as does the spike in 2001 after the September 11
th
 attack on the 
World Trade Center in New York.   
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Figure 5.1: Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Rate, 1995-2008 
 
 Figure 5.2 below suggests variation across place.  This figure shows the anti-
ethnic hate crime rate per 100,000 population from 2000 to 2007.  This graph shows a 
number of interesting characteristics of the anti-ethnic trend.  First, there was a spike in 
all regions in 2001 in anti-ethnic violence.  This is likely due to the terrorist attacks on 
September 11 of that year.  Second, and relatedly, the Northeast and the West appear to 
have taken the biggest hits in 2001 with the West increasing from an average anti-ethnic 
hate crime rate of 0.7 incidents per 100,000 persons to approximately 1.5 incidents per 
100,000, and the Northeast increasing from an average of 0.4 incidents per 100,000 to 1 
per 100,000.  Third, overall, with the exception of 2001, the trend in anti-ethnic incidents 
within regions is fairly stable.  The South, as with the anti-racial trend, consistently has 
the lowest reported anti-ethnic hate crime rate each year.  With the exception of 2006, the 
West consistently has the highest anti-ethnic hate crime rate each year.   
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Figure 5.2: Ethnic Bias Motivation by Region, 2000-2007 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Ethnic Bias Crime Rate per 100,000 for Five States, 2000-2007 
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 In addition to regional variation, there is variation at the state level.  Figure 5.3 
above shows the ethnic bias crime rate for five states across the same years.  California 
has the highest hate crime rate consistently for all years.  Likewise, Missouri has the 
lowest hate crime rate consistently for all years. While these figures suggest considerable 
variation across time and place, they do not explain this variation.   
 I propose that one possible explanation for this variation involves differing trends 
and patterns in immigration over time in different states.  In addition to changes in the 
trend, there have been shifts in the discourse surrounding immigration.  Specifically there 
is more attention paid to immigration in line with changing policies.  Figure 5.4 below 
explores the relationship between immigration and anti-Hispanic hate crime by graphing 
side by side the Hispanic hate crime rate per 100,000 Hispanic population and the 
Hispanic immigration rate per 100,000 Hispanic foreign born for ten states across the 
U.S.  These ten states represent both those with high immigration rates (Arizona, 
California, Florida, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, and Texas) and low immigration 
(Connecticut, Delaware, and Idaho).   
 This figure suggests that, at least, for some states, there is a relationship between 
Hispanic immigration and Hispanic hate crime; however, this relationship may be only 
moderate.  Specifically, in states with a high immigration rate (Arizona, California, 
Nevada, New Mexico, New York, and Texas) immigration and hate crime appear to vary 
together.  For those states with a low immigration rate (Delaware and Idaho) there does 
not appear to be a relationship.  Florida has a high immigration rate but does not appear 
to show a relationship between immigration and hate crime.  The fact that immigration 
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does not appear to increase dramatically in any of these states over this time period could 
make it difficult to detect a relationship between immigration and Hispanic hate crime. 
Figure 5.4: Hispanic Hate Crime Rate and Hispanic Immigration Rate per 100,000 
Foreign Born Hispanic Population across Ten States, 2000-2007 
   
   
   
Note: Blue line indicates Hispanic Hate Crime rate per 100,000 Hispanic Persons.  Green line indicates the 
logged Hispanic Immigration rate  per 100,000 Hispanic foreign born persons. 
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Figure 5.4: Hispanic Hate Crime Rate and Hispanic Immigration Rate across Ten 
States, 2000-2007 cont. 
 
   
 
   
 
Note: Blue line indicates Hispanic Hate Crime rate per 100,000 Hispanic Persons.  Green line indicates the 
logged Hispanic Immigration rate  per 100,000 Hispanic foreign born persons. 
 
The following analysis examines the relationship between immigration and hate crime 
that is suggested by the above figures. 
Structure, Threat, and Reporting: Factors used to Explain Anti-Hispanic Hate 
Variables 
 The dependent variable, drawn from the UCR, represents the number of Hispanic 
hate crimes in a given state each year.  On average there were approximately 13 anti-
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 The state characteristics include the control measures, as well as the controls for 
the correlates of reporting discussed in chapter 3.  The measures for minority threat 
include first two indicators of minority group size: the Hispanic immigration rate and the 
percent Hispanic.  The immigration rate is the rate per 100,000 of the Hispanic foreign 
born population that emigrated from four countries: Cuba, El Salvador, the Dominican 
Republic, and Mexico.  All together these countries represent approximately 25% of the 
total immigration each year into the United States and between approximately 65 and 
76% of Hispanic immigration each year into the United States.
15
  This measure is drawn 
from the Department of Homeland Security‘s Immigration Yearbooks published 
annually.  The natural log is used to reduce the skew in the distribution.  The more 
traditional indicator of minority group size in the percent of the total population that is of 
Hispanic origin is drawn from the 2000 Census and the 2002-2007 American Community 
Survey. 
 The economic threat indicators include the ratio of Hispanic to white 
unemployment (% Hispanic unemployed/% white unemployed) as well as the ratio of 
Hispanic to black unemployment (% Hispanic unemployed/% black unemployed).  These 
are drawn from the 2000 Decennial Census and the 2002-2007 American Community 
Survey.   
 Finally, the political threat indicator is the % Hispanic voters drawn from the 
Current Population Survey‘s Voting and Registration Supplement.  This is the percent of 
Hispanics over the age of 18 who voted.  The total Hispanic population is included in the 
models as the indicator of exposure. 
                                                 
15
 In addition to these countries representing some of the largest contributors to Hispanic immigration in the 
United States, they also have no missing data at the state level.   
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 Analysis 
 As with the models used in Chapter 4, in order to examine the relationship 
between the predictors and the number of anti-Hispanic hate crimes, a Generalized 
Estimating Equation (GEE) with an autoregressive working correlation structure is 
specified.  These models allow for the examination of the marginal effect of the 
predictors on the dependent variable while adjusting for serial autocorrelation in the 
errors.   
Results 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of State Characteristics for Anti-Hispanic Hate 
Crime Analysis for Sample of 39 States 
 
Mean SD Min Max 
Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Counts 10.365 21.402 0 206 
Hispanic Immigration Rate 7.374 0.544 5.702 9.796 
% Hispanic 8.638 9.301 0.572 44.402 
Hispanic/White Unemployed 1.407 0.661 0 3.490 
Hispanic/Black Unemployed 0.480 0.376 0 3.925 
% Hispanic Voters 15.953 9.282 0 60.417 
Total Poverty 12.579 3.227 6.429 21.609 
% Young White Males 8.119 2.177 1.808 14.440 
West 0.255 0.436 0 1 
South 0.333 0.472 0 1 
% Urban 21.332 18.957 0 100 
Aggravated Assault Rate 274.122 150.953 42.579 973.730 
% Population Covered 82.186 27.355 0 100 
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros 20.599 22.408 0 100 
Police per Capita 220.874 112.104 47.571 823.306 
% Bias Unit 11.658 15.799 0 100 
% Community Policing 47.219 27.236 0 100 
Hispanic Population 786448.2 2007886 4339 13220888 
 
 As with the anti-black analysis, the anti-Hispanic analysis begins with an 
examination of the descriptive statistics of the indicators used in the regression analysis.  
These are presented in table 5.1 above.  The average logged Hispanic immigration rate 
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per 100,000 Hispanic foreign born population is 7.374 with a range from 5.702 to 9.796. 
The average percent of the population in the state that are of Hispanic origin is 8.64% 
with a range from 0.57 to 44.4%.  
 The ratio of Hispanic to white unemployed on average is 1.407 with a range from 
0 to 3.490 and the ratio of Hispanic to black unemployed on average is 0.480 with a 
range from 0 to 3.925.  The political threat indicator, the percent of Hispanics who voted, 
on average is 15.953 with a range from 0 to 60.417.  The average percent of the 
population living below the poverty line is 12.579 with a range of 6.429 to 21.609 and the 
average percent of the population who are young white males is 8.119 with a range from 
1.808 to 14.440.  Approximately 25% of the states are in the Western region of the 
United States and 33% are in the Southern United States.  On average 21.332 percent of 
the state population reside in cities over 100,000 population.  Finally, the average 
Hispanic population in a given state year is 1,012,180 with a range from 25,156 to 
13,220,888.
16
 
 The distribution of state statutes as with the anti-Black analysis is as follows.  
Approximately 56 percent of the states include sexual orientation as a protected category, 
while nearly 59% include disability.  The statutes are 2% reporting statutes alone, 33.3% 
criminal statutes alone, and 49.8% both reporting and criminal statutes.  Additionally, 
59.6% of the statutes are bias statutes and 31.6% include perception clauses.  Finally, 
19.6% are civil rights statutes, 27.2% are freestanding statutes, 5.9% are coattailing 
statutes, 9.1% are modifying statutes, and the majority (43.9%) are penalty enhancement 
statutes. 
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 For a review of the descriptive statistics of the correlates of reporting please refer to chapter 4. 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for State Statute Control Measures 
 
Percentage 
Sexual Orientation Statute 55.9 
Disability Statute 59.3 
Reporting Statute 2.0 
Criminal Statute 33.3 
Reporting & Criminal Statute 49.8 
Bias Statute 59.6 
Perception Statute 31.6 
Civil Rights Statute 19.6 
Freestanding Statute 27.2 
Coattailing Statute 5.9 
Modifying Statute 9.1 
Penalty Enhancement Statute 43.9 
Obs 408 
Groups 51 
 
 As with the anti-black analysis, the regression analysis of the anti-Hispanic hate 
crime incidents proceeds in five steps.  Each of these is presented in Table 5.3 below.  
Model 1
17
 examines the relationship between minority threat, here measured as the 
Hispanic Immigration Rate, and Hispanic hate crime.  The results suggest that 
immigration is positively associated with Hispanic hate crime.  Specifically, a one unit 
increase in the rate of Hispanic immigration results on average in an increase in Hispanic 
hate crime by a factor of 1.328.  Model 2 adds in the more traditional measure of 
minority threat in the percent of the population that is of Hispanic origin.  Most 
importantly, the immigration term remains significant independent of the overall 
proportion of the population that is Hispanic and the percent Hispanic is significant with 
a one unit increase in the percent Hispanic population in the state decreasing anti-
Hispanic hate crime by a factor of 0.96.  Model 3 adds in the economic and political 
                                                 
17
 In addition to the analyses presented here, temporal lags were added to the models to examine the 
possibility that the size of the minority population, the level of economic competition, or the level of 
political strength in the previous year is significantly related to the following year‘s level of Hispanic hate 
crime.  The results indicate that this is not the case.  Results presented in Appendix C. 
Stacey, Michele, 2010, UMSL, p. 104 
 
threat indicators.  As with the anti-black analysis the economic threat indicators are not 
significant; however, unlike the anti-Black analysis, the political threat indicator is not 
significant. Model 3 adds in the control indicators.  Of these, only one is significant.  
Specifically the percent of the population living below the poverty line indicates that 
poorer states have fewer hate crimes.  Additionally, the inclusion of these control 
measures reduces the immigration term to non-significance.   
The final model in Table 5.3 adds in the controls for the correlates of reporting.
18
  
Not only are these correlates of reporting added to the models in order to control for 
differences across states in reporting practices, but it is also possible that by adding these 
correlates of reporting to the model the relationships between the minority threat 
indicators and anti-Hispanic hate crime may change.  Controlling for the correlates of 
reporting does not change the relationship between the percent Hispanic and Hispanic 
hate crime.  Additionally, of the reporting controls, the percent of the population covered 
by the reporting agencies, the percent of agencies not reporting zeros, the average police 
per capita, and the percentage of agencies having a specialized bias unit or specialized 
bias personnel are significant predictors of Hispanic hate crime.  The more of the state‘s 
population that is covered by the reporting agencies the more reported Hispanic hate 
crime.  Specifically, a one unit increase in the population covered on average results in an 
increase in Hispanic hate crime by a factor of 1.02, and a one unit increase in the percent 
of agencies reporting non-zeros increases Hispanic hate crime by a factor of 1.01 on 
average.  Additionally, a one unit increase in the average size of the police departments in 
the state decreases Hispanic hate crime by a factor of 0.996 on average.  Finally, a one  
                                                 
18
 Adding the property crime rate in supplementary analyses did not change the results dramatically.  
(Results not shown.) 
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Table 5.3: Regression of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Counts on State Structural Characteristics, 2000-
2007 (Robust Standard Errors) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 (S.E.) 
IRR 
(S.E.) 
IRR 
(S.E.) 
IRR 
(S.E.) 
IRR 
(S.E.) 
IRR 
Intercept -12.879** -12.281** -12.135** -11.948** -12.415** 
(0.974) (0.957) (0.128) (1.245) (1.514) 
LN Hisp Imm Rate 0.284* 0.263* 0.264* 0.212 0.191 
(0.129) 
1.328 
(0.127) 
1.301 
(0.128) 
1.302 
(0.130) (0.139) 
% Hispanic  -0.046** -0.048** -0.051** -0.062** 
 (0.009) 
0.955 
(0.009) 
0.953 
(0.013) 
0.950 
(0.012) 
0.940 
Hisp/Wh Unemployed   -0.149 -0.201 -0.245 
  (0.130) (0.133) (0.146) 
 
Hisp/Black Unemployed   0.273 0.348* 0.184 
  (0.179) (0.181) 
1.417 
(0.218) 
% Hispanic Voters   -0.003 -0.005 -0.010 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
Total Poverty    -0.075* -0.015 
   (0.035) 
0.928 
(0.035) 
% White Males, 18-29    0.116 0.033 
   (0.070) (0.078) 
 
West    0.285 0.213 
   (0.252) (0.235) 
 
South    -0.169 -0.451 
   (0.247) (0.247) 
 
State Hetero    0.002 0.006 
   (0.006) (0.007) 
 
Aggravated Assault      0.001 
    (0.001) 
 
% Pop Covered     0.023** 
    (0.004) 
1.023 
% Report Non-Zeros     0.010* 
    (0.004) 
1.010 
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Table 5.3: Regression of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Counts on State Structural 
Characteristics, 2000-2007 (Robust Standard Errors) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 (S.E.) 
IRR 
(S.E.) 
IRR 
(S.E.) 
IRR 
(S.E.) 
IRR 
(S.E.) 
IRR 
Police per Capita     -0.004** 
    (0.001) 
0.996 
% Bias Unit     0.018* 
    (0.009) 
1.018 
% Comm Pol     -0.009 
    (0.006) 
 
2000 0.2667 0.189 0.211 0.123 0.113 
 (0.182) 
 
(0.177) (0.180) (0.179) (0.212) 
2002 -0.003 -0.026 -0.059 -0.046 -0.056 
 (0.182) 
 
(0.178) (0.187) (0.184) (0.216) 
2003 0.149 0.120 0.053 0.069 -0.236 
 (0.222) 
 
(0.222) (0.223) (0.223) (0.359) 
2004 0.164 0.293 0.133 0.156 -0.231 
 (0.226) 
 
(0.224) (0.223) (0.226) (0.344) 
2005 0.349 0.224 0.286 0.800* -0.001 
 (0.227) 
 
(0.228) (0.225) (0.348) 
2.225 
(0.494) 
2006 0.199 0.356 0.186 0.668* -0.127 
 (0.231) 
 
(0.228) (0.235) (0.343) 
1.951 
(0.482) 
2007 0.416 0.356 0.299 0.761* -0.061 
 (0.229) 
 
(0.226) 
 
(0.234) (0.337) 
2.140 
(0.472) 
Exposure:      
Hispanic Population --- --- --- --- --- 
Wald χ2 11.30 37.71 39.63 60.26 145.38 
Obs 384 384 384 384 384 
Groups 48 48 48 48 48 
p < .01 ** p < .05 * 
unit increase in the percent of the agencies in the state with a bias unit, or other 
specialized personnel for handling bias crimes, increases the reported number of Hispanic 
hate crimes by a factor of 1.02 on average. 
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 As with the anti-black analysis in chapter 4, it is possible that these relationships 
will look differently if we take into account the differing definitions of hate crime.  Table 
5.4 below suggests that this is indeed the case.  Immigration is not significantly related to 
Hispanic hate crime once the definition of hate crime is controlled.  However, the percent 
Hispanic in the state remains significant even controlling for these differing definitions. 
Of particular interest in this analysis is that, unlike the anti-black analysis, the definition 
of hate crime in the state is significantly related in some respects to the prevalence of 
anti-Hispanic hate crime.  Specifically, states with a bias statute as opposed to a hate 
statute on average have more reported hate crime.  This is to be expected in some 
respects because bias statutes define hate crime more broadly than do hate statutes.  
Additionally, states with either just a criminal statute or both a criminal statute and a 
reporting statute report fewer hate crimes on average than do states with just a reporting 
statute.  However, the criminal statute indicator loses significance once the other 
reporting practices of the states are controlled.  Finally, of the types of hate crime statute 
two are significant.  The first are coattailing statutes, which define hate crime by 
attaching it to a predefined criminal statute.  States with coattailing statutes report more 
hate crime on average than do states with penalty enhancement statutes.    Another 
interesting relationship that emerged in this analysis is the positive relationship of civil 
rights statutes and anti-Hispanic hate crime.  Specifically, states with a civil rights statute 
report more Hispanic hate crime on average than states with penalty enhancement 
statutes.  However, both of these effects loose significance when controlling for the 
reporting practices of the states..  As such, it appears that states with civil rights and 
coattailing statutes likely report differently than do states with penalty enhancement  
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Table 5.4: Supplementary Analysis of Predictors on the Number of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crimes, 2000-
2007 (Robust Standard Errors) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef 
 
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) 
Intercept -12.437** -12.170** -12.021** -11.405** -12.322** 
 
(0.991) (0.979) (0.996) (1.317) (1.558) 
LN Hispanic Immigration Rate 0.227 0.230 0.226 0.185 0.197 
 
(0.133) (0.131) (0.131) (0.136) (0.146) 
% Hispanic 
 
-0.032** -0.034** -0.044** -0.046** 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) 
Hispanic/White Unemployed 
  
-0.129 -0.187 -0.166 
   
(0.133) (0.140) (0.149) 
Hispanic/Black Unemployed 
  
0.270 0.289 0.099 
   
(0.175) (0.187) (0.213) 
% Hispanic Voters 
  
-0.003 -0.003 -0.005 
   
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Total Poverty 
   
-0.076 -0.036 
    
(0.040) (0.040) 
% Young White Males 
   
0.071 0.003 
    
(0.076) (0.083) 
West 
   
0.115 -0.032 
    
(0.313) (0.295) 
South 
   
-0.326 -0.723** 
    
(0.267) (0.270) 
% Urban 
   
0.013 0.007 
    
(0.007) (0.007) 
Aggravated Assault Rate 
    
0.001 
     
(0.001) 
% Population Covered 
    
0.022** 
     
(0.004) 
% Agencies: Non-Zero Count 
    
0.011* 
     
(0.005) 
Police per Capita 
    
-0.003 
     
(0.001) 
% Bias Unit 
    
0.018* 
     
(0.009) 
% Community Policing 
    
-0.006 
     
(0.006) 
Sexual Orientation Statute 0.066 0.127 0.149 0.074 0.082 
 
(0.253) (0.253) (0.254) (0.261) (0.239) 
Disability Statute -0.300 -0.162 -0.158 -0.261 -0.558* 
 
(0.247) (0.253) (0.254) (0.264) (0.253) 
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Table 5.4: Supplementary Analysis of Predictors on the Number of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crimes, 2000-
2007 cont. (Robust Standard Errors) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Coef Coef 
 
Coef Coef 
 
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) 
Criminal Statute -0.814* -0.896** -0.899** -0.895* -0.626 
 
(0.344) (0.343) (0.343) (0.365) (0.331) 
Reporting & Criminal Statute -0.723* -0.756* -0.753* -0.617 -0.655* 
 
(0.351) (0.353) (0.353) (0.366) (0.339) 
Bias Statute 0.905** 0.800** 0.799** 0.603* 0.587* 
 
(0.251) (0.253) (0.254) (0.261) (0.234) 
Perception Statute -0.587** -0.383 -0.402 -0.472 -0.319 
 
(0.223) (0.231) (0.233) (0.279) (0.265) 
Civil Rights Statute 0.812** 0.761** 0.744** 0.769** 0.222 
 
(0.242) (0.244) (0.245) (0.241) (0.223) 
Freestanding Statute 0.321 0.222 0.205 0.186 -0.031 
 
(0.222) (0.229) (0.231) (0.237) (0.227) 
Coattailing Statute 1.103** 0.875* 0.878* 0.859* 0.526 
 
(0.373) (0.391) (0.396) (0.395) (0.372) 
Modifying Statute -0.032 -0.102 -0.084 -0.272 -0.060 
 
(0.339) (0.341) (0.343) (0.337) (0.329) 
2000 0.228 0.185 0.206 0.135 0.107 
 
(0.177) (0.173) (0.176) (0.186) (0.215) 
2002 -0.075 -0.062 -0.096 -0.068 -0.044 
 
(0.178) (0.174) (0.182) (0.192) (0.220) 
2003 0.094 0.076 0.045 0.110 -0.023 
 
(0.221) (0.218) (0.224) (0.232) (0.368) 
2004 0.129 0.127 0.136 0.200 -0.052 
 
(0.227) (0.224) (0.224) (0.233) (0.353) 
2005 0.282 0.270 0.260 0.661 0.077 
 
(0.229) (0.226) (0.227) (0.370) (0.511) 
2006 0.204 0.235 0.199 0.560 -0.007 
 
(0.232) (0.230) (0.238) (0.364) (0.500) 
2007 0.339 0.332 0.279 0.661 0.089 
 
(0.231) (0.230) (0.238) (0.357) (0.487) 
Exposure 
     Hispanic Population --- --- --- --- --- 
Wald χ2 56.43 35.49 67.39 94.22 155.89 
Obs 384 384 384 384 384 
Groups 48 48 48 48 48 
p < .01 ** p < .05 * 
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statutes and that it is this reporting that explains the relationship between these statutes 
and Hispanic hate crime.   
 Besides these relatively straightforward effects, another significant effect 
emerged.  Specifically, when controlling for reporting states that include disability as a 
protected category have a higher Hispanic hate crime rate than do states that do not 
include disability.  Although this is interesting it is likely that this effect is spurious.   
Alternative Indicators of Economic Threat 
 As with the anti-black analysis it is possible that unemployment is not the best 
indicator of economic competition.  As such, two additional indicators of economic threat 
are tested.  Specifically, the income ratio (both Hispanic to white and Hispanic to black) 
as well as the poverty ratio (both Hispanic to white and Hispanic to black) are included in 
lieu of the unemployment ratio in table 5.5.  Models 1-3 test the income ratio as the 
measure of economic threat while models 4-6 test the poverty ratio.   
 Of the four additional indicators of economic threat, the only significant 
relationship is an inverse relationship between the ratio of Hispanic to black per capita 
income and hate crime.  However, this relationship loses significance when controlling 
for other state structural characteristics and reporting practices.   
Testing Blalock’s Curvilinear Hypotheses 
 
 As mentioned in Chapter 4, Blalock proposes that the relationship between the 
minority threat indicators and hate crime may not be linear.  In an effort to examine these 
potential curvilinear relationships, quadratic terms for each of the economic and political 
threat indicators were added to the full model.  These results are presented in table 5.6 
below.  Of the potential curvilinear relationships explored none are significant.  This  
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Table 5.5: Alternative Indicators of Economic Threat on Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Counts, 2000-2007 
(Robust Standard Errors) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) 
Intercept -11.811** -11.796** -12.750** -11.942** -12.113** -12.134** 
 
(1.112) (1.301) (1.549) (1.033) (1.575) (1.836) 
Hispanic Immigration 
Rate 
0.255* 0.216 0.172 0.219 0.186 0.164 
(0.129) (0.131) (0.140) (0.133) (0.137) (0.148) 
% Hispanic -0.049** -0.051** -0.062** -0.046** -0.052** -0.063** 
 
(0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.013) 
Hispanic/White Income 1.084 0.355 1.934 
   
 
(1.261) (1.384) (1.471) 
   Hispanic/Black Income -1.145* -0.528 -1.065 
   
 
(0.531) (0.599) (0.642) 
   Hispanic/ White Poverty 
   
0.008 0.071 0.017 
    
(0.098) (0.111) (0.114) 
Hispanic/Black Poverty 
   
0.028 0.026 0.014 
    
(0.022) (0.023) (0.028) 
% Hispanic Voters 
 
-0.002 -0.007 
 
-0.002 -0.008 
  
(0.011) (0.011) 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
Total Poverty 
 
-0.068 0.005 
 
-0.093* -0.027 
  
(0.036) (0.034) 
 
(0.038) (0.038) 
% Young White Males 
 
0.099 -0.000 
 
0.134 0.026 
  
(0.069) (0.077) 
 
(0.109) (0.110) 
West 
 
0.255 0.164 
 
0.522 0.426 
  
(0.258) (0.235) 
 
(0.295) (0.280) 
South 
 
-0.136 -0.444 
 
0.002 -0.349 
  
(0.243) (0.234) 
 
(0.258) (0.254) 
% Urban 
 
0.002 0.005 
 
0.002 0.005 
  
(0.006) (0.007) 
 
(0.007) (0.008) 
Aggravated Assault Rate 
  
0.000 
  
0.001 
   
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
% Population Covered 
  
0.024** 
  
0.022** 
   
(0.004) 
  
(0.004) 
% Agencies Reporting 
Non-Zeros   
0.011* 
  
0.010* 
  
(0.004) 
  
(0.004) 
Police per Capita 
  
-0.004** 
  
-0.004** 
   
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
% Bias Unit 
  
0.020* 
  
0.021* 
   
(0.009) 
  
(0.009) 
% Community Policing 
  
-0.009 
  
-0.013 
   
(0.006) 
  
(0.007) 
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Table 5.5: Alternative Indicators of Economic Threat on Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Counts, 2000-2007 
cont. (Robust Standard Errors) 
2000 0.170 0.084 0.111 0.043 -0.050 -0.009 
 
(0.184) (0.180) (0.218) (0.175) (0.180) (0.215) 
2002 -0.029 -0.017 -0.060 -0.126 -0.076 -0.114 
 
(0.185) (0.189) (0.226) (0.175) (0.188) (0.221) 
2003 0.123 0.110 -0.189 -0.003 0.044 -0.416 
 
(0.223) (0.227) (0.360) (0.218) (0.227) (0.381) 
2004 0.132 0.143 -0.237 -0.174 -0.061 -0.530 
 
(0.225) (0.227) (0.344) (0.258) (0.266) (0.396) 
2005 0.355 0.769* -0.051 0.160 0.944 -0.193 
 
(0.227) (0.344) (0.493) (0.314) (0.611) (0.695) 
2006 0.274 0.662* -0.141 0.200 0.958 -0.159 
 
(0.232) (0.340) (0.485) (0.319) (0.593) (0.675) 
2007 0.427 0.783* -0.026 0.293 1.027 -0.138 
 
(0.230) (0.334) (0.474) (0.323) (0.592) (0.672) 
Exposure: 
      Hispanic Population --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Wald χ2 45.93 60.99 158.38 32.91 54.76 132.25 
Obs 384 384 384 345 345 345 
Groups 48 48 48 47 47 47 
p < .01 ** p < .05 * 
suggests that the observed relationship between the size of the Hispanic population and 
Hispanic hate crime is linear.   
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Table 5.6: Testing the Curvilinear Hypothesis: Regression of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Counts, 
2000-2007 (Robust Standard Errors) 
 
Minority 
Threat 1 
Minority 
Threat 2 
Economic 
Threat 1 
Economic 
Threat 2 
Political 
Threat  
Full 
Model 
 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) 
Intercept -11.815** -12.011** -12.324** -12.667** -12.363** -15.463* 
 
(1.298) (1.519) (1.549) (1.534) (1.511) (7.119) 
LN Hispanic 
Immigration Rate 
0.983 0.176 0.187 0.197 0.193 1.069 
(1.825) (0.139) (0.140) (0.139) (0.138) (1.845) 
Hispanic 
Immigration Sq 
-0.052     -0.059 
(0.121)     (0.122) 
% Hispanic -0.062** -0.115** -0.062** -0.060** -0.061** -0.122** 
 
(0.012) (0.038) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.040) 
% Hispanic Sq  0.001    0.002 
 
 (0.001)    (0.001) 
Hispanic/ White 
Unemployed 
-0.251 -0.232 -0.327 -0.338* -0.241 -0.488 
(0.146) (0.145) (0.372) (0.166) (0.147) (0.413) 
Hisp/White 
Unemployed Sq 
  0.029   0.046 
  (0.123)   (0.129) 
Hispanic/Black 
Unemployed 
0.193 0.184 0.188 0.733 0.194 0.971** 
(0.217) (0.211) (0.218) (0.468) (0.218) (0.496) 
Hisp/Blk 
Unemployed Sq 
   -0.189  -0.271 
   (0.146)  (0.153) 
% Hispanic Voters -0.010 -0.015 -0.011 -0.009 -0.024 -0.031 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.025) (0.025) 
Hispanic Voters 
Sq 
    0.000 0.000 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Poverty -0.015 -0.031 -0.015 -0.014 -0.017 -0.035 
 
(0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) 
% Young White 
Males 
0.034 0.035 0.033 0.057 0.038 0.076 
(0.079) (0.078) (0.078) (0.081) (0.078) (0.081) 
West 0.205 0.292 0.218 0.241 0.204 0.335 
 
(0.237) (0.240) (0.235) (0.238) (0.235) (0.246) 
South -0.449 -0.461 -0.446 -0.484* -0.464 -0.516* 
 
(0.248) (0.246) (0.248) (0.248) (0.247) (0.248) 
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Minority 
Threat 1 
 
 
Minority 
Threat 2 
 
 
Economic 
Threat 1 
 
 
Economic 
Threat 2 
 
 
Political 
Threat  
 
 
Full 
Model 
 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) 
% Urban 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.003 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Aggravated 
Assault Rate 
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Population 
Covered 
0.023** 0.024** 0.023** 0.022** 0.023** 0.023** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% Agencies 
Reporting Non-
Zeros 
0.010* 0.011* 0.010* 0.009* 0.010* 0.010* 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Police per Capita -0.004** -0.003* -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
% Bias Unit 0.018* 0.017* 0.018* 0.019* 0.018* 0.017* 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
% Community 
Policing 
-0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
2000 0.115 0.102 0.118 0.121 0.113 0.124 
 
(0.211) (0.212) (0.213) (0.213) (0.213) (0.215) 
2002 -0.025 -0.077 -0.061 -0.086 -0.074 -0.117 
 
(0.218) (0.216) (0.217) (0.219) (0.219) (0.226) 
2003 -0.194 -0.263 -0.245 -0.316 -0.253 -0.366 
 
(0.368) (0.358) (0.360) (0.365) (0.359) (0.377) 
2004 -0.203 -0.228 -0.237 -0.298 -0.229 -0.292 
 
(0.347) (0.344) (0.343) (0.348) (0.344) (0.352) 
2005 0.026 0.037 -0.007 0.017 0.022 0.116 
 
(0.497) (0.496) (0.493) (0.500) (0.495) (0.504) 
2006 -0.100 -0.110 -0.131 -0.117 -0.118 -0.059 
 
(0.486) (0.483) (0.481) (0.487) (0.482) (0.490) 
2007 -0.034 -0.033 -0.040 -0.056 -0.057 0.006 
 
(0.475) (0.472) (0.471) (0.478) (0.472) (0.479) 
Exposure:       
Hispanic 
Population 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
Wald χ2 143.73 152.55 145.57 144.17 146.90 155.20 
Obs 384 384 384 384 384 384 
Groups 48 48 48 48 48 48 
p < .01 ** p < .05 * 
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Table 5.7: Interaction Effects: Testing the Moderation of Threat for Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime 
Counts 
Immigration X H/W Unemployed 
Intercept -12.423** 
Hispanic Immigration Rate 0.192 
H/W Unemployed -0.241 
Interaction: Immigration X Unemployed -0.016 
Immigration X H/B Unemployed  
Intercept -12.089** 
Hispanic Immigration Rate 0.158 
% H/B Unemployed 0.131 
Interaction: Immigration X Unemployed 0.232 
Immigration X Hispanic Voters 
Intercept -12.502** 
Hispanic Immigration Rate 0.201 
Hispanic Voters -0.011 
Interaction: Immigration X Hisp Voters 0.007 
Hispanic Voters X H/B Unemployed  
Intercept -12.660** 
% Hispanic Voters  -0.015 
% H/B Unemployed 0.457 
Interaction: Hisp Voters X H/B Unemployed -0.041 
Hispanic Voters X H/W Unemployed  
Intercept -12.365** 
% Hispanic Voters -0.012 
% H/W Unemployed -0.240 
Interaction: Hisp Voters X H/W Unemployed -0.005 
Immigration X % Pop Covered  
Intercept -12.431** 
Hispanic Immigration Rate 0.192 
% Population Covered 0.023 
Interaction: Immigration X Pop Covered 0.001 
Immigration X % Non-Zero  
Intercept -12.411** 
Hispanic Immigration Rate 0.189 
% Non-Zero Count 0.010* 
Interaction: Immigration X Non-Zero -0.009 
Immigration X % Community Policing  
Intercept -12.524** 
Hispanic Immigration Rate 0.203 
% Community Policing -0.062 
Interaction: Immigration X Comm Pol -0.001 
Immigration X % Urban  
Intercept -12.414** 
Hispanic Immigration Rate 0.193 
% Urban 0.006 
Interaction: Immigration X % Urban -0.004 
Immigration X % Young White Males  
Intercept -12.237** 
Hispanic Immigration Rate 0.162 
% Young White Males 0.043 
Interaction: Immigration X Young White Males 0.107 
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% Hispanic X H/W Unemployed 
Intercept -12.434** 
% Hispanic -0.061** 
H/W Unemployed -0.258 
Interaction: % Hispanic X H/W Unemployed -0.003 
% Hispanic X H/B Unemployed  
Intercept -12.418** 
% Hispanic -0.061** 
H/B Unemployed 0.290 
Interaction: % Hispanic X H/B Unemployed -0.005 
% Hispanic X Hispanic Voters  
Intercept -12.491** 
% Hispanic -0.060** 
Hispanic Voters -0.011 
Interaction: % Hispanic X Hispanic Voters -0.000 
% Hispanic X % Pop Covered  
Intercept -12.492** 
% Hispanic -0.063** 
% Pop Covered 0.023** 
Interaction: % Hispanic X % Pop Covered 0.000 
% Hispanic X % Non-Zero  
Intercept -12.493** 
% Hispanic -0.061** 
% Non-Zero 0.010* 
Interaction: % Hispanic X % Non-Zero 0.000 
% Hispanic X % Young White Males  
Intercept -12.472** 
% Hispanic -0.062** 
% Young White Males 0.039 
Interaction: % Hispanic X % Young White Males -0.001 
% Hispanic X % Community Policing  
Intercept -12.536** 
% Hispanic -0.063** 
% Community Policing -0.008 
Interaction: % Hispanic X % Community Policing 0.000 
% Hispanic X % Urban  
Intercept -13.174** 
% Hispanic -0.077** 
% Urban -0.004 
Interaction: % Hispanic X % Urban 0.001* 
% Hispanic X Immigration  
Intercept -12.382** 
% Hispanic -0.062** 
Hispanic Immigration Rate 0.188 
Interaction: % Hispanic X Immigration -0.003 
p < .01 ** p < .05 * 
Testing the Moderating Effects of Minority Threat and Reporting 
 While there does not seem to be a mediating relationship of economic or political 
threat on hate crime, as with the anti-black analysis, it is possible that there is a 
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moderating relationship.  In other words, it is possible that the effect of the minority 
threat indicators may be stronger across levels of economic competition or minority 
group political strength.  The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.7 above.  
First, the effect of Hispanic immigration or percent Hispanic may vary across values on 
the respective unemployment ratios; however, this is not supported in the analysis.  
Second, the effect of immigration or percent Hispanic may vary across values of minority 
political power, but again this is not supported by the analysis.  Third, the effect of 
minority group political power may vary across levels of economic threat, but as with the 
other hypotheses this is not supported by the analysis.   
Additionally, it is possible that the effect of immigration or percent Hispanic may 
vary depending on the reporting practices of the states.  Specifically, it is possible that 
immigration or percent Hispanic may have a stronger effect where there is more reporting 
such that, especially due to the rarity of Hispanic hate crime, it may be difficult to detect 
a significant relationship between minority group size and hate crime where there is little 
reporting.  To test this interaction terms between immigration as well as percent Hispanic 
and the percent of the population covered by the reporting agencies, the percent of 
agencies reporting non-zero counts, and the percent of agencies with a community 
policing policy were  included in the model.  There does not appear to be a moderating 
relationship between minority group size and reporting.    
Likewise, it is possible that the effect of minority group size varies across levels 
of the percent urban population.  Specifically, it is possible that the effect of minority 
group size may be stronger in states with a larger proportion of their population residing 
in large cities.  This may be due to a concentration of immigrants and Hispanics in 
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general in those large cities where there is greater access to jobs.  While the relationship 
between immigration and hate crime does not appear to be moderated by the percent 
urban population, the effect of the percent Hispanic on hate crime is significantly 
different at different levels of percent urban.  In other words, the negative relationship 
between percent Hispanic and hate crime is conditioned by the percentage of the 
population living in large cities, such that the effect will become stronger in states with 
more of their population in cities over 100,000 population. 
Likewise, it may be that the effect of minority group size will be different across 
the different levels of the potential offending population.  In other words, it is possible 
that the effect of minority group size may be stronger where there are a larger 
concentration of young white males.  This hypothesis is not supported in the analysis.  
Finally, the effect of Hispanic immigration may depend on the overall size of the 
Hispanic population.  Specifically, it is possible that where there is already a large 
concentration of Hispanics an increase in the size of the Hispanic immigrant population 
may not result in an increase in Hispanic hate crime.  On the other hand, where there are 
few Hispanics an increase in the Hispanic immigrant population may result in a more 
dramatic increase in hate crime.  This hypothesis was explored using a multiplicative 
interaction of the percent Hispanic and the Hispanic immigration rate, but the results 
indicate this is not the case. 
Testing the Fragility of the Immigration Term 
 There is little precedent at  the macro level on the best way to measure 
immigration.  In order to find the best measure of immigration over time at the state level 
data from the Department of Homeland Security‘s (DHS) Immigration Yearbooks are 
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used in the preceding analysis.  However, DHS only provides the number of legal 
immigrants entering a given state each year that are from specific countries.  In order to 
adjust for the different sizes of the 51 states that make up the continental United States, it 
was necessary to create a rate.  This proved to be slightly more difficult than one would 
expect, because depending on the denominator chosen to make the rate and the sample 
used in the analysis the results were different.  The take away point to this discussion is 
that the relationship between this indicator of immigration and hate crime is fragile.  
Thus, in order to determine which would be the best indicator of Hispanic immigration 
and what would be the best sample of states and years to use, a series of analyses were 
conducted.  This analysis is presented in Appendix D.   
 Four sampling frames and four denominators were used.  The four denominators 
are: first, the total population in the state; second, the total Hispanic population in the 
state; third, the total Hispanic foreign born population in the state; and fourth, the total 
foreign born population in the state.  The first sample is the full set of 51 states for the 
years 2000-2007.  The second sample is the full set of 51 states for a more limited time 
frame, 2000-2004.  The third and fourth samples divide each of these two into a 
subsample consisting of those states that are at least 2% Hispanic in all years.  In addition 
to examining different sampling frames the models were also assessed including and 
excluding the percent Hispanic measure.   
 The results of this fragility test suggest that regardless of the denominator used 
immigration is not related to Hispanic hate crime once reporting is controlled when using 
the full sample of 51 states.  On the other hand, the results indicate that when controlling 
for the percent of the state that is Hispanic, immigration as a function of the Hispanic 
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population and immigration as a function of the Hispanic foreign born population are 
significant and positive in many of the models.  Indeed the immigration terms are most 
consistently positive, with the exception of the term using the total population as the 
denominator which is negative.  This total population denominator, however, is not 
substantively significant.   
For the purpose of the analysis presented in this chapter Hispanic immigration 
was measured as the rate per 100,000 Hispanic foreign born persons coming from four 
countries (Cuba, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico).  This indicator was 
chosen for two reasons.  The first is conceptual.  Specifically, the immigration term 
should capture increases in the immigrant population, as such this indicator captures year 
to year changes in the Hispanic foreign born population. The second is statistical.  In 
examining the different immigration terms across samples the indicator used here was the 
most consistent.  Specifically, the results were similar for both the period from 2000-
2007 and the shorter period from 2000-2004.  This suggests that while still fragile, this 
indicator may be the most robust indicator of Hispanic immigration. 
Discussion 
In the past ten years Hispanics have become the largest minority group in the 
United States.  A large part of this shift in the demographic makeup of the country has 
been immigration.  As a result of this increasing population, Hispanics today may be seen 
as an even greater threat to the majority white population than African-Americans.   
The analysis in this chapter set out to examine the trend in anti-Hispanic hate 
crime, and specifically attempt to explain this trend using the minority threat framework.  
The findings suggest that while immigration explains some of the variation in hate crime 
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against Hispanics this relationship may be due to other structural characteristics of the 
state that are related to immigration.  On the other hand, like the anti-Black analysis it 
appears that the overall size of the minority population is related to the level of hate 
crime, and is independent of the other state structural characteristics and reporting.  
Additionally, as with the previous examination of the anti-black hate crime trend, 
reporting seems to explain much of the variation in Hispanic hate crime.   
In terms of the minority threat framework, the results do suggest a relationship 
between minority group size and hate crime, and suggest that this relationship is quite 
robust (at least in terms of the overall size of the minority group); although, the 
relationship appears to be negative which is contrary to the expectations of minority 
threat.  Additionally, the minority threat framework proposes a positive relationship 
between the political strength of the minority group as well as the level of economic 
competition and hate crime, but this is not supported in the analysis.  These findings are 
consistent with those from the previous chapter on anti-Black hate crime, except there 
does not appear to be a relationship between Hispanic political power and Hispanic hate 
crime.   
Overall the findings from the analysis of the Hispanic hate crime trends suggest 
that much of the trend is explained by the reporting practices of the differing states.  On 
the other hand, it appears that state structural characteristics and the differing definitions 
of hate crime also play majors roles.  Of particular importance is the fact that an 
increasing Hispanic population appears to decrease hate crime against them, which may 
be of particular interest as the Hispanic population continues to grow in many states and 
in the country as a whole.
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CHAPTER 6 
 
TRENDS IN HOMOPHOBIC VIOLENCE 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The gay rights movement started on June 27, 1969 when a group of New York 
City police raided a gay bar in Greenwich Village.  While raids were not unusual in 1969, 
this raid was special because on this day the people in the bar fought back.  This 
resistance and the protests that followed became known as the Stonewall Riots and set the 
stage for the gay rights movement (Carter, 2004).  Just under a decade later, on 
November 27, 1978, County Supervisor Harvey Milk, the first openly gay man to be 
elected to public office, was assassinated in San Francisco (Engel, 2001).  Finally, two 
decades later, on October 12, 1998, Matthew Shepard was tortured and left to die in 
Wyoming.  Each of these events has led to the political climate today surrounding sexual 
orientation as a protected category in hate crime law, and culminated in the passage of the 
Matthew Shepard Act signed into law in October of 2009 (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2010).  
The Matthew Shepard Act added sexual orientation and gender identity to the federal 
hate crime law.  Many Christian organizations spoke out in opposition of the Matthew 
Shepard Act, as did many conservatives.  Indeed, only 44 Republican members of the 
House of Representatives, and only 5 Senate Republicans voted in favor of the bill 
(Hulse, 2009).   
This comingling of politics and religion surrounding the debate over gay rights 
issues has been a consistent theme over the course of the gay rights movement since the 
late 1960s.   Religion has played a major role in the decision making process surrounding 
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the policies of many states and the federal government with regard to many issues, but in 
the past two decades has found its foothold in condemning policies which are seen to 
benefit gays and lesbians.  Examples of this can be seen in discussion surrounding the 
Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell policy (see Montopoli, 2010) which is regularly used to prevent 
―out‖ gays and lesbians from serving in the military, as well as discussions surrounding 
the issue of gay marriage.  For instance, the Mormon and Catholic Churches were some 
of the largest contributors to the campaign for Proposition 8 in California (ABC 7 News; 
Mormons for 8) which contradicted a ruling by the California Supreme Court in 2008 that 
allowed same sex couples to marry in the state. 
19
  
The Gay Rights Movement 
The Gay Rights movement, like the Civil Rights Movement, has been the primary 
driving force behind making policies to extend equal rights to gays and lesbians including 
equal protection against hate crime.  The movement took off after the raid on the 
Stonewall Inn in New York City in 1969.  A month later the first gay pride march was 
held organizing the gay and lesbian community.  A decade later, Harvey Milk proved that 
the gay community could organize into an electoral constituency to make things happen 
for themselves when he was elected to the position of County Supervisor in San 
Francisco.  After Milk was assassinated in 1979, a jury acquitted his killer, Dan White, of 
first-degree murder.  The day the news of the acquittal came out thousands of protesters 
marched through the streets of San Francisco from the Castro District to City Hall, this 
became known as the White Night riots.   
The gains made during the 1970s were handed a setback in 1981 when the first 
cases of AIDS were reported.  The AIDS epidemic caused a backlash against the gay 
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 Proposition 8 was upheld by the California Supreme Court in 2009. 
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community, and became known as the ―gay-disease‖.  However, by the 1990s, the 
tragedy of the AIDS epidemic helped to rebuild sympathy for gays and lesbians and 
brought the community back together to fight for themselves again.   
During the term of President Bill Clinton two major events in gay rights history 
occurred.  First, the gay and lesbian community came together in support for the 
President‘s support of a bill that would allow gays to serve openly in the armed forces, 
but opposition to the movement resulted in the Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell policy, a watered 
down version of the original bill.  Second, in 1996, Congress passed the Defense of 
Marriage Act, which prohibits the Federal Government from recognizing same-sex 
marriage, thus leaving the recognition of same-sex marriage to individual states to decide.   
With the death of Matthew Shepard in October of 1998, the gay community 
turned toward the expansion of hate crime law to include protections for sexual 
orientation and gender identity.  This expansion was accomplished in many states, and by 
the federal government with the passage of the Matthew Shepard Act in October of 2009.   
The gay rights movement over the past decade has been centered on the issue of 
gay marriage.  In 2000, Vermont became the first state to offer ―civil unions‖ to same sex 
couples which offer some of the same privileges as marriage.  Then in 2004, 
Massachusetts became the first state to recognize same-sex marriage.  This was followed 
by Connecticut in 2008, Iowa in 2009, Vermont in 2009, the District of Columbia in 
2010, and New Hampshire in 2010.  However, this movement has faced many setbacks, 
with 29 states adding constitutional amendments banning same sex marriage, and 12 
others restricting marriage to one man and one woman through legislation.
20
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 The majority of states have amended their constitutions to define marriage as only between a man and a 
woman including Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, 
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Defining Homosexuality 
The definition of homosexuality has changed dramatically over the past century.  
At one time homosexuality was defined as a mental disorder and was included in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychological Association.  
Indeed, it was not until the third edition of the DSM that homosexuality was not included 
(Zucker & Spitzer, 2005).  It has always been defined by most churches as a sin (McNeil, 
1976), and seen as something that could be cured. Today there are many Christian groups 
that consider themselves to be ―ex-gay‖ (Wolkomir, 2001).  These groups are made up of 
individuals who have been ―cured‖.  On the other hand, there are some scientists today, 
and even some church organizations, which are beginning to concede that there may be a 
genetic component to sexual orientation (Johnson, 2003).   
The question then is how these cultural patterns of discrimination and policy 
decisions translate into hate crime.  As was established in chapter 1, hate crime is a 
manifestation of prejudice.  It is a way for people who view someone as being lesser than 
themselves to establish their dominance.  Homophobia
21
 is still an acceptable prejudice to 
have (Hoffman, et al., 2000), and people who hold this view are even supported by many 
individuals, most importantly by their religious teachers.  As with the other forms of hate 
crime examined in this text, this chapter proposes minority threat as an explanation for 
changes in the trend in sexual orientation hate crime over time and across states. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
21
 The term homophobia was originally defined to mean the trepidation of being close or in proximity to a 
homosexual (Weinberg, 1972).  Since this original definition, however, the use of the term has broadened 
to include ―a wide range of negative emotions, attitudes and behaviours toward homosexual people‖ 
(Haaga, 1991: 171).  Thus, homophobia is similar to other prejudices (Herek, 2004), and will be treated 
here as the motivating prejudice behind anti-gay/lesbian/bisexual hate crime. 
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Minority Threat and Sexual Orientation Hate Crime 
 As mentioned previously Blalock‘s original formulation of his minority threat 
hypothesis suggested that as a minority group increases in size the majority group will 
feel threatened and will take action to reduce that threat.  That action will be in the form 
of discrimination, formal social control, and informal social control.  Blalock also 
proposed that one of the mechanisms leading to prejudiced behavior would be political 
threat.  That is as the minority group became larger its political strength would increase 
and threaten the political power of the majority group.  Over the course of the past two 
decades gays and lesbians have become an increasingly visible and powerful group.  
Advocacy groups such as the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), the National Gay and 
Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF), and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) have worked to 
promote equal rights for all regardless of sexual orientation.   States are faced with a 
growing demand from their LGBT community for equal protection under the law (West, 
1998).  Sexual orientation has been added to national laws protecting employment rights, 
voting rights, as well as the federal hate crime statutes (Barnard & Downing, 1999).  If 
Blalock is correct the mobilization of the LGBT community around these political issues 
will pose a threat to the majority group, in this case heterosexuals. Evidence of this 
political threat abounds in the discussion surrounding the issue of gay marriage, with 
conservative and religious groups claiming that gay marriage threatens the very 
foundation of marriage and the family (Stacey, 1996).   
 Blalock‘s second mechanism through which minority threat should manifest is 
economic competition.    Indeed, Christian Right leaders, specifically Tony Marco, have 
argued that gays and lesbians are immensely wealthy.  He suggested: 
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Homosexuals claim they are economically, educationally and culturally 
disadvantaged.  Marketing studies refute those claims.  Homosexuals have an 
average annual household income of $55,430, versus $32,144 for the general 
population and $12,166 for disadvantage African-American households.  (Marco, 
1992). 
 
However, these statistics come from a survey done by the Wall Street Journal in 
1991, and are thus likely skewed toward those individuals who are readers of the 
publication.  Indeed, there is no good estimate of the affluence or lack thereof of the 
LGBT community.  But some intuitive assumptions could be made.  Specifically, it has 
been established in research that women on average make less money than do men for 
doing similar jobs (Crosby, Stockdale, & Ropp, 2007).  Thus if one household has two 
men bringing home a paycheck, while another has a man and a woman bringing home a 
paycheck, it would make some sense that the two male incomes would be higher than the 
man and woman income combined.  However, it also makes sense that a comparison 
between a ―traditional‖ family (man and woman) and a lesbian couple (two women) 
would indicate the opposite.  The combination of a man and a woman‘s incomes would 
be greater than the combination of two women‘s incomes.  This becomes more 
complicated when considering families in which one parent stays at home.  This suggests 
overall that at least in households in which both partners work, there should be a relative 
equality, or a slight disadvantage for lesbian couples, between heterosexual and 
homosexual couples.  
Given this seemingly relative equality between heterosexual and homosexual 
households, this economic threat argument should be less relevant to gay and lesbian hate 
crime.  Additionally, the majority of employers cannot tell whether an individual is gay 
or straight when they interview them, and there is no affirmative action for gay people.  
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So it is not likely that the sexual orientation of the individual will influence the hiring 
process.  If anything, the research that has been done on prejudice may suggest that if the 
sexual orientation of the individual is known the prospective employer may be less 
inclined to hire that individual (Badgett, 1995).  On the other hand, another possible 
relationship here is that it is not the actual threat of the loss of a job to someone who is 
gay or lesbian, but the perception of that threat.  This is an argument similar to others that 
have been proposed in the minority threat framework.  In other words, research suggests 
that many people do not necessarily understand ―affirmative action‖ (Steeh & Krysan, 
1996), and as such may think that if a gay/lesbian person is up for the same job that they 
are, because they are, in some states, a protected group, the gay/lesbian person may get 
the job instead of them.  Research on affirmative action, however, focuses on race and 
ethnicity, and the perception of those groups as a protected category. 
There is however another mechanism that may be considered in a minority threat 
framework explaining anti-homosexual/bisexual hate crime.  This is what I call religious 
threat.  Religion‘s definition of homosexuality as ―an abomination‖ is the root of the 
social climate that leads to discrimination of gays and lesbians.  This social climate is 
evidenced by the arguments made by Christian groups and society at large around issues 
of gay and lesbian relationships to children and influence over them.  Specifically, 
questions exist over whether gays and lesbians should be able to adopt children,
 22
  teach 
in primary and secondary schools,
23
 or even be portrayed by mainstream media.  There is 
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 On the issue of adoption, 10 states and the District of Columbia allow second-parent adoption, or the 
adoption of a child by the non-biological same sex parent. 16 other states have some jurisdictions in which 
second parent adoption has been allowed. Additionally, 14 states and the District of Columbia allow same 
sex couples to jointly adopt a non-biological child. An additional 2 states have allowed joint adoption in 
some jurisdictions. 
23
 Regarding the question of whether gays and lesbians should be allowed to teach, there are many 
examples in which a teacher was targeted for discrimination after coming out as gay or lesbian.  One such 
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an assumption underlying each of these issues in which homosexuality is capable of 
corrupting, or is contagious, and thus may rub off on those individuals (children) over 
whom the gay or lesbian person has influence. 
While this moral argument is based on more than just religion, its foundation is in 
religion.  The view of homosexuality as being depraved, or corrupting, comes from a 
literal interpretation of the Bible.  As such, it is expected that these moral arguments, this 
anti-gay/lesbian social climate, may be more pronounced in areas that are highly 
religious, and more specifically religiously conservative. 
Additionally, it is possible that the political debate and the religiously 
conservative social climate may interact to create a new threat.  As mentioned previously 
religion has played a major role in the debate over equal rights for gays and lesbians.  It is 
possible then that the competing arguments, the debate between the pro-gay marriage 
groups and the anti-gay marriage groups for example, could add a level of threat to the 
landscape.  For instance, it has been suggested by the anti-gay marriage campaigns 
(Brumbaugh, Sanchez, Nock, & Wright, 2007) that homosexuality threatens the 
foundation of marriage and the family.   
While Blalock‘s original treatment of minority threat did not address non-racial or 
ethnic minorities, he did suggest that his theory would apply to any minority group.  As 
such it is my contention that the propositions supplied by the minority threat framework 
                                                                                                                                                 
example is the case of Gerry Crane in Byron Center, Michigan.  Crane was hired as a music teacher in the 
small town in 1993.  He was given great reviews for the first two years of his tenure there.  In 1995, Crane 
and his partner planned a commitment ceremony.  When the town found out about the ceremony and the 
news got back to school officials, parents, and students, angry parents demanded the teacher resign or be 
fired.  Parents pulled their children from Crane‘s classes.  In December, 1995 the school board issued a 
statement that read in part, ―individuals who espouse homosexuality do not constitute proper role models as 
teachers‖ (quoted in Yared, 1997).  By the end of the year, after months of harassment, Crane resigned.   
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may be applied to hate crime against gays and lesbians as it has been applied to racial and 
ethnic violence in the past.   
Sexual Orientation Hate Crime: What We Know 
 The majority of research on sexual orientation hate crime, as with hate crime in 
general, has been at the individual level.  Specifically, research suggests that individuals 
who have been victimized because of their sexual orientation experience more negative 
consequences than gay and lesbian victims of non-bias crimes (Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 
2002).  Additionally, research suggests that as with hate crime in general the offenders in 
sexual orientation bias crimes are generally young white males (Comstock, 1991).  
Sexual orientation bias crimes often occur in schools; studies suggest as many as 80% of 
gay and lesbian teens experience victimization in some form, mostly bullying, in high 
school (Berrill, 1992).  
This examination of sexual orientation as a motivation for victimization at the 
individual level has not translated to the macro level.  However, two studies have been 
conducted in this area.  The first conducted by Green, Glaser, and Rich (1998a) adds 
credence to the assumption that there is no relationship between the economic conditions 
in an area and anti-gay/lesbian hate crime.  Specifically, Green et al. found that monthly 
total unemployment rates are not significantly related to anti-gay/lesbian hate crime in 
New York City from January 1987 to December 1995.  In fact the authors find no 
significant relationship between economic conditions and hate crime for many types, 
including anti-Asian, anti-Black, anti-Semitic, and anti-White hate crime.  The second, 
conducted by Green, Strolovitch, Wong, and Bailey (2001) assessed the relationship 
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between the density of the gay and lesbian population
24
 and hate crime against those 
groups in the five boroughs of New York City.  The authors examined 1990 Census data 
and hate crime reports from the New York Police Department‘s Bias Incident 
Investigative Unit (BIIU) from 1994 to 1995.  While controlling for the size of the white 
population, the population under the age of 5, median household income, and total 
poverty, the authors conclude that there is indeed a strong correlation (.83 for gay men 
and .90 for lesbians) between gay and lesbian population density and anti-gay and lesbian 
hate crime.  This study was limited, however, to the examination of a single city and a 
limited time frame.  Thus the authors were unable to examine changes over time.  These 
are problems inherent in the measurement of the gay and lesbian population and are 
discussed further later in this chapter. 
The Problem of Sexual Orientation Hate Crime 
 The FBI‘s Uniform Crime Reports defines sexual orientation hate crime as those 
against male homosexuals (gay men), female homosexuals (lesbians), homosexuals, 
bisexuals, or heterosexuals.  Within this group the largest subgroup are gay men.  Sexual 
orientation hate crimes account for approximately 15 to 20 percent of hate crime 
incidents reported to police annually.  Gay male hate crimes account for approximately 
60% of sexual orientation hate crimes.  Anti-heterosexual hate crime accounts for only 
2.5% of sexual orientation hate crimes annually.
25
  Sexual orientation hate crimes are 
approximately 70% personal crimes annually, which is slightly higher than racial 
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 The authors measured gay male population density ―by counting the number of households composed of 
two unrelated males over the age of 30… (in which) neither resident of the household could be enrolled in 
school‖.  Lesbian population density was calculated the same way.  This was done using census data at the 
census tract and zip code level (Green et al., 2001:284-285). 
25
 Anti-heterosexual hate crimes are generally simple assaults and intimidation, do not involve weapons 
beyond hands and feet, mostly target young victims and involve young (17-29) adult offenders.  
Additionally, anti-heterosexual hate crimes generally involve female victims and male offenders, with the 
victims most often non-Hispanic whites, while the offenders may either be black or white.   
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incidents (64% personal crimes), similar to ethnic incidents, and considerably higher than 
religious incidents (about 30% personal crimes).   
Figure 6.1 below shows the trend in anti-sexual orientation hate crimes from 2000 
to 2008.  This figure suggests that the sexual orientation hate crime rate has significantly 
decreased since 2000, specifically from approximately 0.58 per 100,000 persons to 0.49 
per 100,000.  This suggests that there is some variation in the trend in sexual orientation 
hate crime over time.   
In addition to variation in the trend in sexual orientation hate crime over time, 
there is variation across region.  This variation is suggested in Figure 6.2 below.  As with 
the trends in anti-racial and anti-ethnic hate crime the South consistently has the lowest 
reported rate for all years, and with the exception of 2006 the West consistently has the 
highest rate for all years.   
Finally, consistent with the analyses of the anti-black and anti-Hispanic hate 
crime trends, it is expected that the trend in sexual orientation hate crime will vary by 
state.  This may be due to differences in the size of the gay and lesbian population, 
differences in the size and influence of the religiously conservative community, or 
differences in the social climate in the state.  For instance, it is possible that states that are 
more politically liberal will be more likely to report sexual orientation hate crimes.  
Additionally, states that have a larger gay and lesbian population, especially one that is 
politically active, may report more sexual orientation hate crime.   
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Figure 6.1: Sexual Orientation Hate Crime Rate per 100,000, 2000-2008 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Sexual Orientation Bias Motivation by Region, 2000-2007 
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various political and social climates that exist.  For instance, Massachusetts is one of only 
a handful of states that has legalized gay marriage (in 2004).  Massachusetts, California, 
Florida, and Georgia each have relatively large gay and lesbian populations, while 
Tennessee and Utah have relatively small, but existent, gay and lesbian populations.  
Additionally, the religious climate is different in each of these states, with Tennessee 
having a very large conservative religious population, as do Florida, Utah, and Georgia, 
while California and Massachusetts do not.  Obviously, these six states do not represent 
all of the different derivations that exist across the U.S.; however, they provide some 
estimation of the amount of variation that does exist. 
 This figure suggests that in some states there was an overall decrease in sexual 
orientation hate crimes (California, Massachusetts, Utah, and Georgia), while in other 
states the trend was more volatile (Tennessee), and other states (Florida) had a more 
stable trend in sexual orientation hate crime from 2000 to 2008.   
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Figure 6.3: Sexual Orientation Hate Crime Rate per 100,000 total persons by State, 2000-
2008 
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 Figures 6.4 and 6.5
26
 below show the sexual orientation hate crime rate for the 48 
contiguous states of the U.S. and the political power of gays and lesbians
27
 for 2001 and 
2007 respectively.  The maps suggest that there may be a relationship between the 
political power of the gay and lesbian population and hate crimes against them.  
Specifically, the Northeastern states have the highest concentration of gay and lesbian 
political power, evident by the larger circles in that region, and have the higher rates of 
sexual orientation motivated hate crime, evident by the blue color. Thus, these figures 
suggest that there is variation across time and place in sexual orientation hate crime and 
that there may be a relationship between the political strength of the minority group and 
hate crime against them.  
Finally, Figure 6.6 shows the sexual orientation hate crime rate per 100,000 total 
population for the 48 contiguous states and the evangelical adherence rate per 1,000.  
While it was expected there would be a positive relationship between evangelical 
adherence and sexual orientation, it appears there may actually be an inverse relationship.  
Specifically, in states where there was more hate crime, such as California and the 
Northeast there are fewer evangelical adherents; however, as with any relationship there 
are some exceptions with states such as Kansas and Georgia having both larger 
evangelical adherence rates and higher sexual orientation hate crime rates.   The 
remainder of this chapter will propose an explanation for the variation seen in the figures 
and will propose minority threat as this explanation for that variation. 
                                                 
26
 These Maps were created using ArcGIS.  The data was drawn from the Uniform Crime Reports Hate 
Crime Reporting Program, the 2000 Religious Congregations and Membership Survey, and the 2000 
Census. 
27
 This is a scale measure, described in more detail later in this chapter, ranging from 0 to 6 indicating states 
that provide certain civil rights protections, such as employment and school discrimination, adoption, and 
marriage to gays and lesbians.   
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Data and Methods 
 For this analysis data are drawn from four sources.  These include, the Uniform 
Crime Reports, which provide the dependent variable in the number of anti-homosexual 
hate crimes in the state each year from 2000 to 2007 for all 51 states (the 50 states of the 
US and the District of Columbia).  These include those motivated by anti-gay male, anti-
lesbian, anti-homosexual, and anti-bisexual bias.   
 Second, the majority group political power indicator is drawn from Dave Leip‘s 
Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections from 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006.  This indicates the 
percent of votes for the Republican candidate in the senatorial race. It‘s expected that 
political conservatives will be more likely to vote for the Republican candidate in an 
election, and that a state‘s level of political conservatism will be related to the level of 
discrimination against gays and lesbians including hate crime.  Estimates for inter-
electoral years were drawn from the prior year‘s election such that the estimate for 2001 
was the percentage from 2000, etc.   
 Third, the gay and lesbian population estimate is drawn from the 2000 Census and 
the 2002-2007 American Community Survey.  This represents the percent of unmarried 
partner households that have same-sex partners. Prior research suggests that this proxy, or 
some derivation thereof, is a valid estimate of the gay and lesbian population (Black, 
Gates, Sanders, & Taylor, 2000; Green et al., 2001; Census, 2001; Gates  & Ost, 2004).   
 The size of the conservative religious population was drawn from the 2000 
Religious Congregations and Membership Survey and represents the rate of evangelical 
adherents per 1,000 persons in the population.  Religious adherents include ―all full 
members, their children, and others who regularly attend services or participate in the 
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congregation‖ (ARDA, 2001).  The analysis was limited to evangelical28 religious groups 
because not all religious groups have the same opinion of homosexuality.  On the 
contrary, it is expected that the most conservative Christian groups, those that believe in a 
literal interpretation of the Bible and those that are most committed to their faith, will be 
the most likely to feel threatened by the increased policy attention paid to gay and lesbian 
issues in the past twenty years.  Evangelical congregations generally represent these more 
conservative groups.  These evangelical congregations are defined as those that ―have 
typically sought more separation from the broader culture, emphasized missionary 
activity and individual conversion, and taught strict adherence to particular religious 
doctrines‖ (Steensland, Park, Regnerus, Robins, Wilcox, & Woodberry, 2000).   
Finally, gay and lesbian political power is measured using a scale of civil rights 
protections afforded to gays and lesbians.  Specifically, drawing from data collected by 
the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) and confirmed by state statute provisions and case 
law, each state was coded as to whether it provided protection in six categories.  First, 
each state was coded for protection from discrimination based on sexual orientation in 
employment (1 for protected, 0 for not protected).  Second, each state was coded 1 if the 
state statutes protect individuals from discrimination, harassment, and/or bullying in 
schools based on their sexual orientation and 0 if not protected.  Third, states which allow 
for second parent adoption were coded 1 while states that do not allow for second parent 
adoption were coded 0.  Likewise, states were coded 1 if they allow for joint adoption 
and 0 otherwise.  Finally, two measures were used to assess marriage equality.  The first 
is whether the state has equal rights or equivalent rights for same sex couples (coded 1 if 
                                                 
28
 These include congregations such as the American Baptist Association, the Southern Baptist Convention, 
Seventh Day Adventist, and Pentecostal.  For a complete list of congregation included in this measure see 
Steensland et al. 2000. 
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the state has equal rights and 0 otherwise). These equal or equivalent rights could refer to 
the legalization of gay marriage, but more often refer to states with some form of civil 
union.
29
  The second measure is whether the state has a gay marriage prohibition (coded 1 
if the state does not have a prohibition and 0 otherwise).  While these two measures are 
somewhat related, they are far from perfectly correlated, because some states which 
prohibit gay marriage do allow some protections, such as civil unions, for gay and lesbian 
couples.  For instance, California allows for domestic partnerships that extend equivalent 
rights to gay and lesbian couples but has an amendment to prohibit gay marriage.  These 
six measures were then added together to create an additive scale (α is between a low of 
.645 in 2000 and a high of .841 in 2007) of gay and lesbian political power ranging from 
a low value of 0 (indicating a state with no civil rights protections for gays and lesbians) 
to 6 (indicating a state with all of the protections for gays and lesbians). 
 Due to data limitations that will be discussed further in the conclusion, the 
following analysis consists of an examination of the descriptive statistics of the variables 
described above, bivariate correlations of the relationships between each of the measures, 
and t-tests of differences between means.  For the purpose of the t-tests the data was 
divided into groups according to the size of the gay and lesbian population and the 
political power of the gay and lesbian community.  Finally, the sample was limited to the 
2000 data alone and a cross sectional negative binomial regression model was used to 
assess the relationship between these indicators and anti-gay/lesbian hate crime.  The 
panel models could not be estimated due to a lack of available data for some of the 
                                                 
29
 Civil unions offer some of the same responsibilities and privileges as does ―marriage‖, with a few notable 
exceptions.  First, civil unions often are not recognized outside of the state that the union was made in, 
while marriages are recognized anywhere the couple may go.  Second, marriage is a legal status providing 
federal tax benefits, and other benefits, that are not extended to civil unions outside of the state.   
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indicators in the analysis over time.  This limitation will be discussed further in the 
conclusion.  
 The standard negative binomial regression log likelihood function is (Hilbe, 
2007): 
   (6.1) 
This model allows for the regression of the predictors on the number of 
gay/lesbian/bisexual hate crimes in a given state in 2000 while adjusting for 
overdispersion in the dependent variable.   
Results 
 The analysis began with an examination of the distribution of the predictors and 
the dependent variable for the years 2000 to 2007.  Table 6.1 presents the descriptive 
statistics.  On average there were 23.86 anti-gay/lesbian/bi hate crimes in a given state 
year with a range from 0 to 420.  Additionally, on average the state was 9.15% 
gay/lesbian with a range from .43 to 31.71. The average score on the gay/lesbian political 
power scale was 1.43 with a range from 0 to 6.  Finally, the average percent republican 
votes was 49.09 with a range from 0 to 99.18; however, the data on this measure was 
limited to 50 states and 270 state-years. 
 
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of Anti-Homosexual Hate Crime Predictors by 
State-Year 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max Obs/Groups 
Anti-Homo 23.86 46.96 0 420 408/51 
% Same-Sex Households 9.15 5.3 0.43 31.71 408/51 
% Republican Votes 49.09 16.63 0 99.18 270/50 
Gay/Lesbian Political Power 1.43 1.57 0 6 408/51 
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Table 6.2 below examines the bivariate correlations between the measures in the 
anti-homosexual hate crime analysis.  Several of the bivariate relationships are 
significant.  Specifically, the size of the gay and lesbian population is significantly and 
positively correlated with anti-gay/lesbian/bisexual hate crime.  Likewise, the political 
strength of the gay and lesbian population is significantly and positively correlated with 
anti-gay/lesbian/bisexual hate crime.  Finally, although the data is somewhat more 
limited, the percent of Republicans in the state is negatively and significantly correlated 
with anti-gay/lesbian/bisexual hate crime.  In addition to the correlations between the 
predictors and anti-homosexual hate crime there are also significant relationships 
between the predictors.  Specifically, the size of the gay/lesbian population is 
significantly and positively correlated with gay and lesbian political power while 
negatively and significantly correlated with the percent of Republican votes.  This 
suggests that it is likely that gays and lesbians will have more political power where there 
are more gays and lesbians and less where there are more Republicans. 
 
 
Table 6.2: Bivariate Correlations of Anti-Homosexual Hate Crime, 2000-2007 
 
Anti-
Homo 
% Same-Sex 
Households 
% Republican 
Votes 
Gay/Lesbian Political 
Power 
Anti-Homo 1 
   % Same-Sex 
Households 0.12* 1 
  % Republican Votes -0.20** -0.06 1 
 Gay/Lesbian Political 
Power 0.37** 0.20** -0.40** 1 
p < .01 ** p < .05 * 
 
 
 Finally, the 2000-2007 data was broken down into groups according to the 
percent gay and lesbian population (Table 6.3) and the score on the gay/lesbian political 
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power scale (Table 6.4) and the means on each group were compared.  Using a one-tailed 
test states that have less than average gay and lesbian population have significantly fewer 
anti-homosexual hate crimes than states with greater than average gay and lesbian 
persons consistent with the bivariate correlations.  Likewise, states with fewer than 
average gays and lesbians score significantly lower on the gay and lesbian political power 
scale.  Similarly, states that score less than the average on the gay and lesbian political 
power scale have significantly fewer anti-gay/lesbian/bisexual hate crimes, and states that 
score lower on the political power scale have significantly more Republican votes.   
 
Table 6.3: Descriptives and T-Tests of Difference Between Means Gay/Lesbian Population 
Size, Anti-Homosexual Hate Crime 
 
Mean (Gay/Lesbian 
Pop > Mean) 
Mean (Gay/Lesbian 
Pop < Mean) T 
Anti-Homo 28.26 16.62 -4.48** 
Gay/Lesbian Political 
Power 1.57 1.19 -3.09** 
Obs 254 154 
 Groups 49 51 
 Note: One tailed Test 
   p < .01 ** p < .05 * 
 
Table 6.4: Descriptives and T-Tests of Difference Between Means by Gay/Lesbian Political 
Power, Anti-Homosexual Hate Crime 
 
Mean (Gay/Lesbian 
Political Power > Mean) 
Mean (Gay/Lesbian 
Political Power < Mean) T 
Anti-Homo 44.98 14.86 -31.16** 
% Republican Votes 38.79 53.5 13.97** 
Obs 122 286 
 Groups 19 38 
 Note: One tailed Test 
   p < .01 ** p < .05 * 
 
 The remainder of the analysis will use the 2000 cross sectional sample of states.  
Table 6.5 below presents the descriptive analysis for the 2000 data.  On average in 2000 
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there were 25.06 anti-homosexual hate crimes with a range from 0 to 399.  The average 
size of the gay and lesbian population was 11.89 with a range from 7.02 to 25.4.  The 
average score on the gay and lesbian political power scale was 1.29 with a range from 0 
to 4.  The average evangelical adherence rate was 144.47 per 1,000 persons with a range 
from 16.19 to 431.48.  Finally, two controls consistent with the previous analyses for the 
differential reporting practices of states were used.  On average in 2000, 80.4% of the 
population was covered by reporting agencies and 22.69% of agencies reported non-zero 
counts.   
 
Table 6.5: Descriptive Statistics of Measures used in Cross Sectional Analysis 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
Anti-Homo 25.06 57.07 0 399 
% Same Sex 11.89 2.97 7.02 25.4 
Gay/Lesbian Political Power 1.29 1.12 0 4 
Evangelical Adherence Rate 144.47 113.87 16.19 431.48 
% Pop Covered 80.4 30.32 0 100 
% Non-Zero  22.69 26.71 0 100 
 
 
 
 Table 6.6 below presents the bivariate correlations of the measures used in the 
cross sectional analysis.  There are a few significant bivariate correlations.  First, there is 
a significant and positive relationship between the gay and lesbian political power scale 
and the gay and lesbian population.  Likewise, as with the panel data, there is a 
significant and positive correlation between the size of the gay and lesbian population 
and the political power of gays and lesbians.  There is a negative relationship between the 
evangelical adherence rate and gay and lesbian political power such that gays and 
lesbians have less power where there are more evangelicals.  Similarly, gays and lesbians 
have more political power where more agencies report non-zero counts.  It is possible 
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that states that are more sensitive to gay and lesbian issues may also be more sensitive to 
hate crime and other minority issues in general.  Thus, states with a larger minority 
population may report more hate crime.  Finally, there is a negative relationship between  
the evangelical adherence rate and the percent of the state population covered by 
reporting agencies, suggesting that states that have fewer evangelicals have a larger 
proportion of their population covered by their reporting agencies.  It is possible that 
states with more conservative view points, including conservative Christian viewpoints, 
will be less likely to support laws that would provide special protections to certain groups 
and thus be less likely to report to programs measuring those types of crime; however, 
this is purely speculative.
30
 
 Finally, a negative binomial regression model was used to assess whether these 
bivariate relationships hold up when controlling for other covariates.  The results of this 
regression analysis are presented in Table 6.7 below.  The first model suggests that there 
is a relationship between the size of the gay and lesbian population and anti-homosexual 
hate crime, with a one unit increase in the size of the gay and lesbian population 
increasing the expected number of anti-homosexual hate crimes by 26%.  The second 
model suggests that this relationship between gay and lesbian population size and hate 
crime is mediated by the political power of the gay and lesbian population consistent with 
Blalock‘s minority threat argument.  However, the gay and lesbian political power is no 
longer significant when controlling for the rate of evangelical adherents (Model 3).  The 
evangelical adherence rate is significantly and negatively related to anti-
                                                 
30
 Additionally, it is possible that because the religious measure is limited to evangelicals, who may be 
more likely to ―separate from the broader culture‖, this is simply picking up an avoidance of participation 
in that culture.   
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gay/lesbian/bisexual hate crime.  Additionally, including this religious indicator in the 
model returns the percent gay and lesbian population to moderate significance.   
 
Table 6.6: Bivariate Correlations of Measures used in Cross Sectional Analysis 
 Anti-
Homo 
% Same 
Sex 
Gay/Lesbian 
Political 
Power 
Evangelical 
Adherence 
Rate 
% Pop 
Covered 
% Non-
Zero 
Anti-Homo 1      
% Same Sex 0.19 1     
Gay/Lesbian 
Political 
Power 
0.31* 0.40** 1    
Evangelical 
Adherence 
Rate 
-0.19 0.16 -0.33* 1   
% Pop 
Covered 
0.19 -0.06 -0.12 -0.41** 1  
% Non-Zero  0.08 0.27 0.34* 0.12 -0.26 1 
p < .01 ** p < .05 * 
 
Model 4 then adds in the first of the reporting controls and Model 5 adds in the 
second reporting control.  The percent of the population covered by reporting agencies is 
significantly and positively related to anti-homosexual hate crime.  Also of note, the 
inclusion of the reporting control does not decrease the effect of the evangelical 
adherence rate on anti-homosexual hate crime; however, the inclusion of the percent of 
agencies reporting non-zero counts does reduce the significance of the evangelical 
adherence rate to only moderate significance.   
 The results of this regression model suggest three additional hypotheses that are 
explored in table 6.8 below.  Specifically, the results suggest that there may be some 
moderating relationships at work.  First, the effect of the political power of the minority 
population may depend on the size of the gay and lesbian population.  There are two 
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potential reasons this relationship may exist.  The first is that it is possible that where 
gays and lesbians have more protections and thus greater political power gays and 
lesbians will be more likely to want to live there producing a greater level of threat to the 
majority group.  Alternatively, and consistent with a minority threat argument, where the 
gay and lesbian population is larger they will be able to mobilize their resources more 
effectively to gain those civil rights protections and thus may pose a greater threat to the 
majority group.   A second potential moderating relationship is that the effect of the size 
of the conservative religious population may be different depending on the size of the gay 
and lesbian population.  Specifically, it is possible that where there are more gays and 
lesbians the religious conservative population may be more attuned to or sensitive to the 
issues of the gay and lesbian population.  Finally, the political strength of the minority 
population may have a different effect on anti-gay and lesbian hate crime depending on 
the size of the conservative religious population. In other words, where gays and lesbians 
have more civil rights protections religious conservatives may feel especially threatened, 
such that they may feel that a powerful gay and lesbian population is a threat, and thus 
there may be a stronger relationship between the religious conservative population and 
hate crime.   
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Table 6.7: Cross-Sectional  Regression of Anti-Homosexual Hate Crime on Predictors, 2000 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) 
Intercept 0.367 
(0.974) 
1.022 
(1.012) 
1.160 
(0.948) 
-0.337 
(1.054) 
-0.972 
(1.119) 
% Same Sex HH 0.228** 
(0.080) 
0.111 
(0.091) 
0.172† 
(0.091) 
0.169† 
(0.088) 
0.170* 
(0.084) 
Gay & Lesbian Political 
Power Scale 
 0.488* 
(0.198) 
0.295 
(0.220) 
0.271 
(0.217) 
0.187 
(0.222) 
Evangelical Adherence Rate   -0.005* 
(0.002) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.004† 
(0.002) 
% Population Covered    0.017** 
(0.006) 
0.022** 
(0.007) 
% Non-Zero Counts     0.011 
(0.008) 
Log-Likelihood -204.332 -201.342 -198.874 -195.565 -194.706 
N 51 
p < .01 ** p < .05 *  †p < .10 
 
 In order to assess these hypotheses interaction terms were added to the full model 
(Model 5 in Table 6.7).  The results suggest that while the effect of religious 
conservatism does not vary across levels of the gay and lesbian population, or across 
levels of gay and lesbian political power, the effect of the size of the gay and lesbian 
population does depend on the amount of gay and lesbian political power.  Specifically, 
the interaction term suggests that the effect of the gay and lesbian population will be 
attenuated by gay and lesbian political power. In other words, where there is more gay 
and lesbian political power the effect of the gay and lesbian population on hate crime will 
be reduced contrary to expectations.   
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Table 6.8: An Examination of Moderating Effects 
% Same Sex X G/L Political Power 
Intercept -1.724 
% Same Sex 0.220* 
G/L Political Power 0.278 
Interaction: % Same Sex X G/L Political Power -0.163** 
% Same Sex X Evangelical Adherence  
Intercept -1.324 
% Same Sex 0.181* 
Evangelical Adherence Rate -0.004* 
Interaction: % Same Sex X Evangelical Adherence 0.001 
G/L Political Power X Evangelical Adherence 
Intercept -1.552 
G/L Political Power 0.649 
Evangelical Adherence Rate -0.003 
Interaction: G/L Political Power X Evangelical 0.006 
p < .01 ** p < .05 * 
 
 
Why Can’t We Go Further? 
 
 When I set out to write my dissertation I wanted to examine the trends in anti-
Black, anti-Hispanic, and anti-gay/lesbian hate crime.  I encountered a number of 
problems, however, in attempting to find data to measure the terms I needed to assess the 
hypothesis that minority threat, and more specifically political threat and religious 
―threat‖, explained the trend in homophobic hate crime.  These problems were primarily 
due to the limited availability of data over time.  The limitations that I encountered will 
be addressed here, and potential solutions to those problems will be proposed. 
 First, as is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, the data on hate crime is 
limited.  There are few sources of hate crime at the macro level.  This is even truer for the 
purpose of examining sexual orientation hate crime.  Although the Uniform Crime 
Reports includes sexual orientation as a hate crime category, not all states include sexual 
orientation as a protected category in their hate crime statutes.  Indeed, as was mentioned 
in previous chapters, only about 56% of states include sexual orientation as a protected 
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category.  As a result the data on sexual orientation hate crime may be even more limited 
than other hate crime types.
31
   
 The hate crime data however was not the only dataset that proved problematic.  
Locating indicators for the political power of the gay and lesbian population as well as an 
indicator of religious conservatism also proved to be troublesome.  While visibility of 
gays and lesbians is increasing in discussions about policy, voting surveys such as the 
Current Population Survey‘s Voting and Registration Supplement that was used in the 
previous chapters, and exit polls conducted by various news organizations, do not ask 
respondents about their sexual orientation.  So there is no national estimate of the voting 
behavior of gays and lesbians.  Additionally, while there are a handful of ―out‖ political 
figures, such as Barney Frank (MA) and Tammy Baldwin (WI), there are no 
organizations that track them as there is with African-American elected officials.  As a 
result of this dearth of political information regarding gays and lesbians this analysis is 
limited to a proxy indicator, which may have limited my ability to assess the relationship 
between the political strength of the minority group and hate crime against them. 
 Likewise, finding a yearly estimate of religious conservatism proved to be 
impossible.  After contacting a handful of experts in religion (Chris Scheitle and Rodney 
Stark), I determined that there is no state level yearly estimate of religious affiliation in 
the United States.  There are many potential reasons for this lack of information.  First, 
the United States Census Bureau, which is intended to simply count the population, is 
limited in that it cannot ask respondents about their religious affiliation due to the 
separation of church and state required by the Constitution of the United States.  Second, 
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 A dummy variable was added to the full model to control for those states that include sexual orientation 
as a protected category.  The dummy measure was non-significant and did not change the results from the 
previous model.  (Results not shown.) 
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while the General Social Survey (GSS) does ask its respondents to provide their religious 
affiliation, and asks several other questions about religion, the sampling frame for the 
GSS is not designed to be valid at the state level.  Additionally, the sampling size of the 
GSS is so small in any given year that many years worth of data must be aggregated 
together in order to have a large enough sample size in the aggregate to make any 
accurate predictions.  Thus, while the GSS would provide a good measure of religious 
affiliation in a cross section at the primary sampling unit (PSU) level it cannot be used to 
look at changes from one year to the next or in state level analyses.  The data that is used 
in this analysis, drawn from the 2000 Religious Congregations and Membership Survey, 
is limited in that the survey is only conducted every ten years, similar to the census.  As a 
result, it is not even possible to estimate a yearly rate using this data after 2000 until the 
2010 data is released, which will not be until 2011 or 2012.   
Finally, in terms of limitations of the data as mentioned earlier the indicator for 
the size of the gay and lesbian population is simply a proxy indicator.  Because the 
indicator includes all two adult households in which the pair are unmarried and of the 
same-sex, it is possible that the indicator also includes college roommates or other 
relationships that may not be of a romantic nature.  As a result the reliability of the 
indicator is uncertain.   
 Given the increased focus on gay and lesbian issues in policy, and the potential 
variation in violence against gays and lesbians there is a need for data to further assess 
explanations for this variation.  Given that politics in particular seems to play a role in 
explaining the similar variation in anti-Black hate crime, there is a need for better sources 
of data on the levels of participation by gays and lesbians in the political procedures of 
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the country as both politicians and voters.  Potential avenues for this type of data 
collection would be in the collection of information on the sexual orientation of 
respondents in voting polls, such as exit polls.    
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter sets out to extend the minority threat framework, traditionally 
applied to racial and ethnic minority groups, to explain trends in anti-sexual orientation 
hate crime.  Looking at the trends in anti-sexual orientation hate crime over the past ten 
years, it seems there is variation in sexual orientation hate crime across states that should 
be explained in order to better assess the problem and provide policies and programs to 
control the problem of hate crime.  Due to data limitations this analysis was limited to 
descriptive and exploratory analyses of the panel data and a cross-sectional examination 
of the relationship between politics, religion and hate crime.   
 It is proposed that minority threat should be extended to include religious 
conservatives as a potential group that may feel threatened by the gay and lesbian 
minority population.  Specifically, it is proposed that those religious groups that believe 
in the literal interpretation of the Bible and who are strongly attached to their religious 
faith will be more adverse to the continued attention paid to and ―lifestyles‖ of gays and 
lesbians, and may use mechanisms of informal social control, such as hate crime, in an 
effort to control, or put back in their place, the minority group.  
However, an examination of the relationship between religious conservatism and 
sexual orientation hate crime indicates that there may actually be an inverse relationship 
between the two.  Because this was a cross-sectional analysis three potential explanations 
exist for this negative relationship.  First, it is possible that because religion also holds 
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values such as tolerance and pacifism those areas that are more religious will have fewer 
hate crimes.  Second, it is possible that areas that are more religiously conservative will 
be less likely to conform to laws they perceive to be providing special protections to 
those groups that they perceive as being unworthy of those protections and thus will 
report fewer hate crimes.  Finally, because the analysis was unable to untangle the 
temporal ordering of these events, perhaps gays and lesbians are less likely to live in 
areas that are religiously conservative and as a result there are fewer potential victims and 
thus fewer victimizations.  Future research is needed to disentangle this relationship.   
A second hypothesis that was proposed is that consistent with the predictions of 
the minority threat framework there should be a positive relationship between the 
political strength of the gay and lesbian community and anti-sexual orientation hate 
crime.  The results suggest that this is the case, both in cross-section and in the panel 
data, but that this relationship may be mediated by religious conservatism.   
Overall, the results of the analysis in this chapter suggest a need for an increase in 
research on sexual orientation hate crime. However, until better data become available for 
the examination of these trends the research community may have to wait.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
WHAT WE KNOW, WHAT WE DON’T, AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE 
 
Introduction 
 
 Hate crime has been at the forefront of policy debates on minority issues for two 
and a half decades.  But the majority of hate crime research up to this point has been 
focused on the individual victims and offenders, with a small number of studies 
examining the incident characteristics and still fewer on the prevalence of hate crime in 
various jurisdictions.  While these macro level studies of hate crime have suggested many 
possible explanations for why one neighborhood may have more hate crime than another, 
these studies have been limited to single jurisdictions.  This limitation has been primarily 
due to concerns over differences in reporting and definition across different jurisdictions. 
 One explanation that has been used in research on the treatment, and more 
accurately the mistreatment, of minority groups has been Blalock‘s minority threat 
framework.  In its simplest form the minority threat framework suggests that an increase 
in the size of the minority group should result in an increase in the discrimination and 
social control of that minority group (Blalock, 1967).  Blalock proposed two mechanisms 
of threat.  First, political threat suggests that where the minority group is more politically 
powerful there will be more discrimination or social control of the minority group.  
Second, the economic threat hypothesis suggests that an increase in competition between 
the minority and majority group will result in more discrimination or social control of the 
minority group.  Blalock also suggests that politics and economic competition should 
mediate the relationship between the size of the minority population and discrimination 
or social control.   
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 Hate crime, like lynching, is a mechanism of informal social control.  One goal of 
hate crime is to control minority groups, and to protect scarce resources (King et al., 
2009).  Research suggests that social control varies across place.  Thus, it is likely that 
hate crime varies across place.  Additionally, social control, and crime for that matter, 
varies across time.  As such the purpose of this study was to propose a possible 
explanation for the variation in hate crime across time and place.   
What We Know 
 
 Research on hate crime has focused on the individual and incident level.  
However, there have been a handful of studies examining hate crime at the macro level.  
Specifically, studies in New York City (Green & Rich, 1998; Green et al., 1998a; Green 
et al., 1998b; Green et al., 2001) and Chicago (Lyons, 2007; Lyons, 2008) suggest that 
demographic changes are related to hate crime.  By controlling for possible correlates of 
hate crime reporting, this study attempts to build on this prior research by examining the 
macro level context of hate crime within and between states from 2000 to 2007.  
 Prior research has focused on within jurisdictional variation in primarily racial 
hate crime incidents.  These studies have found that demographic shifts over time 
contribute to increases in hate crime, and that neighborhoods that are more affluent have 
more hate crime than disadvantage neighborhoods (Lyons, 2008).  Due to strong criticism 
of hate crime research on the basis of differential reporting and differences in the 
definition of hate crime across jurisdictions (McDevitt et al., 2003), these studies have 
been limited to single jurisdictions, and thus are not easily generalizable to the broader 
hate crime spectrum.  We do not know for instance if the mechanisms that shape hate 
crime in Chicago and New York City will be the same as those that shape hate crime in 
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Los Angeles and Salt Lake City.  Additionally, because hate crime is a rare event, at least 
when measured using official crime statistics, the ability of these studies to look at non-
racial hate crime is limited.  Racially motivated hate crime make up between 50 and 60 
percent of the annual reported hate crimes (FBI, 2004), and as such in a single 
jurisdiction there are more anti-racial incidents to be counted.    
 The current study attempted to build on this prior research by examining a large 
number of jurisdictions, multiple types of hate crime, and by controlling for potential 
correlates of hate crime reporting and the differential definitions of hate crime.  The study 
suggests some similarities across the different types of hate crime, but also some 
differences in the explanations for the different patterns and trends.   
 First, in two of the analyses, the anti-Black and anti-Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual, and a 
similarity that stands out as the most interesting is the finding that the political power of 
the minority group is related to the prevalence of hate crime.  However, despite the robust 
relationship between political strength and hate crime the implications of these 
relationships are different for each of the analyses.  The political strength of the African-
American community reduces hate crime victimization in that group as it increases.  
More specifically, at least for the African-American community, it seems likely that the 
more visible the community is in the political arena the less hate crime they experience.  
This suggests that perhaps it is the contact, even if it is through some secondary source, 
with a minority group member that reduces stereotypes and thus prejudices, rather than 
the simple strength of the minority group that matters as the contact hypothesis would 
suggest.  It is possible that the same is true for the Hispanic population.  That is it is 
possible that the more visible Hispanics are in the political arena, the less prejudice there 
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will be against them and thus the fewer hate crimes, but the data was not available to 
examine this possibility.   
 The results of the gay and lesbian analysis suggest a different picture.  Where the 
gay and lesbian population has more civil rights protection, and thus more political 
strength, they are victimized more often.  However, Blalock‘s minority threat framework 
suggests that at a certain point the minority group will become strong enough to decrease 
their risk of victimization.  Thus, it is possible that the African-American population may 
have reached the point where they can exert enough power to reduce their victimization, 
but the gay and lesbian population has not yet reached that point.   
 The second consistent relationship in all three analyses is a significant 
relationship between the minority threat indicator and hate crime.  However, again the 
implications of these relationships are different.  Specifically, where there are more 
blacks relative to whites and where there are more Hispanics in general there is less anti-
black or anti-Hispanic hate crime respectively.  This is inconsistent with the predictions 
of the minority threat framework; however, given that Blalock suggested that there would 
be a point in which the minority group became large enough that they could reduce their 
victimization; it is possible that this relationship is consistent with minority threat.  In 
order to examine this relationship the curvilinear relationships were assessed.  The 
curvilinear effect was significant for the anti-Black analysis, it was also positive 
suggesting that as the size of the black population increases relative to whites the number 
of anti-black hate crimes decreases at a progressively faster rate.  This would be 
consistent with the minority threat suggestion that when blacks are strong enough they 
may be able to reduce their victimization.   
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Finally, as for gay and lesbian hate crime, as the size of the gay and lesbian 
population increases there is more anti-gay/lesbian hate crime on average.  This is 
consistent with the predictions of the minority threat framework, but inconsistent with the 
findings from the other two analyses.  It is possible that unlike the Black and Hispanic 
populations, the gay and lesbian population has not reached the point where they are able 
to reduce their level of victimization.   
 Third, Blalock did not specify the best measure of economic competition.  
Research on minority threat has used various indicators of minority group and majority 
group economic status and various indicators of the competition between the minority 
and majority group, and it is not unusual for these indicators to provide different pictures 
of the relationship between economic competition and social control.  The results of the 
analyses of anti-Black and anti-Hispanic hate crime in this study are no exception. 
Indeed, unemployment does not seem to be the best indicator of threat between the 
minority and majority groups in this study.  Instead, it appears that competition between 
groups based on income is a better indicator of economic competition.  For the anti-Black 
analysis the ratio of black to white unemployment is not significant, however, the ratio of 
black to white per capita income is significant and positive, consistent with the economic 
threat hypothesis.  In other words, where blacks make more on average relative to whites 
there is more anti-Black hate crime.  Additionally, including the income term in the 
model drops the ratio of blacks to whites in the population to non-significance.  This has 
implications for research on hate crime, but also for the incorporation of research on 
income inequality and affirmative action policies into hate crime research.  These 
implications are discussed shortly.  
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 Fourth, the minority threat perspective proposes that the relationship between the 
relative size of the minority population and hate crime should be mediated by political 
and economic threat.  This hypothesis overall is not supported, however, as mentioned 
the minority threat indicator is non-significant when the black to white income ratio is 
controlled.  Some researchers have suggested that it is not a mediating relationship, but 
instead a moderating relationship.  In other words, politics and economics do not explain 
the relationship between minority group size and hate crime, but instead the effect of 
minority group size on hate crime depends on levels of political power or economic 
competition.  An examination of this moderating relationship, however, did not support 
this hypothesis.   
 Fifth, as mentioned, one of the primary reasons that prior research has been 
limited to single jurisdictions is due to reporting differences.  Research on the reporting 
of hate crime suggests some potential correlates of hate crime reporting that may explain 
some of the variation within and between jurisdictions.  Thus, in order to separate out the 
effects of reporting from the actual level of prevalence it is necessary to control for these 
reporting differences.  Controlling for some of these potential correlates some of the 
relationships change, however, some remain the same.  For instance, once reporting is 
controlled the ratio of blacks to whites in the population is no longer significant.  
However, after controlling for reporting the effect of the size of the Hispanic population 
on Hispanic hate crime is still significant, even controlling for the different definitions of 
hate crime across states.   The political threat term for the black analysis remains 
significant even after controlling for reporting.  The relationships for gay/lesbian hate 
crime hold up when controlling for reporting.   
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 Finally, the gay and lesbian hate crime analysis includes an additional hypothesis, 
that gay and lesbian hate crime will be more prevalent in areas where there are more 
religious conservatives.  However, the results indicate that there is an inverse relationship 
between the evangelical adherence rate and anti-gay and lesbian hate crime.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 6, it is possible that because Christianity holds the values of 
pacifism and tolerance where they comprise more of the population there will be less hate 
crime.  An alternative explanation is that where more of the population holds the values 
of conservative Christianity they will be less likely to take seriously those laws that may 
protect groups they see as unworthy and as such will report less anti-gay and lesbian hate 
crime.    
What We Don’t Know 
 
 As with any study on hate crime there are some limitations that are important to 
consider.  The primary one deals with the hate crime data.  The Uniform Crime Reports 
data is inherently limited, because it is official crime data.  In other words, it relies on the 
reporting of crime (Gove, Hughes, & Geerken, 1985).  Research suggests that a large 
number of crimes go unreported (Myers, 1980), and so they are an undercount of crime.  
However, the UCR is the only national level hate crime data collection that allows for the 
examination of hate crime across multiple jurisdictions over time.  One alternative would 
be to use the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) to examine these 
relationships, but the NCVS did not begin collecting hate crime data until 2000 (Harlow, 
2005) and the data is still somewhat uncertain in that it relies on the victim‘s perception 
of the offender‘s motivation. 
Stacey, Michele, 2010, UMSL, p. 163 
 
 Additionally, even controlling for reporting, the use of official crime statistics 
means that it is reported hate crime.  This requires that the victim reports the crime, the 
police recognize and record the crime as a hate crime, and finally the police report the 
crime as a hate crime to the UCR program.  Given the fact that the reporting controls 
were consistently related to hate crime in all three analyses, it is possible that much of the 
trend in hate crime is still simply due to reporting practices, and that much of the 
variation across place is due to differences in those reporting practices.   
 In addition to problems in the measurement of hate crime, the ability to measure 
some of the concepts in the minority threat framework was limited.  In particular, for the 
purpose of the gay and lesbian analysis the measurement of the minority group political 
power and religious conservatism was difficult.  This required the use of proxy measures, 
and the limitation of the analysis to a cross-section.  While this analysis suggests that 
minority threat may explain anti-gay/lesbian hate crime, until researchers are better able 
to measure the concepts in the minority threat framework in relation to this minority 
population the examination of trends in this type of crime is limited.  
 Finally, the analysis was limited to the state as the level of analysis.  For the 
purpose of informing policy the state is an appropriate level of analysis given that 
policies are made at the state level.  The state decides how to define hate crime, and much 
of the hate crime reporting is done through a state agency, but the enforcement of the 
laws occurs at the individual agency, or municipal level.  States are highly heterogeneous 
areas which often have a combination of large cities and small towns.  Research has not 
yet determined to what degree hate crime may be different between a rural and an urban 
area.  Thus, it may be that aggregating the hate crime data to the state level has limited 
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the ability of the analysis to detect the relationships proposed by the minority threat 
framework.  However, while controlling for the percent of the state‘s population residing 
in cities over 100,000 population several relationships remain significant.  The question 
remains, however, as to whether these relationships will hold up at lower levels of 
aggregation. 
 Additionally, the data was limited to a relatively small period of time, 2000-2007, 
and as such the results may have differed had the time frame been extended or a different 
time frame been used.  For instance, there was a relatively small change in the 
immigration rate during this time period, but at other times in United States history there 
were dramatic shifts in immigration.   
Where Do We Go From Here? 
 
 The results of this study suggest a number of implications for research and policy.  
First, there are several suggestions for future research.  The most important one is for this 
study to be replicated at lower levels of aggregation.  Specifically, future research should 
examine the relationships seen here at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), the 
county, and the city levels.  Replication at these lower levels of analysis, but still across 
jurisdiction, will provide researchers a better idea of what specifically it is about the place 
that shapes the macro level context of hate crime.   
 Additionally, the results of the income ratio suggest that this may be the best 
indicator of economic competition.  This suggests that research conducted on income 
inequality that suggests disparities in income between different racial and ethnic groups 
(Darity & Mason, 1998) has important implications for hate crime victimization.  
Specifically, this research may provide greater insight into the mechanisms of economic 
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competition that explain the context of hate crime victimization.  Additionally, research 
which addresses affirmative action policies, and opinions about those policies, should be 
incorporated into the hate crime research canon.  Much of this research suggests biases in 
relation to the use of affirmative action policies (Fine, 1992), and as such those things 
which are related to negative opinions of affirmative action may also be related to hate 
crime.   
 Overall this research suggests that the macro level is an important area of study in 
hate crime research.  As such this study should be extended to other hate crime types 
including religious hate crime.  Additionally, macro level research on hate crime may 
benefit from a comparison of states over time that report consistently to the hate crime 
program such that the reporting practices can be better controlled.  Finally, specifically 
for the examination of the trend in gay and lesbian hate crime this research suggests a 
need for better measures for the examination of the possible correlates of this type of hate 
crime, but more importantly there simply needs to be more research on this type of hate 
crime at the macro level.   
 In addition to the implications for research, this study also provides several 
implications for the development of hate crime policy.   Given the consistent finding that 
reporting drives much of the trend in all three types of hate crime; it seems the best place 
at this point to focus policy attention is on the increase in reporting of hate crime.  This 
should be done both in the encouraging of reporting of these types of incidents by the 
victims to the police, but also in the reporting of the incidents to the UCR program.  
Research at the individual level suggests that victims do not report hate crimes for many 
reasons, some of which are similar to other crimes, and others that are unique to hate 
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crime victimization (Harlow, 2005). For instance, research suggests that hate crime 
victims may believe that the police will not take hate crime seriously and thus they will 
not report their victimization (Harlow, 2005).  Additionally, research suggests that blacks 
are more distrustful of the police than are whites (Brunson, 2007), and as such may be 
less likely to go to the police for help.  Also, for gay and lesbian victims going to the 
police may result in ―secondary victimization‖ due to the biases of the police officers 
who may further victimize the gay or lesbian person, but also because admitting that they 
are the victim of an anti-gay/lesbian hate crime may require them to ―come out‖ as being 
gay or lesbian.  This coming out may result in further victimization or discrimination by 
people they know, even their family (Garnets, Herek, & Levy, 1992).  Finally, for 
immigrant groups, there may be a fear of deportation which may lead to underreporting 
of this type of hate crime (Kittrie, 2006).  Thus, given the fear of mistreatment by the 
police, officers should be trained to deal with these types of victims and the delicate 
issues surrounding their victimization. 
 Another policy implication comes from the somewhat consistent finding of a 
relationship between the minority groups‘ political strength and hate crime.  In particular, 
programs to encourage the participation of minority groups in the political process, 
including the increased visibility of minority politicians, could potentially decrease hate 
crime, although the possibility exists that victimization will increase until the minority 
group becomes powerful enough.  That is, consistent with the results of the gay and 
lesbian analysis, while the minority group is growing in strength they will be more 
threatening to the majority and will experience more victimization.   
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 Finally, the differential definition of hate crime is not significantly related to anti-
black hate crime; however, it is related to anti-Hispanic hate crime. Race and ethnicity (or 
national origin) are consistently protected categories in the majority of hate crime laws.  
However, it appears that the broader definitions of hate crime lend themselves to the 
identification of more hate crimes in the state.  This is to be expected, however, it 
suggests a possible implication for hate crime policy.  Specifically, an important step may 
be to develop a universal definition of hate crime.  This would limit the differences across 
jurisdictions and may result in better comparisons across those jurisdictions.  The first 
step in this process of developing a universal definition of hate crime occurred in October 
of 2009, with the passage of the Matthew Shepard Act.  This act now allows the federal 
government to intercede in the investigation of a hate crime in a jurisdiction that does not 
have the resources or experience to investigate these types of crimes.   
Conclusion 
 
The United States is often referred to as a melting pot.  It has long been a place in 
which many cultures come together under the same legal system.  However, those 
differences have long been a source of contention in the country.  Beginning with the 
lynchings in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, race has been at the forefront of the tensions 
between the different groups, with ethnicity a close second.  The differences that divide 
the population into groups have continued to be the motivation for discrimination and 
violence.  The latest manifestation of that discrimination and violence is hate crime.  
Early research on hate crime focused on the individual level, however, in the past decade 
a handful of researchers have turned toward macro level studies of hate crime.  These 
studies have been limited to single jurisdictions due to concerns over the differences in 
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reporting and definition across jurisdictions.  This dissertation attempts to build on these 
prior studies by controlling for correlates of reporting in an effort to examine trends in 
hate crime within and between jurisdictions. 
The results show that demographic changes and other state structural 
characteristics are related to changes in hate crime.  However, it appears that reporting is 
still a primary driving force behind these trends.  These demographic changes and 
reporting influence the various types of hate crime differently.  The dissertation suggests 
a need for better reporting and a more consistent definition of hate crime across 
jurisdictions.  Overall, this dissertation suggests that the explanation for changes in hate 
crime may not be a simple one, and that further research is needed to fully understand the 
processes that lead to differences within and between jurisdictions, and across bias 
motivation.  This dissertation is only one step in gaining that understanding. 
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Appendix A: Additional Tables 
 
Table A.1: Bivariate Correlation Matrix: Anti-Black 
 
Anti-Black 
Hate Crime 
Counts 
B/W 
Ratio 
W/B 
Unem 
% Black 
Legislators 
% 
Black 
Voters 
Anti-Black Hate Crime Counts 1 
    % Black/% White 0.085 1 
   White/Black Unemployed 0.05 0.107 1 
  % African-American Legislators 0.189 0.857 0.006 1 
 % Black Voters 0.159 0.214 0.106 0.256 1 
Total Poverty -0.104 0.339 -0.024 0.344 0.001 
% Young White Males -0.189 0.069 0.292 -0.205 0.064 
West 0.043 -0.364 0.007 -0.411 -0.162 
South -0.095 0.66 0.037 0.587 0.075 
% Urban 0.272 -0.04 0.071 0.041 -0.014 
Aggravated Assault Rate 0.151 0.425 0.124 0.403 0.166 
% Population Covered 0.264 -0.258 -0.006 -0.302 -0.018 
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros 0.226 -0.092 0.044 -0.045 0.144 
Police per Capita 0.335 0.419 0.038 0.472 0.079 
% Bias Unit 0.425 0.230 0.132 0.129 0.060 
% Community Policing 0.143 0.199 0.452 0.086 0.006 
2000 0.023 0.072 0.807 -0.009 0.137 
2002 -0.013 0.073 -0.164 0.01 -0.134 
2003 -0.008 0.078 -0.167 0.01 -0.134 
2004 0.009 0.084 -0.174 0.01 0.244 
2005 0.005 -0.135 -0.174 -0.003 0.237 
2006 0.005 -0.129 -0.167 -0.003 -0.21 
2007 0.007 -0.128 -0.154 -0.003 -0.21 
Black Population 0.458 0.694 0.098 0.682 0.23 
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Table A.1: Bivariate Correlation Matrix: Anti-Black cont. 
 Total Pov % YWM West South State 
Hetero 
Agg 
Asslt 
% Pop 
Cov. 
Total Poverty 1       
% Young White Males -0.095 1      
West -0.032 0.037 1     
South 0.516 -0.093 -0.407 1    
% Urban 0.02 -0.137 0.385 -0.203 1   
Aggravated Assault 
Rate 
0.322 -0.177 0.048 0.424 0.279 1  
% Population Covered -0.177 -0.002 -0.031 -0.073 -0.017 0.012 1 
% Agencies Reporting 
Non-Zeros 
-0.235 -0.026 -0.051 -0.185 -0.135 0.004 -0.150 
Police per Capita 0.022 -0.252 0.049 0.176 0.553 0.465 -0.033 
% Bias Unit -0.002 -0.121 -0.011 0.078 0.275 0.236 0.207 
% Community Policing 0.006 0.033 -0.153 0.113 0.248 0.261 -0.114 
2000 -0.058 0.281 -0.013 0.005 0.004 0.039 0.003 
2002 -0.034 0.212 -0.013 0.005 0.002 0.018 0.025 
2003 -0.009 0.229 -0.013 0.005 -0.004 -0.008 -0.027 
2004 0.035 0.241 -0.013 0.005 -0.007 -0.015 0.052 
2005 0.046 -0.423 -0.008 -0.006 -0.004 0.003 0.046 
2006 0.042 -0.365 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 0.003 0.053 
2007 0.009 -0.364 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 0.003 0.073 
Black Population 0.199 -0.012 -0.316 0.403 0.198 0.37 -0.071 
 
Table A.1: Bivariate Correlation Matrix: Anti-Black cont. 
 
% Non-0 
Pol per 
Cap 
% Bias 
Unit 
Comm. 
Pol 2000 2002 2003 
% Agencies Reporting 
Non-Zeros 1       
Police per Capita 0.129 1      
% Bias Unit 0.166 0.428 1     
% Community Policing 0.120 0.328 0.420 1    
2000 0.049 -0.010 0.061 0.341 1   
2002 -0.023 0.008 0.072 0.372 -0.14 1  
2003 0.071 0.005 -0.056 -0.266 -0.14 -0.14 1 
2004 -0.011 0.001 -0.050 -0.258 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 
2005 -0.001 0.002 -0.035 -0.244 -0.138 -0.138 -0.138 
2006 -0.006 -0.028 -0.024 -0.227 -0.138 -0.138 -0.138 
2007 -0.032 -0.031 -0.008 -0.192 -0.138 -0.138 -0.138 
Black Population 0.006 0.549 0.253 0.198 0.07 0.064 0.07 
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Table A.1: Bivariate Correlations Matrix: Anti-Black cont. 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 Black pop 
2004 1     
2005 -0.138 1    
2006 -0.138 -0.136 1   
2007 -0.138 -0.136 -0.136 1  
Black Population 0.075 -0.108 -0.097 -0.096 1 
 
Table A.2: Bivariate Correlations Matrix: Anti-Hispanic 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime 
Counts 1 
     Hispanic Immigration Rate 0.04 1 
    % Hispanic 0.51 0.01 1 
   Hispanic/White Unemployment 0.08 0.04 0.16 1 
  Hispanic/Black Unemployment 0.16 0.05 0.33 0.48 1 
 % Hispanic Voters -0.07 0.07 0.02 -0.13 -0.14 1 
Total Poverty -0.02 -0.09 0.15 -0.09 0.05 -0.1 
% Young White Males -0.16 -0.15 -0.28 0.12 -0.14 0.04 
West 0.25 0 0.45 0.01 -0.03 0.1 
South -0.15 -0.17 -0.14 -0.12 0 -0.24 
% Urban 0.27 0.06 0.50 0.22 0.23 -0.13 
Aggravated Assault Rate 0.08 -0.06 0.30 0.14 0.23 -0.1 
% Population Covered 0.21 0.09 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.03 
% Agencies Reporting Non-
Zeros 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.02 
Police per Capita 0.14 -0.03 0.29 0.15 0.14 -0.05 
% Bias Unit 0.22 0.1 0.22 0.09 0.11 -0.09 
% Community Policing 0.13 0.01 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.01 
2000 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.07 -0.08 0.01 
2002 -0.01 0.08 -0.02 0.08 0.08 -0.08 
2003 -0.03 -0.25 -0.01 0.08 0.08 -0.08 
2004 -0.01 -0.12 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.12 
2005 0 0.1 0.02 -0.09 -0.05 0.12 
2006 0.02 0.16 0.04 -0.11 -0.01 -0.15 
2007 0.03 0.07 0.04 -0.12 0.06 -0.14 
Hispanic Population 0.83 0.02 0.67 0.07 0.16 -0.02 
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Table A.2: Bivariate Correlation Matrix: Anti-Hispanic cont. 
 
7 8 9 10 11 12 
Total Poverty 1 
     % Young White Males -0.09 1 
    West -0.05 0.03 1 
   South 0.54 -0.09 -0.41 1 
  % Urban 0.18 -0.1 0.27 -0.04 1 
 Aggravated Assault Rate 0.41 -0.13 0 0.46 0.48 1 
% Population Covered -0.14 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 0.05 0.06 
% Agencies Reporting Non-
Zeros -0.14 0 0.09 -0.1 0.43 0.35 
Police per Capita 0.22 -0.15 -0.02 0.27 0.73 0.63 
% Bias Unit 0.16 -0.07 -0.01 0.23 0.61 0.56 
% Community Policing -0.03 0.19 0.12 0.05 0.35 0.27 
2000 -0.05 0.29 -0.01 0.01 0 0.03 
2002 -0.03 0.21 -0.01 0.01 0 0.02 
2003 0 0.22 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
2004 0.02 0.23 -0.02 0 0.01 -0.01 
2005 0.05 -0.42 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0 
2006 0.05 -0.37 0 0 0 0.01 
2007 0.01 -0.36 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Hispanic Population 0.11 -0.22 0.16 0 0.31 0.15 
 
Table A.2: Bivariate Correlation Matrix: Anti-Hispanic cont. 
 
13 14 15 16 17 18 
% Population Covered 1 
     % Agencies Reporting Non-
Zeros -0.08 1 
    Police per Capita 0.05 0.43 1 
   % Bias Unit 0.2 0.48 0.415 1 
  % Community Policing -0.08 0.24 0.433 0.84 1 
 2000 0 0.04 -0.01 0.094 0.224 1 
2002 0.03 -0.02 0.008 0.094 0.224 -0.14 
2003 -0.02 0.06 0.005 -0.049 -0.125 -0.14 
2004 0.04 -0.01 0.001 -0.049 -0.125 -0.14 
2005 0.05 0 0.002 -0.044 -0.121 -0.138 
2006 0.05 0 -0.028 -0.044 -0.121 -0.138 
2007 0.07 -0.03 -0.031 -0.044 -0.121 -0.138 
Hispanic Population 0.14 0.06 0.21 0.18 0.12 -0.12 
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Table A.2: Bivariate Correlation Matrix: Anti-Hispanic cont. 
 
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
2002 1 
      2003 -0.14 1 
     2004 -0.14 -0.14 1 
    2005 -0.138 -0.138 -0.138 1 
   2006 -0.138 -0.138 -0.138 -0.136 1 
  2007 -0.138 -0.138 -0.138 -0.136 -0.136 1 
 Hispanic 
Population -0.01 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 1 
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Appendix B: Coding the State Statutes: Examples 
 
California Penal Code Section 422.6 is an example of a hate crime statute: 
―No person, whether or not acting under color of law, shall by force or threat of 
force, willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or threaten any other 
person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege (civil rights 
statute=1) secure to him or her by the Constitution or laws of this state or by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States in whole or in part because of one or 
more of the actual or perceived (perception clause=1) characteristics of the 
victim‖. 
Likewise, Section 422.55 defines hate crime as: 
―a criminal act committed, in whole or in part, because of (bias statute=1) one or 
more of the following actual or perceived characteristics of the victim: 
(1) Disability. (disability=1) 
(2) Gender. 
(3) Nationality. 
(4) Race or ethnicity. 
(5) Religion. 
(6) Sexual orientation. (sexual orientation=1) 
(7) Association with a person or group with one or more of these actual 
or perceived characteristics.‖ 
As such the California State Statute is coded as having a perception clause, including 
both disability and sexual orientation as protected groups, and as a bias statute as opposed 
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to a hate statute.  Additionally, the California statute is an example of a civil rights 
statute. 
 The Arizona Revised Statute section 41-1750 calls for the maintenance and 
collection of crime statistics which include ―criminal offenses that manifest evidence of 
prejudice based on race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, gender or 
disability‖, (reporting statute=1) but does not include a similar criminal statute.  On the 
other hand, Colorado Revised Statute Title 18-9-121 defines ethnic intimidation and 
states that ―the advocacy of unlawful acts against persons and groups because of a 
person‘s or group‘s race, color, ancestry, religion, or national origin, for the purpose of 
inciting and provoking bodily injury or damage to property, poses a threat to public order 
and safety and should be the subject of criminal sanctions‖, (criminal statute=1) but does 
not include a similar reporting statute.  Florida‘s ―Hate Crimes Reporting Act‖ (Florida 
Statute 877.19) requires the Governor to ―collect and disseminate data on incidents of 
criminal acts that evidence prejudice based on race, religion, ethnicity, color, ancestry, 
sexual orientation, or national origin‖ and section 775.085 reclassifies a crime ―if the 
commission of such felony or misdemeanor evidences prejudice based on the race, color, 
ancestry, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, mental or physical 
disability, or advanced age of the victim‖ (both reporting and criminal statute=1).   
 Unlike the California statute which is a bias statute, the Illinois hate crime statute 
which defines hate crime is a hate statute.  Specifically, the Illinois statute 5/12-7.1 
defines a hate crime ―when, by reason of the actual or perceived race, color, creed, 
religion, ancestry, gender, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability, or national 
Stacey, Michele, 2010, UMSL, p. 188 
 
origin of another individual or group of individuals, regardless of the existence of any 
other motivating factor or factors a person (commits a criminal offense)‖(bias statute=0).   
 Idaho‘s hate crime statute (section 18-7902) defines malicious harassment as 
crimes in which ―any person, maliciously and with the specific intent to intimidate or 
harass another person because of that person‘s race, color, religion, ancestry, or national 
origin, (commits a criminal offense)‖ as a ―freestanding‖ statute (freestanding statute=1).  
Minnesota on the other hand, attaches harassment as a crime for those offenses 
committed ―because of the victim‘s or another‘s actual or perceived race, color, religion, 
sex, sexual orientation, disability…, age, or national origin‖ (section 609.749) and as 
such is a ―coattailing‖ statute (coattailing statute=1).   
 An example of a modifying statute is Kansas‘s section 21-4716, which adds hate 
as an aggravating factor to its sentencing laws.  Specifically it defines hate crime when 
―the offense was motivated entirely or in part by the race, color, religion, ethnicity, 
national origin or sexual orientation of the victim or the offense was motivated by the 
defendant‘s belief or perception, entirely or in part, of the race, color, religion, ethnicity, 
national origin or sexual orientation of the victim whether or not the defendant‘s belief or 
perception was correct.‖ (modifying statute=1)     
 Finally, an example of a penalty enhancement statute is Vermont‘s section 13-
1455, which defines hate crime and lists a series of enhancement‘s, including that ―if the 
maximum penalty for the underlying crime is one year or less, the penalty for a violation 
of this section shall be imprisonment for not more than two years or a fine of not more 
than $2,000.00, or both‖.  (penalty enhancement statute=1) 
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Appendix C: Regression of the Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Count on Predictors, 2000-
2007: Including the Temporal Lag 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) 
Intercept -12.872** -12.185** -12.112** -11.930** -12.011** 
(1.797) (1.646) (1.633) (1.630) (1.648) 
Hisp Imm Rate 0.095 0.153 0.152 0.159 0.160 
(0.153) (0.147) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) 
1 Yr. Lagged Imm Rate 0.146     
(0.147)     
% Hispanic -0.058** -0.045 -0.057** -0.059** -0.056** 
 (0.013) (0.245) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
1 Yr. Lagged % Hisp  -0.120    
  (0.248)    
Hisp/Wh Unemployed -0.263 -0.226 -0.211 -0.212 -0.240 
(0.148) (0.150) (0.153) (0.149) (0.152) 
1 yr. Lagged H/W Unem   -0.069   
  (0.140)   
Hisp/Black Unemployed 0.073 0.082 0.084 0.173 0.093 
(0.230) (0.231) (0.232) (0.232) (0.232) 
1 yr. Lagged H/B Unem    -0.521  
   (0.282)  
% Hispanic Voters -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 0.015 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) 
1 yr. Lagged Hisp. Voters     -0.026 
    (0.016) 
Total Poverty -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 -0.020 -0.019 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) 
% White Males, 18-29 0.047 0.048 0.049 0.020 0.042 
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087) 
West 0.124 0.148 0.129 0.087 0.123 
(0.252) (0.250) (0.252) (0.253) (0.255) 
South -0.397 -0.384 -0.395 -0.392 -0.416 
(0.267) (0.265) (0.266) (0.267) (0.270) 
State Hetero 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.010 0.007 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) 
Aggravated Assault  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Pop Covered 0.024** 0.023** 0.023** 0.024** 0.023** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% Report Non-Zeros 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) 
Police per Capita -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Bias Unit 0.019* 0.020* 0.020* 0.020* 0.021* 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
% Comm Pol -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 -0.013* 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
2002 -0.065 -0.027 -0.025 0.031 0.080 
 (0.216) (0.219) (0.219) (0.219) (0.221) 
2003 -0.332 -0.322 -0.313 -0.127 -0.399 
 (0.366) (0.372) (0.366) (0.377) (0.273) 
2004 -0.305 -0.366 -0.351 -0.171 -0.562 
 (0.356) (0.351) (0.351) (0.364) (0.373) 
2005 -0.035 -0.068 -0.054 -0.043 -0.130 
 (0.520) (0.519) (0.518) (0.516) (0.526) 
2006 -0.144 -0.161 -0.155 -0.121 -0.120 
 (0.505) (0.507) (0.504) (0.503) (0.511) 
2007 -0.112 -0.094 -0.099 -0.068 -0.199 
 (0.495) (0.496) (0.494) (0.492) (0.504) 
Exposure:      
Hispanic Population --- --- --- --- --- 
Wald χ2 129.52 128.20 127.95 129.78 125.73 
Obs 341 336 336 336 336 
Groups 49 48 48 48 48 
p < .01 ** p < .05 * 
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Appendix D: Testing the Fragility of the Immigration Term (Models based on Table 5.3) 
       Model 1: Baseline 
(Immigration and Year 
Dummies) 00-07 w/o % Hisp 00-07 2% Sample 00-07 w/% Hisp 00-04 w/o % Hisp 00-04 2% Sample 00-04 w/ % Hisp 
       Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Total 
Persons 
-0.174** -0.210* 0.147 -0.132 -0.169 0.154 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Hispanic 
Persons 
0.202 0.222 0.237* 0.206 0.120 0.225 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Hispanic 
Foreign Born Persons 
0.284* 0.096 0.263* 0.351* 0.156 0.315* 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Total 
Foreign Born Persons 
-0.040 -0.089 0.162 -0.019 -0.085 0.146 
       Model 2: Economic 
Threat Model 00-07 w/o % Hisp 00-07 2% Sample 00-07 w/% Hisp 00-04 w/o % Hisp 00-04 2% Sample 00-04 w/ % Hisp 
       Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Total 
Persons 
-0.168* -0.210* 0.161 -0.135 -0.186 0.160 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Hispanic 
Persons 
0.215 0.219 0.241* 0.212 0.099 0.223 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Hispanic 
Foreign Born Persons 
0.126 0.086 0.260* 0.358* 0.129 0.323* 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Total 
Foreign Born Persons 
-0.029 -0.082 0.167 -0.013 -0.086 0.149 
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Appendix D: Testing the Fragility of the Immigration Term (Models based on Table 5.3) cont. 
 
Model 3: Political 
Threat Model 00-07 w/o % Hisp 00-07 2% Sample 00-07 w/% Hisp 00-04 w/o % Hisp 00-04 2% Sample 00-04 w/ % Hisp 
       Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Total 
Persons 
-0.188** -0.230* 0.153 -0.164* -0.196 0.146 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Hispanic 
Persons 
0.207 0.173 0.233 0.202 0.053 0.210 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Hispanic 
Foreign Born Persons 
0.131 0.095 0.264* 0.367* 0.147 0.335* 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Total 
Foreign Born Persons 
-0.053 -0.167 0.159 -0.040 -0.154 0.134 
       Model 4: Controls 00-07 w/o % Hisp 00-07 2% Sample 00-07 w/% Hisp 00-04 w/o % Hisp 00-04 2% Sample 00-04 w/ % Hisp 
       Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Total 
Persons 
-0.134 -0.225* 0.102 -0.182* -0.269* 0.079 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Hispanic 
Persons 
0.212 0.136 0.264* 0.210 0.008 0.248 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Hispanic 
Foreign Born Persons 
0.083 0.006 0.213 0.287 -0.017 0.272 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Total 
Foreign Born Persons 
0.012 -0.143 0.171 -0.012 -0.242 0.154 
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Appendix D: Testing the Fragility of the Immigration Term (Models based on Table 5.3) cont. 
 
Model 5: % Urban   00-07 w/o % Hisp 00-07 2% Sample 00-07 w/% Hisp 00-04 w/o % Hisp 00-04 2% Sample 00-04 w/ % Hisp 
       Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Total 
Persons 
-0.074 -0.202 0.105 -0.124 -0.283* 0.074 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Hispanic 
Persons 
0.256* 0.178 0.268* 0.235 0.027 0.247 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Hispanic 
Foreign Born Persons 
0.086 0.029 0.212 0.279 -0.006 0.274 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Total 
Foreign Born Persons 
0.075 -0.092 0.170 0.035 -0.224 0.152 
       Model 6: Full Model 00-07 w/o % Hisp 00-07 2% Sample 00-07 w/% Hisp 00-04 w/o % Hisp 00-04 2% Sample 00-04 w/ % Hisp 
       Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Total 
Persons 
-0.163 -0.232* 0.077 -0.193 -0.276* 0.062 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Hispanic 
Persons 
0.245 0.256 0.237 0.211 0.177 0.206 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Hispanic 
Foreign Born Persons 
0.077 0.074 0.191 0.249 0.142 0.238 
Hispanic Immigration 
per 100,000 Total 
Foreign Born Persons 
0.040 0.024 0.181 0.001 -0.029 0.144 
*p<.05 **p<.01 
       
